

# THE RELEVANCE OF ART TO MASTERY



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## THE RELEVANCE OF ART TO MASTERY

We all know that Art is not Truth. Art is a lie that makes us realize Truth, at least the Truth that is given us to understand.

Pablo Picasso, 1923 (quoted in Chipp 1968, 264)

The equation of science with objective truth is deeply ingrained in contemporary thought; a symmetrical article of belief equates art with subjective escape. Little wonder that psychoanalysts from Freud on have valued the scientific aspect of their identity and downplayed the artistic. The dread of feeling at a remove from the scientific community is based largely on the perceived threat of being disconnected from objective truth and order. Worse still, perhaps, it could mean the risk of being lumped together with the other historical victims of attractive but deceptive illusions.

Science, however, brings order to only a fraction of the world. It organizes facts and, to the extent that it does, it allays anxiety regarding disorder. But art makes its own unique contribution to the truth. It has more to do with feelings about facts. And psychoanalysis?

Perhaps one might say that it is concerned primarily with facts about feelings. One thing that does seem certain is that the facile dichotomies of an earlier time do not hold. “[May] we begin to recognize that science and art are not as far apart from one another as Freud and his scientific age liked to assume? . . . Science is itself a form of reality . . . and does not not necessarily manifest the culmination of mental development or represent any absolute standard of truth, as [Freud] assumed” (Loewald 1975, 278, 291).

The same Age of Reason that produced the ban on metaphor as an obstacle to the truth sowed the seeds of doubt about such blissful simplicity. It saw the emergence of Vico (1668-1744) and the birth of an opposite current of thought. Rebellious against the all-powerful Cartesian movement, Vico held that the search for a neutral style robbed the mind of its imaginative power. Language, he maintained, shaped minds, which in turn shaped language. There is no universal speech denoting a timeless reality. The forms of speech express specific kinds of vision. He extolled the power of imaginative insight to feel and enter into other minds and situations and know them from within. He delineated this mode of understanding as distinct from a body of knowledge of facts and events. It depended on the capacity for conceiving more than one way of categorizing reality. Implicit in this, it seems to me, was the teaching of Aquinas that whatever is known is known according to the manner of the knower.

This was to be distinguished from a priori truth such as that attained in mathematical reasoning, where every step is demonstrated. A priori knowledge can extend only to what the knower himself has created (an old Augustinian proposition). Mathematical knowledge is irrefutable because man himself has created it, not-as Descartes supposed-because it represents some objective, eternal aspect of reality. The mode of understanding that Vico was adumbrating had not been sketched before. It was dependent neither on perception nor fantasy; it was neither deductive nor inductive. It depended, rather, on memory and imaginative insight. Fallible though it might be, it was a new realm of thought opposed to that of Descartes (Berlin 1980, 119).

Radical doubts about the nature of reality have never ceased to grow, while the necessity for at least the illusion of stability in the midst of flux has never begun to wane. Pascal wagered, James willed, Heidegger leaped to faith-faith in the existence of meaningfulness-to support the workings of knowledge and imagination as inseparable parts of intellectual vision. Einstein, like many creative scientists before and since, was aesthetically attached to the idea of the existence of internal harmony. Artists, whether “believers” or not, spend their lives creating it.

As disturbing questions are raised by historians, metahistorians, existentialists, relativists, perspectivists, hermeneuticists, and de-constructionists, significant changes continue to take place in our understanding of the nature of truth and of the relation between reality and imagination, objectivity and subjectivity.

A pragmatic view holds that the world consists of many “interpenetrating spheres of reality” that can be approached according to many systems of ideas-aesthetic, scientific, religious. Reality is more fluid and elusive than reason and has many dimensions. We work over the contents of the world selectively, counting and naming whatever lies upon the special lines we trace, while all the while there is an infinite chaos of relations that has not yet attracted our attention. Order and disorder are human inventions that correspond to what happens to interest or not interest us. Disorder is not the absence of order but only the disappointment of a certain expectation (James 1902).

