JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK

The Personality



American Handbook of Psychiatry

The Personality

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Contents

The Personality

This chapter will be limited to the strictly psychological views of personality, as opposed to the more properly psychiatric theories. All theories must deal with certain basic philosophical questions, however, and we would like to review five such points of relevance before moving on to see how they have been answered by theorists interested in the question, “What is man?”

The Classical Philosophical Questions

What Is a Cause?

It is frequently overlooked that today's conception of a cause is only one of several used earlier in history. In particular, based upon Aristotle's theory of knowledge, one could once speak of at least four causes. The first he called the material cause. In describing a chair we can say that we know it is a chair because like most chairs it is made of wood, or metal, or the like. Another cause of the chair is the fact that it was assembled by someone or something (a machine). This Aristotle termed the efficient cause. Chairs also meet our blueprint conceptions of what chairs "look like." This usage Aristotle termed the formal cause.

Finally Aristotle noted that there is often a purpose in events, a "that for the sake of which" something like a chair is made to come about. The "sake" for which a chair is constructed might be termed "utility" in eating, writing, and so forth. Of course, the chair docs not itself decide to "come about." It is the human being who obtained the wood (material cause) and made it (efficient cause) into a chair matching his physical requirements (formal cause) so that he might live more comfortably (final cause) who may be said to have a purpose or an intention.

Are Theoretical Meanings Bipolar or Unipolar?

When we theorize we essentially deal in meanings. The early Greeks viewed the world as consisting of "many" meanings, tying into one another by way of opposition. Just as to know "left" is to know "right," so, too, did men like Socrates and Plato assume that all meanings were at some point united through bipolar opposites. That which is "error" is tied oppositionally to that which is "truth." To split up this totality of knowledge a method termed the dialectic was employed (see Rychlak, p. 256). Aristotle eventually countered this reliance on oppositional discourse and dialectical reasoning as organon by arguing that when one begins in error he ends in error. One cannot extract truthful conclusions from premises that are false to begin with, dialectically or otherwise. Only through premises of a "primary and true" or factual nature could science advance. This demonstrative strategy in reasoning laid emphasis on the unipolarity of meaning, in which the "law of contradiction" (A is not not-A) separated sense from nonsense.

What Is a Scientific Explanation?

Although Aristotle wanted to move the scientist out of his armchair into the world of facts, he was not above employing final causes in his description of nature. For example, in his *Physics* Aristotle theorized that leaves exist for the "purpose" of providing shade for the fruit on trees (pp. 276-277). In helping to forge modem scientific methods, Bacon later waged a spirited attack on this Aristotelian use of teleological explanation in nature. Since his

time the natural scientist has made conscious effort to explain events in only material and/or efficient cause terms, with modest use of formal causality, but *no* use of the final cause.

John Locke then followed in this British empiricist tradition to say that man's basic reasoning capacities are entirely demonstrative as well, consisting of small units of unipolar meanings (simple ideas), which added up to more involved combinations of meaning (complex ideas) in quasi-mathematical fashion. Meanings thus "issued from below," and man's "tabula rasa" intellect was passively molded via input influences from the external environment.

In Continental philosophy, on the other hand, we have the more Kantian model of intellect taking root. Kant stressed man's "categories of the understanding," which were like intellectual spectacles (formal causes) framing in meaning "from above." Whereas Locke felt that we could not—as human beings— subdivide, frame, or invent one "new" simple idea in mind, Kant recognized that through exercise of a "transcendental dialectic" in free thought man could and often did see the *opposite* implication of these Lockean inputs. This led to alternative implications for meanings were again taken as bipolar, and hence man *could* be said to influence his relationship to "reality" in a way impossible to conceive of on the Lockean model.

Are All Theories Written from the Same Meaningful Perspective?

Natural science explanation was thus to be written in material and especially efficient cause terms, utilizing a Lockean model of summative structures or, in the case of mentality, "inputs." This placed the theoretical account at a "third person" or extraspective perspective. The extraspectionist writes his theory about "that, over there," the object or organism under empirical observation. On the other hand, with the rise of psychiatry as a science of man, we see a more introspective or "first person" theory being written. The introspectionist writes about "this, over here," the individual or subject under study in a "personal" way. In this case a more Kantian formulation is possible as we consider the intellectual spectacles as a "point of view" for the sake of which (final cause) an organism may be said to behave. This shift in theoretical perspective is probably the main alteration in scientific procedure brought about by the rise of psychiatry.

What Is Proper Evidence for Belief in a Theory?

The final aspect of knowledge that science was to affect has to do with the nature of proof. What should we require as evidence before we believe the truth value of a proposition? If one believes a theoretical account because of its intelligibility, consistency with common-sense knowledge, or its implicit self-evidence, he uses as grounds for his conviction procedural evidence. On

the other hand, science was to raise the status of validating evidence. In the latter case we believe a theoretical proposition only after having submitted it to “control and prediction,” which involves an observable succession of events that have been designed to test a prediction about the effect of one (predictor) variable on another (criterion) variable. Here again psychiatry has been the focal point for these interplaying vehicles for the exercise of evidence.

The Major Schools of Personality Theory in Historical Overview

One could trace personality study back to early philosophy, but "modern" personality theory is usually dated from Freud's brilliant work beginning in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. We shall formulate the major intellectual traditions in terms of Lockean versus Kantian models as reflected in man's image.

Mixed Lockean-Kantian Models and the Psychoanalytic Tradition

It is not difficult to show that Freud is a twentieth-century dialectician, who tried to find his way within the strictures of a demonstrative science that did not quite meet his theoretical needs. Freud is the father of modern personality theory because he did—seemingly unknowingly—depart from the material and efficient causes of the "medical model" to assign formal and especially final causes to man's description. His concept of a rational unconscious, directing man from out of a region of wishes and desires, was entirely Kantian in formulation. Thanks to the use of dialectic the psyche is divided into subidentities, each with its own "that for the sake of which" it operated. This is what makes Freud's account so true to life, so *human* and familiar to us who are enacting a series of daily events that we know too well are crazy quilt patterns of contradiction and inconsistency. Freud made man intelligent and introspectively directing by seeing that his physical (hysterical) symptoms were—like our chair, above—*themselves* in existence

"for the sake of" causes that lay behind them (intentionality). A symptom carried meaning, and even more complexly, such meanings were *always* compromises between two (bipolar) wishes: the repressing and the repressed!

Freud was instructed in science by Brücke and encouraged to write more scientifically by Fliess. Both of these men were uncompromising Lockeans in scientific commitment. It was under pressure from Fliess that Freud began writing his ill-fated *Project for a Scientific Psychology.* This is the clearest Lockean formulation in all of Freud, but one that he could not complete and in later years tried to have destroyed unpublished. Whereas in his very first theoretical account Freud had actually referred to antithetic ideas and counter wills (pp. 117-128), in the ill-fated *Project* he was to speak of "quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles" (p. 295). The former constructs are clearly on the side of formal and final causes, whereas the latter are on the side of efficient and material causes. Fliess had pushed Freud over the line to scientific respectability, but within three months' time Freud could honestly say to his friend: "I no longer understand the state of mind in which I concocted the psychology *[the Project*]" (p. 134).

What Freud *did* do in time was to introduce his libido theory, as a kind of efficient cause (thrust) and possibly material cause (does libido "exist?") translation of introspective mental mechanisms into a pseudo-Lockean frame

of reference. It is for this reason that we classify the psychoanalytical tradition as a mixed Lockean-Kantian model. Freud most surely wanted to be "scientific" in his approach, and he did *not* wish to be called a dialectician, an appellation he identified with "sophist." But anyone with the proper grasp of history can see that he made his energies behave dialectically. Drive power always issues from a dialectical ploy of some sort, oriented teleologically for goals in conflict (lust versus propriety, and so on), and then rephrased in energy terms (efficient causes) after the implications are clear.

Although he retained the essentially "reductive" tactic of Freud's Lockean substrate energies, Jung moved his concept of libido even more teleologically over to a direct parallel with Bergson's *elan vital* and Schopenhauer's concept of *Will,* both of which are teleological constructs (p. 147). Jung also clearly recognized that his therapeutic approach was dialectical in nature (p. 554). Adler was to prove the most teleological of the original founders of analytical thought, rejecting quasi-physical energies altogether in favor of an emphasis on the "natural" tendency for movement to occur in human behavior without having to be propelled (p. 41). Moreover, this movement was always fixed by some goal (telos) as embodied in a life plan, prototype, or life style (formal causes that, when exercised, permitted a "that for the sake of which" purposiveness in Adlerian thought). Let Adler retained a healthy respect for the tough-minded approach to theoretical description. His Lockeanism is reflected in a basic distrust of the idealism that

our Kantian “spectacles” suggest, and Adler was adamant in his rejection of the dialectical ploy (p. 145).

It was Sullivan more than any other person who shifted the locus of psychoanalysis to an interpersonal rather than an intrapersonal frame of reference. This was a decidedly Lockean shift, bringing about a more extraspective formulation in behavioral description. His concept of energy was far less teleological in connotation, and, indeed, Sullivanian conceptions of behavior are the most compatible of all analytical formulations with the more “mechanistic” theories of what are called in academic circles the “behavioral sciences.” Sullivan relied heavily on the formal cause in his concept of the *dynamism,* or patterned energic distribution. Dynamisms were viewed as akin to the Lockean building blocks, as unipolar identities that might then combine into more complex assemblages constituting a person or a society (p. 103).

In more recent years Arieti has attempted to offset the heavy reliance of the Sullivanians on the interpsychic as opposed to the intrapsychic aspects of behavior. Whereas Sullivan had adapted Cooley and Mead’s “looking-glass self” conceptions to say that man is what his environment makes him, Arieti stated flatly that “the self is not merely a passive reflection” (p. 370). Psychic identities are not *tabula rasa,* but rather the individual has a certain cognitive contribution to make to his ultimate personality. Thus we find in Arieti a

return to the more balanced, mixed models of the main psychoanalytical stream. The Kantian spectacles are now "levels" of cognitive development, moving across the age span to bring the individual to higher and higher stages of symbolic organization.

There are many other theorists who might be cited in this tradition, such as Horney, Fromm, Rank, and so forth, but we must refer the reader to the other chapters of this volume for a more thorough coverage of such views. We wish now to move into another major tradition having implications for theories of personality.

Lockean Models: The Behavioristic Tradition

Important as psychoanalysis was in the framing of man's image in the twentieth century, this theory was never popular as a formal position in the psychology departments of American academia. The difficulty lay in Freud's having to rely upon the procedural evidence of his patients. If he made an interpretation that "struck home" and aided his client's subsequent psychological adjustment, Freud naturally assumed that his theory had validity—for this client, and quite likely for all humans as well. Unfortunately, as events were to demonstrate both within and without the analytical camp, there are many such therapeutic insights to proffer, therapists to proffer them, and clients to be healed by the knowledge so garnered. If they all work

equally well to heal, which "insight" is the "true" one, reflecting what is actually taking place in the personality—a Freudian's, Jungian's, Adlerian's, or Sullivanian's?

From its very beginnings in the academic centers of Germany, psychology has sought to be a scientific discipline. Two of its important founding fathers, Helmholtz and Wundt, were dedicated Lockeans who argued that not until a behavioral phenomena had been traced back to "simple forces" (Helmholtz) and "motion" (Wundt) could it be said that a complete account of its nature was rendered (Cassirer, pp. 86, 88). We can see here the substrate efficient cause "reduction" that had been the hallmark of sound science since the days of Bacon. It remained for John B. Watson to pull together the demonstrative, extraspective, Lockean tenets of this style of "natural science" description and press them upon the study of man in his school of behaviorism. Here was a "truly scientific" rendering of human activity, one that academic psychology could embrace and further through experimentation.

As Watson said of the behaviorist: "The rule, or measuring rod, which the behaviorist puts in front of him always is: Can I describe this bit of behavior I see in terms of 'stimulus and response?" (p. 6). We recognize in this stimulus-response conception the *sine qua non* of efficient causality. As behaviorists we stand "over here" and describe the behavior of others "over

there" in efficient cause terms. There is no attempt to speculate about the "inside" of "that" person "over there." Such introspective efforts were effectively discredited by Watson. Hence teleological positions resting upon final causation are literally impossible in the behaviorist's world view. All that can transpire is an "input" (stimulus) and/or an "output" (response), each of which is extraspectively observable, hence subject to scientific manipulation. Indeed, the behaviorist typically equates his research terms (independent variable and dependent variable) with his theoretical terms (stimulus and response.) The world of reality is "out there," and the behaviorist makes no bones about his job being that of mapping it "as discovered."

What then leads to regularities in behavior? Here the behaviorists have differed over the years. Watson relied upon Pavlov's conditioned reflex and the Pavlovian-Thorndikian conception of a reinforcement that supposedly cemented this connection of stimulus and response by way of some kind of physical process. This theory has been termed a "drive reduction" view, based essentially on a belief in the efficacy of inborn needs such as hunger, thirst, sex, and so forth to establish regularities in behavior entirely outside of awareness, much less intentionality. Indeed, when he voiced his initial call for behaviorism in 1913, Watson made it clear that this approach "recognizes no dividing line between man and brute" (p. 158). This resulted in an entirely mechanical conception of human behavior, with reflexes being combined a la Lockean building blocks into habits, and congeries of habits leading to higher

level behaviors at the social level (not unlike the Sullivanian conception referred to above). But nowhere was there the dialectical clash, the internal jockeying, or the self-deceiving aspects of behavior so characteristic of psychoanalysis.

Not all behaviorists were to foster such an exclusive reliance upon extraspective theory. Tolman, for example, drew inspiration from the Gestalt theorists and proposed that animals (including man) approached life in terms of a Kantianlike *sign-gestalt* (p. 135), which acted as a sort of road may along which behavior could be directed by the individual— even in terms of his expectancies. We see here more of a mixed model and the hint of final causality, although Tolman formally rejected teleology in the best tough-minded tradition. Hull doubtless raised behaviorism and so-called learning theory to its highest level of expression, continuing in the Watsonian style of a drive reduction to account for habitual behavior. Mowrer added the significant idea that a "reduction in anxiety" could act as a potent reinforcement, leading to the stamping in of abnormal responses. Although the response is self-destructive in the long run, leading to neurotic symptoms, the fact that it reduces anxiety over the short run tends to maintain it (see Dollard and Miller section, below).