It still remains valid, however, to make certain distinctions between art and science. Science aims at the highest order of intellectual abstraction that will cover the most nearly objective and universal generalization. It thus tends to be antipathetic to the individual, subjective, and emotional elements. These are seen as impeding the work of the intellect.

Art, on the other hand, aims at something quite different. Instead of attempting to eliminate the emotional, subjective, and individual elements, it strives for a balance between the

objective and the subjective, halfway between the intellect and emotion. While it must be unique and individual, to be sure, it must not be so removed from the general as to be uncommunicable.

As an example of art striking a balance between emotion and intellect, in contrast to science which attempts to bar the emotions, take Bach's *Art of the Fugue*, which is built according to principles of constructivism. This refers to the conception of music, handed down from medieval times, that music is a mathematical discipline-according to Leibnitz, "a secret exercise of arithmetic during which the mind is unaware that it is counting." At the same time, however, it is written in the undeviating key of D-minor around a single theme based on a minor triad with narrow intervals around it. This practically amounts to a formula for conveying pathos. Thus, the rational principle of mathematic-like constructivism is joined with highly emotional musical material to form a dynamic union between Ratio and Pathos while at the same time preserving a mutual tension between them.

To the extent that we consider psychoanalysis an art or a science we expect different things of it, and this also influences the way it is practiced. For example, the famous "blank screen" approach was based on the scientific metaphor of aseptic technique and the concern with "contaminating" the growth of a pure culture of transference neurosis. Whether "true" transference neurosis exists at all, let alone as a necessary outgrowth of the unfolding of psychoanalytic treatment, is questioned by many experienced analysts. As far as the "blank screen" is concerned, it is probably not possible except for practitioners who are characterologically so predisposed, is frequently neither feasible nor therapeutically desirable, and, as mounting archival evidence indicates, was not practiced by Freud, who advocated it.

Another aspect of the scientific metaphor of psychoanalysis was Freud's comparison of the recovery and reconstruction of the past in the manner of archaeology. We psychoanalysts have long been accustomed to telling ourselves that we unearth and reconstruct the subjective truth of a patient's personal past via fragments of memory and transferences, much as Sir Arthur

Evans believed he was doing with the archaeological fragments of the palace complex at Knossos in Crete. However, as any archaeologist now knows, what Evans succeeded in accomplishing was less a reconstruction of what *was* than a new creation embodying old building blocks. He did bring intelligent, plausible, coherent “narrative” meaning to what had been fields of ruins. But “historical” truth?

As I have stressed earlier, Breuer and Freud’s (1893-95) epochal discovery that hysterical symptoms could be translated into metaphors and replaced by discourse makes it easy to overestimate the importance of language in psychoanalysis. However, Spence (1982) has argued that the nature of language is such as to seriously question whether it has the capacity to unearth “objective” historical truth or, more likely, to create a coherent but essentially narrative truth. He points out that it leaves out more than it includes, yet it includes so much that any number of connections can be made among the elements that are encompassed.

As Spence indicates, it is especially the *flexibility* of language that lends itself to the creation of correspondences between the patient’s material and the analyst’s interpretation. By choosing the right words, a lexical overlap can be made between what the patient is or has been talking about and a given interpretation. The formal match or similarity, as by punning, is enough to convey plausibility, whether or not it is “demanded” by the material, especially if it also includes a number of known facts that have not otherwise been accounted for.

This “flexibility” of language touches on a fundamental *aesthetic* property, namely, the plasticity of a medium. Aesthetic plasticity refers to the capacity of something to undergo endless transformations without rupturing the inner connection between its elements. Take time, for example. Music treats time as having both inner consistency and malleability; it remains the same and is forever changing. By treating time as plastic material capable of undergoing transformations while retaining its integrity, and addressing both of these characteristics of aesthetic plasticity, music is able to reconcile or bridge between the two aspects of time-



constancy and variability (G. J. Rose 1980).

The plasticity of words is seen in the fact that their separate aspects of physical sound, intellectual content, and affective weight may be elaborated almost independently. Poetry recombines their physical attributes, emotional overtones, and semantic meanings. In poetry, words are the plastic, malleable medium, as spatial forms are in painting, and time is in music (G. J. Rose 1980).

The relevance of this for psychoanalysis is that the aesthetic plasticity of words makes it possible to correlate and link various dichotomies, thus objectifying them and making them available for conscious reflection. One such linking, fundamental to both art and science, is that between a (hidden, latent) inner unity, of meaning, for example, amid the outer changeability. Conversely, the aesthetic property of plasticity makes it possible to experience that something familiar can assume quite other aspects, or take on an unusual character.

Another way of stating this is that concern with a thing not being what it was, and with its becoming something other than what it is, is common to both art and psychoanalysis. When an analyst uses words "flexibly" to show correspondences and suggest new connections between the familiar and unfamiliar, he is, knowingly or not, exploiting the aesthetic plasticity of words and acting as an artist.

Aesthetic considerations may also play some part in the recall and reconstruction of the past. It is quite possible that when memories are recalled or reconstructed they are subject to preconscious aesthetic considerations of what constitutes good form. Just as gestalt principles underlie the perception of formal line patterns, if it is valid to transpose them to cognition and recollection they might help us understand the "retroactive power" of the present on the past.

For example, in the perception of patterns, other things being equal, a shape tends to be

continued in its initial mode of operation. But the mind, continually striving for completeness, stability, and rest, tends to regularize what was irregular and complete what was incomplete. Thus, a system left to itself tends to lose asymmetries and become more regular. Memory reinforces this tendency; less good shapes tend to be forgotten.

It is possible that these principles governing the perception of forms are applicable to the ways in which we tend to rework the past. For example, the tendency toward regularity, symmetry, and completion in our perception of formal line drawings might well be analogous to our tendency to rework the past in terms of our need for narrative flow, plausibility, and certainty. In both areas we might be dealing with the aesthetic need for “good shape.”

One might now approach the question of whether psychoanalysis is an art or a science somewhat along the lines of these general propositions. Instead of holding to the idea that there is some privileged access to an independent reality “out there,” reality is always being formed and transformed rather than being discovered. Physical structures and programming, knowledge and imagination all contribute to its construction. Each of the symbolic forms-science, language, art (as well as myth and religion)-builds it from its own standpoint and leaves out as much as it includes. Aesthetic considerations of good form probably influence the construction of all symbolic forms, including art and science and psychoanalysis no less.

More specifically, psychoanalysis is a science in so far as it is based on objective, empirical data of growth and development, informed by the concept of the unconscious and the phenomenon of transference. Its indispensable instrument is ordinary language. But this must not allow us to forget that there is more to thought and meaning than language, and less to language than truth. To paraphrase Churchill on democracy, it is the worst form of communication there is-except for all the others. For purposes of communication, ordinary language leaves out too much and includes too much; when directed to the recall of the past, it probably alters the very memories it attempts to recover. Insofar as it attempts to objectify

subjective feelings so that they may be reflected upon, understood, and reshaped, it depends on the aesthetic plasticity of language as an expressive art form. In so far as it makes use of an inseparable mix of objective knowledge and subjective imagination, like all cognition, it may be described in terms of the ego functioning in a “transitional process” of everyday life’s creativity (G. J. Rose 1980).

Thus far, we have discussed the relevance of art in the most general terms: the relation of psychoanalysis to art and to science; the aesthetic plasticity of words; the possible influence of aesthetic form on memory.

We will now turn to other basic yet more specific considerations: the contribution that art makes to a rethinking of the customary subject/object dichotomy and, related to this, the refinement of imagination-that is, the primary process.

The idea of a dynamic tension among elements which interact to form an organic unity has always been essential to art. Such interactionism has become a key word for modern science as well. In the context of the new worldview in physics-that the universe is a dynamic web of interrelated events in which all forms are fluid and ever-changing-basic distinctions seem less absolute than formerly. For example, in metamathematics limitative theorems have mixed up subject and object. In physics, quantum mechanics has taught us that the observer is necessarily a factor interfering with what is observed. Sharp separation between the I and the world is no longer possible. Science has evolved to the point where it appears that the structures and continuities of an earlier time are fluid discontinuities. On the other hand, the logic of dichotomy, including the separateness of subject and object, seems to have given way to one that emphasizes permeability.