Skinner was to alter drive reduction thinking by proposing what has often been termed an "empirical law of effect" position. In his concept of

operant conditioning Skinner argued that "whatever" leads to a recurrence of the response following that response's "operation" on the environment may be termed a reinforcement. Thus, if a bear lumbering through the forest turns over a log (operant response) and is rewarded thereby with a rich lode of insects, it follows that he will be seen turning over logs on subsequent occasions. But it is not the "hunger" drive which is being reduced that leads to the later logrolling. At least, argues Skinner, it adds nothing to speculate on such "unobservable" obscurities as needs or drives "within the organism." As he once said to Evans: "I don't see any reason to postulate a need anywhere along the line. . . . As far as I'm concerned, if a baby is reinforced by the sound made by a rattle, the sound is just as useful as a reinforcer in accounting for behavior as food in the baby's mouth" (p. 10). As operant conditioning behaviorists, we look extraspectively outward and keep our theories empirically pure.

Skinner does retain the language of stimuli and responses, of course. And it is this fundamental attempt to account for all of behavior in efficient cause terms that stamps a man as a behaviorist, neobehaviorist, or whatever. In fact, the cybernetic account of behavior is comparably built on an efficient cause conceptualization. Whether we call them stimuli and responses, or inputs and outputs, whether mediations between stimuli and responses, or feedback circuits, the tie binding all such "mechanistic" accounts of man is their fundamental Lockeanism. Although Wiener has drawn parallels

between man and machine, it has never properly occurred to the cyberneticist that man has any other than a demonstrative power of reason. Yet, as Freud properly grasped, whereas the Ten Commandments fed into a machine would "teach it" or "communicate information" to it in a unidirectional (unipolar) sense, so that these proscriptions would never be violated (their premises would never be challenged), the same commands fed into a man would *of necessity* teach him "ten possible sins!" But in Skinner's world not only are all such one-sided "controls" possible, but also they are desirable and of the essence of existence. For that is the nature of behavior; it is seen as obeying determinate laws, functioning with complete efficient-cause predictability. The trick is to find how best to direct this flow of impetus factors across time.

Kantian Models: Phenomenology, Gestalt Psychology, and Existential Psychology

It was precisely the "wooden" conception of man the Helmholtzian-Wundtian and the behavioristic formulations led to that moved men like Kohler, Koffka, and Wertheimer to found a reactionary form of scientific approach they termed Gestalt psychology. This school took root about the time Watsonian behaviorism was emerging in the second decade of this century. But the Gestaltists were not the only voices rising in opposition to natural science descriptions of man. Throughout the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's, and particularly following World War II, a rising tide of criticism was

voiced by the existentialists, men whose philosophical antecedents went back to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. What both Gestalt psychology and existentialist psychology have in common is their conviction that traditional natural science theory applied to man somehow robs him of that spontaneous sense of subjective experience that he knows as reality. This is termed the "phenomenal" realm of experience.

It was Kant who carefully showed how reality was constituted of *phenomena* (sensory knowledge, as via seeing, hearing, and so on) and *noumena* (the presumed underlying "stuff" of "things in themselves"). Put in terms of our causes, Kant was saying that material causation was always dependent upon an assumption that "things are really there, even though all I can know about palpable events is what my senses tell me." And when we now consider the objectivities of natural science, it is obvious that they all rely on a kind of "inter- subjective agreement" between individuals who are themselves functioning within their own, private, subjective phenomenal field of awareness. Both Gestaltists and existentialists seek to say something about this phenomenal field, which, in turn, pitches their theories to the introspective perspective—making it difficult for a sensitive communication to take place with the exclusively extraspective theories of behaviorism.

There is also a kind of "hope" in the line of theoretical descent now under consideration that is yet to be realized. It concerns a new method of

arriving at scientific proofs to rival the "control and prediction" tactic of extraspective validation. Building on the theme of alienation first introduced by Hegel, and then popularized in the writings of Kierkegaard, the existentialists argue that man has been alienated from his true (phenomenal) nature by science's penchant for objective measurement, control, and stilted, nonteleological description. It was Husserl who first pointed to the need for such a variant form of scientific method. Although he worked to lay down the principle of just how this method might be conceived, the actual process was never crystallized.

Binswanger's existential analysis, or *daseinsanalyse,* is conceived in terms roughly equivalent to the phenomenological method of Husserl—as the full description of an individual's experience without "scientific" prejudice or bias, even in the sense of presuming that certain experience is normal, other abnormal, and so forth (p. 110). Hallucinations are thus phenomenally as true as are perceptions of a more "objective" cast. Through *daseinsanalyse* Binswanger essentially hopes to trace back the individual's present conceptual schemes (attitudes, beliefs, personality predilections) to what might be termed the "existential *a priori"* that conditions them, or determines their nature, much as a major premise directs the ultimate conclusions drawn in the syllogism. The Kantian emphasis here is obvious. We find the spectacles, or the "world designs" to use Binswanger's language, that frame in experience for the individual and in this way come to see *his* reality (dasein)

from his subjective perspective.

What this phenomenological method has come down to again and again is 100 percent reliance upon procedural evidence. Although it may indeed be based upon intersubjectivity, and doubtless the resultant account leaves out much that is rich in a subjective sense, validating evidence does at least point to objective generalizations. With nothing else to go on, the scientist *can* state this objective "probability" as a body of knowledge without having to haggle over the details of "what do we know about phenomenon X?" And this has been the great indictment of phenomenological efforts. Not that they are wrong as to theoretical statement, but that they have lacked the methodological or evidential support to be taken as authoritative rather than simply as literary accounts. It must not be overlooked that *all* so-called clinical accounts suffer from the same problem. Freud, as we know, took psychoanalysis to be a valid scientific method, as do many analysts today. Yet not the least of the reasons that he found it so difficult settling disputes with students and colleagues can be traced to the exclusive reliance that clinical analyses must make upon procedural evidence.

Even though Gestalt psychology was to meet the strictures of validating evidence by proposing a series of remarkably creative experiments, the lock that behaviorism has on academia never really permitted this more Kantian approach to flourish. One annually hears of the complete demise of Gestalt

psychology, but the truth is that it makes rather frequent rebounds under the guise of so-called cognitive psychology. The Gestaltists, too, were advocates of phenomenology, which Koffka once essentially defined as the attempt "to look naively, without bias, at the facts of direct experience" (p. 73). Gestalt psychology is best known for its supposed attempt to prove that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts." What has not often been made clear is that this conception of the relations between the "one" and the "many" has philosophical precedents dating back to the pre-Grecian philosophers (see Rychlak, pp. 257-267). And invariably over the course of the centuries it was the more idealistic, dialectically oriented philosopher who argued this point. Plato, for example, viewed knowledge as "one," as having "many" facets, but each of these latter aspects were configurated into a single, overriding totality. By beginning at any point with a given (thesis), reasoning dialectically to its opposite (antithesis), and resolving the inner contradictions thus implied, the student (and teacher) could arrive at a higher state of totality (synopsis, later "synthesis" a la Hegel).