If science has reached this point, it must be said that art got there long ago. Art highlights that the Cartesian boundaries between inside and outside are not absolute. Langer (1957) is

more precise and cogent: all the arts *objectify* subjective reality and *subjectify* the outward experience of nature.

This brings us to an important consideration: art forces us to make a distinction between two types of thinking and perception—the imaginative and nonlogical kind, on the one hand, and the cognitive, logical type, on the other. Wherein lies the difference? In the case of logical, cognitive thought and perception, subject and object are separate, opposed. In imaginative, nonlogical thought and perception, thinking and thought, subject and object are together in mutually influential motion. Within rationality, there is an interpenetration of subject and object.

All art invites a degree of fusing of subject and object, seer and seen, hearer and heard, and then a re-separation and possibly a new division. It was stated earlier that music demands a special kind of hearing—the kind that moves with the tones and draws the hearer into their motion. Modern painting, too, often requires a degree of merging and re-separation for it to be experienced. With drama and literature it is the temporary identification with the fictional characters that melts the boundaries. Not only am I, the spectator or reader, required to pretend that I am he and she and perhaps all the characters simultaneously and in succession, but also that now is then, and here is there. These are three primary process condensations of time, place, and person.

Of course, the point of this partial merging with the art object, which any aesthetic experience requires, is not to get on a One-Way Regress Express—any more than empathic, analytic listening should lead to a mutual fusion state or *folie a deux*. Rather, it is to re-emerge with perception and thought refreshed.

In short, the imaginative, if nonlogical, perception and thought demanded by art are characterized by a temporary suspension and then reimposition of the usual boundaries of subject-object, time and space. The fusion and re-separation recalls the fluid temporal, spatial,

and personal boundaries of the child-openness and sensuousness-but it is not itself child-like. At its most it offers new possibilities in the light of the adult's knowledge of reality; at its least, it refines sensibility and responsiveness.

In addition to making us face up more clearly to the differences between imaginative (nonlogical) thought and cognitive (logical) thought, art also forces us to reconsider the fundamental principles which govern their operation and their relationship to each other: the primary and secondary processes. There is reason to rethink Freud's statement that "a sharp and final decision" between these two processes takes place by puberty (1915, p. 195).

Let us remind ourselves of the contrast between primary and secondary processes in psychoanalytic theory. First, as regards modes of discharge, the primary process seeks immediate discharge of tension; this provides release and thereby pleasure. The secondary process is characterized by delayed discharge or-another way of saying this-greater control. This is accompanied by rising tension and also greater contact with reality.

Secondly, there is the contrast between the two as regards their different modes of organizing data. The primary process dissolves ordinary logical and perceptual and temporal boundaries and condenses things into wholes. Within these wholes, opposites can coexist. Thus, primary process organization makes it appear that this is also that, or here might at the same time be there (spatial condensation), now can simultaneously be then, or then now (temporal condensation), and I may also be he, you, she, or they, and so on (condensation of person).

According to formal logic there must be a total separation between what a thing is and what it is not. The point about a symbol, however, is that it is *both* itself and something else; and the point about a metaphor is that it asserts that this *is* (not just resembles) that. Therefore, according to the formal logic of the secondary process, the whole area of symbolic and metaphorical expression is irrational. Obviously, logic alone gives a false picture when it comes

to the nonrational, imaginative primary process (Milner 1957, 161).

In addition to symbolism and metaphor, considerations of music also show that the sharp dichotomy we formerly made between primary and secondary processes is a false one. In the first place, all the perceptual configurations associated with the primary process (condensation, fragmentation, reversals, changes in size and shape, reduplication, figure-ground shifts) are embodied in music in the form of inversions, augmentation, diminution, rhythmic and thematic variations, and so on (Ehrenzweig 1953; Friedman 1960).

Secondly, the crucial characteristic that distinguishes musical and logical thought is time. Time is essential in music; it does not exist in logic. Music deals with motions that unfold in time (Sessions 1950). It then links these motions into tonal patterns which link consistency with novelty in such a way that they seem necessary-not logically necessary, but organically necessary in that the new patterns recapitulate the past and reintegrate as they move forward. We are in a realm which does not know Descartes and precedes Aristotle: neither logical nor illogical, but nonlogical. It comprises most of our existence.

The sharp distinction between primary and secondary processes is not tenable. It came about because of Freud's adherence to a closed system model of the organism, consistent with nineteenth-century physiology (Fechner's constancy principle). This began to change, however, in the 1940s and 1950s. With the theoretical work of Hartmann (1939) and Rapaport (1951) and the experimental work of Schilder (1942) and Fisher (1954, 1956) in perception, the closed model finally became an open one. As it did, the idea took hold of a continuum, rather than a sharp demarcation, between primary and secondary processes underlying all thought and perception.

Two of the implications of this shift from the closed to the open model were the increased significance of the ego as the organ of adaptation (Schur 1966, 45) and a new emphasis on object

relations. The process of internalization and building of psychic structure was now perceived to be ongoing rather than essentially restricted to childhood.

Most important, since the primary process is also part of this open system, it, too, can participate in ongoing development. It is the formal organizational patterning of the primary process--condensation and displacement, for example (Holt 1967)-that develops by becoming linked with the slow discharge of the secondary process. This in turn affects the entire range of mental processes (Schur 1966).

This is where the arts are most importantly relevant: they promote this advancement of the primary process, and thus the accretion of psychic structure. They accomplish this through objectification and feedback. Objectification introduces feedback from the external world, exposing the primary process to secondary process monitoring in the light of reality (Noy 1968-69, 1969). The primary process configurations, now slowed down and scrutinized by the logic and reality considerations of the secondary process, are reinternalized. Further primary process forms may summate, be objectified, elaborated, and reinternalized in a continuous process of psychological development-in a working system *open* to the outside. The ambiguity of the primary process is tolerated within the problem-solving framework of the secondary processes. In short, under favorable conditions, primary and secondary processes may coexist harmoniously on a continuum with each other.

The work of two contrasting artists, M. C. Escher and Claude Monet, allows us to examine the interplay of primary and secondary processes.


Escher keeps creating the illusion of an illusion, yet every illusion created is the result of totally reasoned constructions. They have us moving up or down through levels of a hierarchical system, always done with correct perspective, yet always finding ourselves back where we started. Thus, they have been called pictorial parables of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem: only

by stepping out of the system may one complete it (Hofstadter 1979).

Writing of this apparent affinity between his work and the field of mathematics, Escher said: “By keenly confronting the enigmas that surround us, and by analyzing the observations that I had made, I ended up in the domain of mathematics. Although I am absolutely innocent of training or knowledge in the exact sciences, I often seem to have more in common with mathematicians than with my fellow artists” (Escher 1971, 42). (That his appeal is even broader is suggested by the fact that one drawing has been reproduced in a chemistry textbook and also on the record album cover of an American pop group.)

Some examples of the way he makes reason and imagination work together: *Day and Night* (2/38, catalogue # 303) shows the equilibrium of opposites, using the double function of black and white motifs. “It is night when the white, as an object, shows up against the black as a background, and day when the black figures show up against the white” (p. 24).





M. C. Escher. *Sky and Water*. (Reproduced by permission of Cordon Art B.V.)

In *Sky and Water I* (6/38, catalogue # 306) birds and fish alternate foreground and background depending on where the eye concentrates. In the central portion of the print, birds and fish are pictorially equal-fitting into each other like jigsaw pieces. Birds become less three-dimensional proceeding downward and become a uniform background of water. Fish gradually lose their shape as they progress upward and become a background of sky. Thus, "the birds are

'water' for the fish, and the fish are 'air' for the birds" (p. 28).