Although they did not press a dialectical formulation, basing their studies on sensory mechanisms such as the eye, ear, and so forth, the Gestaltists did show again and again that man contributes something to reality by way of his innate equipment (analogical to Kantian "spectacles"). Knowledge is not simply a question of information input. There are certain "laws of organization" that result in perceptual constancy, rules of memory

and thought that make certain "total organizations" likely to result in one phenomenal experience while the same factors slightly reorganized result in another. The Gestaltists were theorizing introspectively, describing what was taking place "over here," as an observer looking out onto the world studies his own processes. Their behaviorist counterparts found this sort of talk almost spiritual, harking back to the Middle Ages. There was a certain truth in this, of course, because the major factor of a "totality" is that it has organization; that is, it is a formal cause. And, assuming now that the individual may be said to behave "for the sake of' this total experience rather than simply responding to inputs, it follows that we begin taking on the meaning of a final cause in our theoretical accounts. Little wonder, therefore, that tensions were to arise. What is probably most regrettable in this academic confrontation is that the issues separating behaviorists from Gestaltists have never been made clear. Often *ad hominerm* have been substituted for rational discourse, and nowhere does one find analyses in terms of causation, theoretical perspective, or philosophical presumptions. Actually the Gestaltists would welcome such discourse, but the behaviorists find it just another example of the tenderminded theorist's mania for obfuscation and cheap verbal triumphs.

Some Examples of Classical Answers to the Classical Questions

Having now reviewed the three major intellectual traditions that have made an impact on psychological theory, we might review a number of theoretical constructs that have been proffered within these lines of descent. Since, as we noted above, the psychoanalytical tradition has been slighted in the formal outlooks of academicians, it will be clear to the reader that psychologists have placed greatest emphasis on the behavioral and the phenomenological aspects of human behavior. It is often possible to show that these constructs were directed at some clearly philosophical issue, such as determinism versus teleology. A theorist's name and his major construct will be given in the title to each of the subsections.

Sheldon's "Morphogenotype"

William H. Sheldon has continued and furthered the style of theorizing about man that dates back through Kretschmer, Lomboroso, and others to the very founder of such speculations, the father of medicine: Hippocrates. The emphasis here is on material and efficient causation, which—-along with formal causality in the syndrome picture—has been the mainstay of all medical models of illness, including the psychiatric. Hereditary concepts are of this nature, and the transmission of various characteristics that might be seen in overt behavior is along a "chance" line, sketched entirely in terms of a Lockean model. The point here is that "genes" are "primary and true" items of

physical structure that combine in various ways entirely due to physicochemical laws (efficient causes). Natural selection (Darwin) has determined the final result, for there has been no teleological advance in this descent of man. At least there has been no deity teleology or natural teleology at work. Whether there has been a human teleology— and how this is to be conceived—is a question that has not yet been settled.

Sheldon's theory rests on the assumption that an hereditary factor termed the morphogenotype (gene-induced bodily form) is in operation. Analogizing to the in utero development of the human embryo, Sheldon argued that the morphogenotype selectively works in physicochemical terms to emphasize the development of the ectodermal (nervous system, sense organs, etc.), endodermal (visceral and digestive organs, etc.), or mesodermal (muscles, bones, blood vessels, etc.) layers of the developing organism. The resulting bodily structure at birth is predominantly ectomorphic (thin, linear, delicate), endomorphic (rotund, often corpulent), or mesomorphic (muscular, large-boned, strong). Components of each of these dimensions are to be seen in every human form, and Sheldon has devised a series of ratings to score individuals along these "primary components of physique."

Sheldon reviewed the literature on personality and devised what he termed were the "primary components of temperament," as follows: viscerotonia (people who love physical comfort, are socially outgoing,

complacent, amiable, and love to eat and drink in the company of others); somatotonia (assertive, physically active people, who love risk-taking, competition, and the leader role); and cerebrotonia (people with restraint in action and emotion, a love of privacy, and a hypersensitivity to pain). Empirical study of the relationship between the physique and temperament established that endomorphy was related to viscerotonic personality tendencies, ectomorphy to cerebrotonic traits, and mesomorphy to somatotonic behaviors. Although there are obvious problems here of the "chicken-egg" variety, not to mention the effects of diet on bodily developments, we see here one fine example of a theory of personality relying upon purely "natural science" explanation. It is not a very thorough explication of the human pattern, but neither does it presume to explain all things. Sheldon has extended his study to include individual differences among delinquents, the sexes, and so forth.

Allport's "Functional Autonomy"

One of the more challenging issues put to men who considered themselves students of personality was the question of just how behavior in the present was sustained. Addressing himself directly to the behaviorist's conception of a stimulus-response sequence (efficient cause) that had been stamped into habit by a reinforcement (material cause in physical satiation), Gordon Allport proposed that some behaviors become functionally

autonomous of such "drive reductions." Although a child might have initially studied his school books because his parents showed him love and gave him financial rewards for good grades, the mature adult can in fact acquire along the way a love of knowledge per se. The "conditioning" process of earlier years is not irrelevant to the now functionally autonomous motivation, that is, free from the tie to specific reinforcements—that the activity itself has taken on. Behaviorists would term all such "function pleasures" to be extensions of the basic drive reductions (the physical caressing from parents) as so-called secondary reinforcements (pleasure in reading, acquiring knowledge, and so forth).

But Allport was trying in his own way to break personality description free of "yesterday's" blind directedness. He rejected not only behaviorism in this regard but also psychoanalysis—where he felt that man's higher behaviors were invariably reduced to yesterday's "fixations" having no real value for the behavior as witnessed. Allport was a transitional figure in psychology, accepting the merits of stimulus-response psychology even as he tried to conceptualize human behavior in less mechanistic and hence more teleological ways. Rather than speak of behavioral habits, Allport took as his basic unit of study the construct of a trait, which he defined as: ". . . a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system (peculiar to the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and expressive

behavior" (p. 295). Note the tie given here to the physical structure of the central nervous system (material cause). A trait is a formal cause notion, since it implies a self-bearing "style" of behavior.

Allport was thus hoping to point out that man's behavior is not blindly habitual, responsive to stimulus input *only,* but also to some degree self-directing and stylized. Man could behave "for the sake of" an interest, a fascination, a freely operating desire that he had learned over time was worthy of perpetuating in its own right. Allport popularized Windleband's distinction between the nomothetic and idiographic sciences in psychology. Psychology, he contended, must be like history—a study of the trend line of development over the course of life. One can learn a good deal about the nature of digestion by studying the alimentary canals of thousands of animals, from lower to higher, within the confines of an isolated laboratory. But one cannot learn why the French value one style of living while the Italians another without considering the respective histories of these nations. In the same way personality as a compendium of traits must be seen uniquely evolving across time. And to immerse oneself in the first five years, as Freud had done, or to believe that only through base reinforcement does man find the motivation to approach life, as Watson had done, was for Allport a common error in theoretical formulation. Man can be functionally autonomous from such base reinforcements, as he can be functionally autonomous from the fixations of toilet training.

Murphy's "Canalization"

Another historically important attempt to counter the more "mechanical" formulations of stimulus-response psychology was made by Gardner Murphy, when he distinguished between conditioning and canalization—a term used earlier by Pierre Janet in a different sense. A conditioned response, said Murphy, was indeed a mechanical sequence of events (efficient causes). But these movements were simply preparatory; they oriented the animal for eventual gratification that was itself more in the nature of an anticipated achievement leading to goal realization (p. 193). As the restaurant waitress approaches our table to take our order, there are various mechanical, unthinking conditioned responses that we make in ordering our meal; for example, we arrange our plate and table utensils, tap nervously on the menu, and so forth. But the consummatory act, the *goal* of eating what we choose to eat, is not itself a conditioned response or a class of such responses. What a person comes to prefer, comes to work for and select in life is not simply conditioned—it is canalized. Behavioral patterns thus become fixed through active, purposive, self-directed attempts on the part of the individual to channel (canalize) his behavior in terms of something he has personally discovered to be satisfying. Conditioned responses are passive and routine. Canalizations are active and selective.

Thus man is passively shaped in the Watsonian sense, but he is also

actively self-created through a process of anticipation and achievement (p. 170). One can see here an effort to bring some modicum of "that for the sake of which" into personality theory. As Allport would have it, man passes through life with an intellect open to the possibility in things. He is being demonstratively "input" with experience, but he has this capacity to evaluate such input, to take delight as well as to respond with simple animal satisfaction. At some point the taking delight begins selectively to direct what is satisfying. This directing or canalizing is entirely on the side of a final cause, possibly also including the formal cause as a kind of plan, wishful design, and so forth. Murphy thus did not deny the behavioral findings of the rat laboratory. He simply wished to point out that there was more to human behavior than this routine, blindly repetitive series of responses. Choice and purpose were "in" the picture.

Murray's "Regnancy of a Need"

H. A. Murray was to solve the problem of directed behavior in somewhat more physical terms than either Allport or Murphy. The behaviorists had referred to needs as specific tissue deprivations of some sort, as in the case of hunger or thirst. Murray was to broaden the scope of this term, using it much as Allport had used traits to include the purely psychological aspects of behavior. He viewed the need as a hypothetical property of force, presumably a force in the brain region that organizes behavior in a directional sense (p.

123). Needs generate action, which, in turn, eventuates in some counteracting environmental force termed a *press.* The individual with a great need for achievement might well find that there are forces in his experience that counter an easy access to wealth, the attainment of accolades for athletic prowess, or the professional recognition from colleagues. There are all kinds of environmental pressures against which the individual must struggle in order to gain the satisfaction of his needs.

The typical fashion in which people go about meeting their needs in the face of counteracting pressures from their life's milieu Murray called the *thema.* This entire theoretical account is essentially an analogy from Murray's projective test, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). In the same way that the clinician analyzes a "hero" figure in a TAT story, so, too, does the personality theorist assess the individual in his life circumstance.

Murray proposed a series of need terms to be used in the description of behavior, including aggression, achievement, affiliation, exhibition, order, and so forth. Precisely what an individual is like in personality could now be assessed in terms of the particular combinations of his unique needs, their level of satiation or deprivation, and the life circumstances (press) that faced him. The highly affiliative person, for example, after a period of time in which he might be forced to be alone, could well begin appearing highly frustrated and even abnormal simply because of his rising need state and the

circumstances of his life milieu. Murray retained a physical tie-in to the functioning of the body, making an effort to resolve the dualisms of Freudian or Jungian formulations. Dualisms have never fared well in psychological academic circles. The behaviorists had argued that habits took on a hierarchical arrangement—from lower-level, simple stimulus-response connections, to higher-level complexities of a more global nature (we see here a Lockean model being pressed). Murray now builds on this conception by arguing that certain needs were prepotent (overriding force) to other needs. Such needs demand answering in the "now"; they dominate our brain process as *regnancies* (predominant physiological reactions), assuring that some form of behavior will be undertaken to seek the goal that can satisfy the condition of a rising motivation (p. 45).

Since the need concept is now a psychological one, we can say that Murray has effectively resolved the dualism of classical analysis by claiming "wishes" or "cathexes" are regnant brain processes. The man under regnant brain processes heralding a prepotent need for achievement is to be seen driving himself forward across life's way to success at all costs. This theoretical usage puts a kind of directionality (final cause) in the account without actually making it seem that way, because all needs are either given at birth in physical constitution or they are "learned" (input influences a la Lockean model) over the years of development. Hence the image of man here is more introspective than classical behaviorism would have it, but we still do

not find that heavy aura of the "internal world" that Freud and Jung provide us with. Murray has milked the dialectical side of man out of his theory. Man no longer takes in an input meaning, reasons to its opposite meaning-implication, and thence directs himself via a true choice to some alternative or compromise creation all his own. Man is directed by regnancies emanating from physicochemical forces in the brain, forces that have been planted there by nature or by the social milieu. What quasi- dialectical clash there is takes place between these internal forces (needs) and the external counterforces in the milieu (press). But man *qua* man is not "in the middle" as Freud believed him to be, with an ego identity struggling internally to compromise the wishes of the id and superego identities.

Dollard and Miller's "Anxiety''

An even more thorough job of taking the dialectical capacities of man out of his theoretical conceptualization was accomplished by Dollard and Miller. Their motives were laudable, in that they hoped to cement laboratory theory of a Hullian cast with the insights of the consulting room and thereby unite psychology in a way it had never been united previously. Since stimulus-response theory is more abstract than clinical formulations, this translation could have been performed on Adler, Jung, Sullivan, and so forth. But Freud was selected, and the procedure adopted was to rewrite Freudian terminology into the more abstract Hullian terminology of cue, drive,

response, reinforcement, habit, and so forth. This is a drive reduction theory. A "drive" is a strong stimulus impelling action, which, when reduced (material cause), acts as a reinforcement of the stimulus-response regularity (efficient cause) that preceded it. Freud's sexual concept is interpreted as such a drive. There are basic drives (such as pain) and drives of a secondary cast, which can be easily attached (learned) to stimuli that do not ordinarily bring about a basic drive arousal.

One such secondary drive is anxiety, which is interpreted as a learned drive having the properties of fear, except that in the case of anxiety the source of the threat is vague (p. 63). We fear a train bearing down on us, but we are anxious knowing why. The point of importance for learning theory, however, is that when such vaguely stimulated anxieties are reduced—when we flee the elevator situation (claustrophobia)—this return to a normal emotional level acts as a reinforcement. It samps in the flight response, in relation to the elevator stimulus. Hence the next time we face an elevator situation we will be sure to flee in order to reduce the anxiety that has once again mounted due to inexplicable reasons.

Now this theoretical treatment of anxiety has become extremely important in psychology. For example, it lies at the heart of the so-called behavioral approaches to psychotherapy (see, for example, Wolpe). It has proved very popular because, just like Murray's regnancies, we have reduced

the Freudian dualisms of mental events versus bodily drives to a single, hence monistic, formulation. This is all very much in the traditions of natural science, and the essence of this tactic is to say that a physically based drive (material cause) brings about and sustains behavior (efficient cause) entirely "on its own." The neurotic's symptom is sustained because he reduces anxiety by performing it. His grasp of why he does this is vague, thanks in part to the fact that he has not paid sufficient attention to his life circumstances in the past. For example, when he was frightened as a child in an elevator, he "stopped thinking" as a response ("repression") and therefore never really knew what it was about the elevator that actually set off his fear (a loud noise, a frightening passenger, the fact that he was being taken to the dentist, and so forth). So far as learning theory is concerned, the actual reason for the symptom is unimportant, or at least quite secondary to the fact that a symptom now is coming about and must be removed.