Escher wrote:

How subjective everything is. . . . There is no proof whatever of the existence of an objective reality apart from our senses. ... In my prints I try to show that we live in a beautiful and orderly world. . . . My subjects are also often playful. I cannot help mocking all our unwavering certainties. It is, for example, great fun deliberately to confuse two and three dimensions, the plane and space, or to poke fun at gravity. Are you sure that a floor cannot also be a ceiling . . . that it is impossible to eat your cake and have it/ I ask these seemingly crazy questions . . . and [am] not afraid to look at the relative nature of rock-hard reality (pp. 6-7).

By treating everything as material for form, rather than already formed, in the process of becoming rather than already "there," as malleable and changing rather than fixed and static, Escher's art magnifies the ongoing interplay and linkage between primary and secondary processes-dramatizing that seemingly solid experience hovers in a transitional area between knowledge and imagination.

The work of the twentieth-century master Claude Monet, at the furthest possible reach from Escher, also illustrates the marriage of primary process modes of organization with the attention, concentration, and knowing deliberation of the secondary process.

Monet's landscapes and seascapes are omnidirectional and unanchored, floating free in a world of pure appearance which, in ordinary life, we glimpse only occasionally-"as perhaps when we are just rising out of sleep and the room around us drifts into view like a flotilla of nameless patches of color. Such moments do not fail to evoke memories of early childhood, of dreamy, unfocused existence when, it seems, the frontier between 'here' and 'out there' is only vaguely defined .... Such states are unbidden. We find ourselves in them. But when an artist moves into

this state, he does so at will, through disciplined practice with nothing dreamy about it. He is a sharp-eyed specialist in vagueness” (Gordon & Forge 1983, 56).

In a traditionally composed landscape there is a concentration on certain central points of focus. The eye is led forward toward the horizon. Monet's canvases offer few such invitations for the eye to enter and explore in a pointed, directional way. Instead, the pictures face us all at once and we are “in” them at once, needing to look everywhere on the canvas.

*Vetheuil in the Fog* (1879), for example, refuses the viewer any pathway by which to approach it as it hovers immersed in the fog. It is there at once, and we have no choice but to be immersed in it at once. “Somehow the boundaries between subject and object, viewer and viewed, have become porous, open to a two-way exchange” (p. 142).

Likewise, in the Varengeville landscapes of 1882-83 foreground and distance interpenetrate each other-the diagonal drift of pine trees in the foreground finds a resting place on the far hillside. In between, ground we cannot see. “We need to look everywhere on the canvas without giving special value to one place over another, and it is only through this all-over reading that the great spatial drama of the cliff top comes into its own and we are able to locate and feel the vertiginous drop to the surface of the water-beyond the boundaries of the canvas” (p. 150).

This immersion and simultaneity, this conflation of time and space, everything into everywhere and at once, finds its culmination in the Water-Lily Decorations. Monet conceived it as a completely integrated environment which would interlock the paintings’ and the viewers’ space. In the waters, lilies are in continuous interaction with the reversed reflections of unseen trees upside down. Within the water’s surface, trees, sky, and the light of day are found simultaneously condensed into all possible conjunctions. “The plane of the water brought everything, near and far, into a single pattern, combining the drive of perspective with the

enveloping frontality of the sea” (p. 276).

Frontality, the absence of point of entry or exit for the eye, the lack of focus, the abrogation of near/far, up/down discrimination, the condensation of real and reflected objects on the water’s plane—all make for a sense of simultaneous envelopment and limitless expansion reminiscent of the luminosity and ambiguity of early childhood.

Have the disciplined eye and hand of a master specialist in color and light ushered us back to a state of narcissistic regression? It has been suggested (Levine 1985) that Monet’s lifelong attachment to the sea is reenacted in his paintings and bespeaks a maternal fixation, an oral-erotic fantasy not unlike what Freud imagined he saw in the smiles of Leonardo’s figures; in current terminology, regression to self-object symbiosis.

To be sure, in Monet’s canvases one experiences the momentary sense of union with the painting so characteristic of the aesthetic experience. However, instead of the constricted awareness and dreaminess of a hypnotic trance-like state of regression, what follows is the sparkling quality of hyperalertness and fresh recognition of sensuousness and affect. Moreover the heightened sense of aliveness persists after we leave the painting and may even permanently alter the way we visually experience atmosphere and light, as well as the passage of time.