Although many psychoanalysts today would agree with the statement "neurotics behave as they do to avoid anxiety," the actual translation of an introspective, Kantian-Lockean (Freudian) model into an extraspective, entirely Lockean (behaviorism) model *has* lost something in the translation. In the first place Freud's concept of repression was not one of a passive "stopping thought," or overlooking possible cues in the environment. The unconscious mind, according to Freud, knew only too well what it feared or lusted or hated. Second, Freud definitely did not want anxiety to take over the

motivation properties of the personality structure. That was the job of libido —an entirely mental construction of force or drive. This is why he stressed that only the ego could experience anxiety! As is well known, Freud relegated anxiety to an instrumental role as a warning sign (pp. 57-59). The warning to consciousness in neurotic anxiety was something to the effect: "watch out, your lustful desire for mother and your wish to kill father is going to pop up here in a moment and then you will have consciously to admit that you are a rapacious, incestuous pig and murderer." The conscious aspect of the ego is "inoculated" with a modicum of anxiety so that, rather than consciously dealing with such incestuous and murderous intentions or "wishes" (final causes), it deals with an unpleasant physical sensation (material and efficient causes). But to say that symptoms are aimed at avoiding anxiety is completely to misconstrue the meanings of Freudian theory. Neurotics behave as they do not to avoid anxiety, but to avoid the awareness of their completely psychic, unacceptable intentions!

Hence the wedding of Freudian and behavioral theory must and has altered the image of man being described. Theorists are dualists (mind-body) for reasons, and when one alters the necessary teleological implications of this dualism to meet the strictures of monistic scientific thought, he violates the reason impelling dualistic formulations from the outset. Freud had his Fliess, his "natural science conscience," and he gave the Lockean model a sincere effort in the *Project.* But he could not forego the meanings he was

trying to convey by conforming exclusively to the style of description that Dollard and Miller were later to employ. Hence we must count the latter's laudable efforts as only partially successful, through no real fault of their own. Some meanings simply *must* stand as framed.

Cattell's "Source Traits"

Baymond B. Cattell must surely be the foremost theorist to take a measurement approach to the assessment of personality. There is much of the Allport and Murray tactic in Cattell, for he begins with the assumption that behavior is constituted of traits, and that these Lockean building blocks combine to form the personality superstructure. Bather than a hierarchy Cattell speaks of a "dynamic lattice" in which some traits "subsidiate" (take precedence over and hence enter into) others. The unique twist that Cattell gives to the Lockean model is that he sees both surface and source traits in behavioral operation. Surface personality traits are the apparent manifestation of individual differences, superficial assessments that we make as observers because we have no way of directly viewing the commonalities lying beneath. Source traits, on the other hand, "promise to be the real structural influences underlying personality" (p. 27). Thus by using the trait designation Cattell captures a formal cause meaning, but his "source" adaptation gives us a kind of analogy to the reductive explanations of natural science. We get a quasi-material and quasi-efficient cause meaning here

through rough analogy, if nothing else.

What one must do to jump the gap between a surface and a source trait manifestation is carefully to measure overt behavior and then submit these crude empirical measures to the statistical refinement of factor analysis. One finds in this way a common "factor" accounting for various overt manifestations. In time a series of reference factors having universal relevance to behaviors will be empirically identified and carefully validated. This collection of source traits (universal index) can then be applied by the psychologist much as the chemist makes use of his periodic table of elements. So much of source factor A, combined with so much of source factors B and C, results in what we call superficially the (surface) trait of "leadership," and so on. Although an oversimplification this portrayal of Cattell's approach is basically accurate, and we can see in it the substrate notions of Lockean "simple" structures combining to form the higher order, "complex" structures. The specifics of just how personalities got to be the way they are "now" constituted would depend upon the typical "input" notion (efficient cause) of environmental influence, including conditioning and hereditary explanations.

Skinner s "Contingency"

We have already noted above that B. F. Skinner was an important figure in the "empirical law of effect" interpretation of reinforcement. Rather than

attributing behavioral regularities to such "inside the organism" concepts as needs, wishes, aspirations, intentions, and so on, Skinner argued that only those responses that "operate" on the environment to bring about rewarding events are retained by an organism. At least, most of an animal's response and virtually all of human responding is of this nature. Skinner termed this an operant response, and that "something" in the environment that serves as a reinforcement of such operants he termed a contingency. What are the contingencies of reinforcement available to an organism in the environment? If we know this, then we can easily predict what behavior it will *emit,* for behavior is always under the control of some class of empirically demonstrable reinforcing contingencies.

Although Skinner is not precisely a "personality theorist," surely his image of man has been given enough serious consideration by specialists in this area to rank him at the very top of contributors to the study of personality. And what he constantly emphasizes in all of his characterizations of man's behavior is that the environment and not man is the selective agent in behavioral control. He specifically rejects the concept of "autonomous man" (p. 67). Skinner, more than any other modern psychologist, is an uncompromising classicist in his image of man as exclusively an efficiently caused succession of events. He has acknowledged a debt to British empiricism (Lockean model) by noting to Evans that he "short- circuited" Kantian formulations (p. 15).

An even more remarkable observation on his theoretical stance is reflected in the following: “Operant behavior, as I see it, is simply a study of what used to be dealt with by the concept of purpose. The purpose of an act is the consequences it is going to have” (Evans, p. 19). We find here an almost startling preempting of the final by the efficient cause meaning. Through viewing man exclusively on extraspective terms, and fixing on the consequences of “that” behavior “over there,” Skinner can assess the consequences (contingent reinforcements) of “that” behavior to see which consequences perpetuate it and which do not. Once he determines empirically what such contingencies entail, he can exert what he takes to be a form of efficient cause control over it. But what if the organism “over there” is considered introspectively and judged to behave “for the sake of” personally held intentions, after all? What if, in the case of man, rather than his being under the control of the extraspective manipulator, he is actually simply conforming or cooperating with what he takes to be the manipulator’s purposes?

Well this would make no essential difference to the Skinnerian formulation. For example, psychologists have shown to general satisfaction that “being aware” of the response- reinforcement contingency, or, in other terms, knowing that verbal behavior X will lead to reinforcement Y, decidedly facilitates the efficiency of learning verbal behavior X. Some psychologists claim that there is very little, if any, verbal learning without such an

awareness on the part of the subject. This could easily be taken as evidence in support of a final cause view of behavior, with the response- reinforcement contingency interpreted as "that advantage, clue, goal, or plan for the sake of which" behavior is acquired and perpetuated. Yet such questions are not thought worthy of serious theoretical consideration in the Skinnerian world view because what is fixed upon is *only* the flow (impetus, efficient cause) of events across time. This is taken as "behavior." Just so long as it can be shown that certain contingencies lead to behavioral pattern A and other contingencies lead to behavior pattern B, this is all the Skinnerian feels obliged to deal with as he perfects his ability to "control" such patterns—from A to B and back again.