If not regression, then what? Monet has made the terms of perception the subject matter of his art. His canvases confront the viewer with the normal interplay of primary and secondary processes, slowed down and magnified.

What Monet learned from the theme of the sea and rediscovered in his frontal approaches to the landscape was the redistribution and spreading of focus, the open invitation to movement, reorientation and fusion (Gordon & Forge 1983). In terms of perception, these elements describe the global, undifferentiated, primary process prestages of perception. Normally subliminal, these

pre-stages can be recaptured in tachistoscopic experiments. What Monet's paintings accomplish is to capture the rapid cycle of subliminal dedifferentiation and redifferentiation, implicit in all perception, restrain their immediate discharge, transfix them in time, and raise them to the level of full awareness.

According to the view being advanced here, there is no need to postulate a looseness of repression of id drives, or a regression in the service of the ego (Kris 1952). If the primary process can undergo development as part of an open system, neither is it necessary to assume two different types of imagination under the auspices of the primary or secondary processes and distinguished from each other according to the immediacy of delay in discharge of psychic energies and the role of ego control (Beres 1960). Nor is it necessary to assume the existence of a special cognitive process as the basis for creativity (Rothenberg 1979).

It would seem preferable to assume that an ongoing growth process includes the possibility of developing a freer access to inner and outer experience and a fuller play of all one's faculties in a more open encounter with both worlds. Microscopically, this implies a relatively free traffic of information styled differently under both the primary and secondary processes (perhaps corresponding to the cerebral hemispheres) and their collateral integration.

Factors discussed earlier would have to come into play: the capacity to hold the reality sense in temporary abeyance while an ongoing reintegration balances the tension of strangeness with the release of familiarity. This presupposes the ability to depart, at least temporarily, from the security of established dogma and the mirroring approval of those who think similarly, in order to see and think freshly. When the reality sense is reimposed, the dimensions of reality will have been enlarged-marking this as a work of creative imagination and distinguishing it from a mere private retreat from reality.

This formulation stresses that, underlying all thought and perception, there is always a

fine-tuned coordination between the primary and secondary processes. Rather than a replacement of primary process by secondary process, or an occasional, privileged, creative regression to the primary process under the auspices of the secondary process, the emphasis is on a fructifying influence between both modes and their mutual development. This places creative thought in a normative, developmental, and progressive context rather than a special category of its own, or reducing it to an aberrant and regressive one. It may even enable us to talk fairly precisely of the structural dynamics of all the arts and account for their parallel effects (G. J. Rose 1980).

At this point it may be helpful to step back and remind ourselves that these rather esoteric terms-primary process and secondary process-have a direct bearing on everyday life. They are the dried out technical names for the more detailed workings of imagination and rationality. To repeat: while we may separate them theoretically for purposes of better conceptualization, in actual experience they are inseparable. Just as there is no objective perception without subjective interpretation-inferences being corrected in the light of ongoing comparisons, leading to fresh observations, inferences, and corrections (Gombrich 1960)-knowledge and imagination work together continuously. They constitute inseparable parts of intellectual or aesthetic vision (Bronowski 1978).

Furthermore, since primary imagination and secondary process rational knowledge of reality are always working together in fine-tuned coordination in thought and perception, many of the divisions we make, based upon their separateness, are convenient and familiar but essentially misleading. All the arts show that the Cartesian separations do not hold as firmly as we once thought. On the one hand, they highlight the interpenetration between inside and outside; on the other hand, they help us to generate other connections that reason alone is unlikely to anticipate.

As for science and art, they are both approaches to the mastery of reality, and

psychoanalysis has features of each. In science, art, and psychoanalysis, if they amount to anything more than hack work, the norms of conventional knowledge are always being confronted with the nonlogical playfulness of imagination. Science without imagination is sterile; art without rational knowledge is wild; psychoanalysis without either is merely a cult. Only the combination of imagination and knowledge, based on an interplay between primary and secondary processes, allows one to leap-thoughtfully-toward new intellectual possibilities.

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