Rotter's "Expectancy"

When Tolman was working out his variant brand of "purposive behaviorism," he emphasized that input stimuli are rarely translated directly into output responses, because as Woodworth had observed, there is a certain "mediation" of the organism in between. This Kantian notion of a "cognitive map" was central to the Gestaltist theorists who inspired Tolman, but in accounting for the continuing influence that an organism (rat, man) has upon his experience, Tolman was to speak of what have ever since been called "mediators" in learning theories. Dollard and Miller have made considerable use of this mediation construct in their translations of Freud. Higher mental

processes (thoughts, words, language) all come down to an operation of some such mediating "cue stimulus" or "anticipatory goal response." Animals learn to begin responding even before they see their reward (reinforcement), said Hull. Anthropomorphizing, we might say that the dog "knows" his dinner is waiting ahead, for he salivates noticeably and breaks into a more rapid run as he sees his master's house ahead. But actually the dog anticipates nothing at all. He has simply been trained to respond to certain "antedating" cues, so that over time his salivation response began moving ahead in time, from his food dish, to the door leading from outdoors, to the silhouette of the entire house ahead, and so forth.

Hull was the behaviorist to develop this line of theory most creatively, and he was obviously trying to account for what in other contexts might be termed intentional or purposive behavior without resorting to a teleology. In personality study Adler and Lewin had been developing conceptions of human behavior based on what has since been called the level of aspiration. Adler made no bones about this being a teleological conception, claiming that people laid down a definite plan (prototype, fife plan) "for the sake of which" they then aspired to further their advantages in living. Lewin's conception was also teleological, but he was not quite so outspoken because he was trying to meet some of the natural science objections to final cause description.

It remained for Julian B. Rotter, a theorist who was influenced by Hull, Adler, and (to a lesser extent) Lewin, to raise this conception of aspiration level to what is probably its most thorough and well-rounded expression. Rotter changed the descriptive label to expectancy, but it has the same meaning of "that for the sake of which" an individual may be influencing his behavior. The child who expects to earn (aspires to) school grades at the A level is crushed with a grade of B, whereas the child expecting C's is elated with the same achievement. One's life circumstance cannot be entirely circumscribed by the "simple facts" of reality. Rotter also added the concept of reinforcement value to say, for example, that even some things that are easy to attain in life are not valued. If we wish to predict behavior we must know not only what the person is expecting, but how much he values that which is upcoming. The child who docs not value education will give little effort to it even if achieving good grades is relatively easy for him.

Although he has moved his descriptions over to the introspective perspective, and his account is far less mechanistic than the classical behaviorist's, Rotter's psychology remains heavily Lockean in tone. He is clearly in the line of descent we have been reviewing to this point. Expectancies amount to past "inputs," learned through conditioning in experience on the basis of an empirical law of effect and functioning in the present as special kinds of mediators. The value of reinforcement is also a function of past reinforcement. Man is not viewed as capable of reasoning to

the opposite of what is given, drawing out an expectancy- aspiration of some other possibility, and then aspiring to what was *never* known, much less reinforced, in the past. Yet Rotter's theory is probably best classified as a mixed Kantian- Lockean model, and he forms a nice bridge to the more clearly Kantian approaches we now turn to.

Lewin s "Life Space"

Although he was not an orthodox Gestalt theorist, there can be little doubt that Kurt Lewin received considerable stimulation from the work of Wertheimer, Koffka, and particularly Kohler—all of whom were his colleagues for a time at Berlin University before he came to America. Lewin took the Gestalt concept of a perceptual phenomenal field and drew it out into a view of the life space, or the total psychological environment that each of us experiences subjectively. This (formal cause) construct embraced needs, goals, unconscious influences, memories, and literally anything else that might have an influence on one's behavior. Rather than seeing behavior as an incoming process of stimulus-to-response, Lewin constantly stressed that behavior takes on field properties as an ongoing process of organization and interpretation following Gestaltlike principles.

The course of behavior follows paths or pathways between one's present location in his life space and the goal or goal region (level of

aspiration) that attracted him. Other goal regions might repel the individual (negative valence), and it is the sum total of all the field forces (efficient causes) entering into an overall pattern (Gestalt, formal cause) that led to behavior (locomotion) within the life space. Hence behavior was directed, and although Lewin might be said to have introduced a modicum of teleology in this more introspective account, the directedness of this behavior was put extraindividually in the sense that the "person" or "personality" is merely one organized subportion of the entire life space. Motions within the field (efficient causes) can be induced by any portion of this life space.

Lewin's handling of teleology is therefore quite unique and rather moderate in relation to the more extreme final cause formulations that can be tied to man's image. The life space is, of course, a derivative concept of the Kantian categories or predicating "spectacles" that are the major contributor to behavior in this theoretical style. But Lewinian psychology is not a complete idealism. Lewin accepted what might be termed a noumenal world on the "other side" of the phenomenal life space. Such influences on behavior as the fact that a path under our foot is slippery, or a roof over our head leaks water, were influences emanating from the foreign hull. As a permeable membrane the life space (formal cause) interacted with such foreign hull influences (material causes), making such alterations in its organization as were called for and mutually altering the status of the foreign hull by reciprocal influences.

Kelly's "Personal Constructs"

One of the most clearly Kantian formulations in the literature is to be seen in George A. Kelly's "Psychology of Personal Constructs." Unlike Rotter, who viewed expectancies as past input influences based upon a reinforcement principle, Kelly ascribed an active intellect to man, one that construed experience rather than passively took it in. For Kelly an expectancy is to be thought of in terms of both a formal and a final cause meaning. It is a stylized meaning through which or "for the sake of which" the individual advances on life daily. Of course, Kelly's actual term is that of the personal construct rather than the expectancy. Just as Kant had argued that freely created thought is dialectical in its essence, so, too, did Kelly view the process of construing as bipolar in nature (p. 304). When one affirms the commonality of events that he has observed recurring over time, he must also negate some other aspect of that recurring experience. To say "Redheads tend to be hotheads" is also to say "Nonredheads tend to be level-headed."

Thought is only possible, said Kelly, because man can dichotomize elements of experience into similarities and contrasts (p. 62). The products of thought, or constructs, state in either clear or highly nebulous terms how "two elements are similar and contrast with a third" (p. 61). Constructs are working hypotheses, predictions, appraisals, and even pathways of movement, for they frame in our meaningful experience like transparent

templets (Kantian spectacles), and hence predetermine just what is possible for us to do. Man is determined mechanically only when he construes himself in this fashion. Constructs are either permeable and capable of change, or they are impermeable, rigid, and frozen into a form of thought Kelly termed pre-emptive. To change behavior we must change the constructs determining that behavior. The philosophy that expresses a strong faith in man's capacity to do precisely this Kelly termed "constructive alternativism." Although constructs are ultimately highly subjective or "personal" in nature, they can be understood introspectively if we make serious efforts to see things from the slant of the personality under study.

Constructs can also be objective in that many men can understand the meanings implied in the same set of constructs. To further a clinician's ability to identify the constructs of his clients Kelly formulated the "Role Construct Repertory Test," or, more simply, the "Rep Test." A role construct is one that defines the individual's more important interpersonal behavior; for example, when he perceives another individual as also a construer, and to that extent enters into an interpersonal relationship with him. By contrasting and comparing how various figures in his life (mother, father, best friend, admired teacher, disliked associate, and so forth) were like and yet different from a third figure, Kelly was able to fashion a list of core personal constructs that he then used to see the world from his client's eyes. "How are your mother and ex-girlfriend alike, and yet different from your wife?" This would be a typical

example of the way in which role constructs are evoked. The individual is free to select his own terms. Kelly devised a nonparametric procedure for factor analyzing these many different constructs to find the very heart of the individual's construct system. This idiographic manner of factor analyzing data is quite different from that of Cattell's, and the image of man that results is, of course, diametrically opposed to the Lockean formulations of the more nomothetic approach.

Maslow's "Third Force Psychology"

Abraham Maslow coined the phrase "The Third Force" in psychological theory by which he meant an approach in the traditions of people like Allport and Rogers. He seems to have identified this approach as "humanistic psychology," a phrase that has achieved considerable prominence in the post-World War II era. After passing through a period of fascination with Watsonian behaviorism, Maslow moved on to emphasize such concepts as self-actualization, human potential, and peak experience. These terms attest to man's capacity for teleological advance, based upon a hierarchy of lower-to-higher needs that rest upon one another, yet are fundamentally independent of each other. Maslow thus picks up the conception of need developed by Murray, as dealing with both physical and psychological necessities. Physiological needs lie at the base of the hierarchy of needs, with higher-level needs such as love, esteem, the need to grow and self-actualize

coming into the organization as kind of emergents. The important point is that one cannot find the meaning of higher-level needs by reducing them to the lower-level needs. Further, it is inevitable that as the lower-level, physical needs are being met, the more humanistic needs will begin to seek expression and gain satisfaction.

Hence, just as neo-Darwinian theorists speak of emergents in the evolutionary processes of nature, so, too, does Maslow rely upon this tactic to modify the Lockean hierarchy that held that the lower levels constitute higher levels and to know the latter we must deal with the formed. This is a clear Gestalt or holistic infusion, a tempering of the more mechanistic features of Lockean thought while striving to retain continuity with the physical aspects of nature. As a theoretical device it is comparable to Freud's uniting of body (physical) and mind (psychological) through use of the instinct concept. Maslow actually based much of his thought on biological conceptions, feeling that there was a "growing tip" to the advance of organismic life (natural teleology). If we want to get a sense of the higher life that evolution is making possible, we should investigate our more self-actualized human life histories. Maslow did just that, isolating the factors of important historical figures like Lincoln and Einstein, whom he judged to be self-actualized individuals.

Maslow claimed that self-actualized individuals see life more clearly than other people. They are more decisive and can take a stand with greater

confidence, for they are prepared to name what is right and what is wrong about life. They have a childlike simplicity and usually admit their lack of knowledge in an area of what is clearly their expertise. Though very confident they are humble and more open in their general approach to others. Without exception they have some worthy task to which they commit themselves completely—a career, duty, or vocation that presses on them, fascinates them, and gives them a sense of fulfillment even though it is not always easy or pleasurable to accomplish. They are, above all, spontaneous and creative in their behavior, willing to "be themselves" for they lack pretense and defensiveness. Mas- low coined the term *Eupsychian* to describe the society that a group of such self-actualized individuals would form if left to their own devices—say, on a secluded island. Presumably the society would reflect their common tendencies: a biological utopia of our very best, the "growing tip" dipped off and transplanted to flower as all utopias do—apart and unmolested by the common foliage.

Piaget's "Schemata"

Although he worked for years in relative obscurity, Jean Piaget has assumed major importance in the outlook of many psychologists during the post-World War II years. Piaget has a concept of the schema that is reminiscent of Kellyian constructs, but it takes on a developmental frame of reference in that presumably we are dealing here with innately prompted

constructions. Thus Piaget argues that schemata are first brought into play on the basis of reflexive activity, as when the infant first employs his sucking reflex, bringing it to bear on the mother's nipple. This process of aligning a patterned behavior (schema) to a proper stimulus Piaget termed accommodation. Once fixed in this fashion the experience of sucking takes on meaning to the child, although of course, the extent of meaningful grasp is limited due to the lack of language. One sees here a decidedly introspective formulation of what is a formal cause term (schema, pattern). The nature of human maturation is now a question of extending and in time patterning various schemata into more and more meaning. The child begins to notice and suck other objects—his fingers, a blanket, and so forth—coming to enlarge this already accommodated schema. This process of enlarging and enriching schemata Piaget termed assimilation.

The essence of Piagetian motivation theory is that the child and then the adult tries to keep his schema relevant and applicable to experience. Schemata that are not assimilable are meaningless by definition, so it is essential to human intelligence that a continuing growth takes place. Much of Piaget's empirical work has involved the study of maturing children, tracing how this process of continuing, expanding, and changing schemata takes place. For example, he early found that the natural experience of reality for the child is anthropomorphic. The child perceives natural events of all sorts, including rain, wind, and so on in terms of intentions and willful acts. The five

year old says that the sun's rays push the wind into activity or organize the clouds to look pretty. Only by about age eight or ten does the child completely divest the physical world of human qualities and view it in purely physical, mechanical terms. Piaget called this early phase "precausal" thinking, but we can see here the time-honored issue of final-formal versus material-efficient causes manifesting itself. The basic question is: do children think "primitively" or do they think entirely "naturally," so that their teleological formulations are actually the phenomenal truth? Piaget leans in the former direction, and thus he departs from existentialism.

Rogers' "Wisdom of Organic Evidence"

It is well and good for science to lay down its principles of explanation, viewing animistic explanations such as children proffer to be "precausal" or "primitive," but does this change what is taking place? The child does, after all, experience intentionality phenomenally. Who is to say that this experience is not therefore just as vital to the meaning of existence as the so-called scientific laws that presumably are the "real cause" of such experience? Although anthropomorphic experience may be recast in the efficient cause substrate of stimulus-response psychology, this does not mean that the causes that propel the individual through his phenomenal field are being identified. What if teleological considerations are at play? This line of argument takes us deeply into the phenomenological-existentialistic or

"cognitive" theoretical sphere, and a foremost spokesman here has been Carl R. Rogers.

Rogers is widely known for his expounding of a phenomenal field construct, which is similar to, although more subjective than, Lewin's life space concept (p. 97). Man's physiological-biological and psychological experience combines to funnel into his organismic experience by way of the phenomenal world. Distinctions of body-mind are thus dropped for all practical purposes since, in essence, man comes to know as much by way of his sensory feelings as he does by way of his conscious symbols. Indeed, says Rogers, there is "a discriminating evaluative physiological organismic response to experience, which may precede the conscious perception of such experience" (p. 507). This organic valuing process is important to the individual. It has a sense of what is worthy and true phenomenally even before rational justification might be given symbolically in words. Hence there is in a sense wisdom within the organic evidence of feeling tones. Extending this, Rogers literally comes to a "naturalistic ethic," for he claims that people all over the world have a common base of organismic valuing, stemming essentially from man's common base in organic evolution. As he summarizes it: "The suggestion is that though modern man no longer trusts religion or science or philosophy nor any system of beliefs to *give* him values, he may find an organismic valuing base within himself which, if he can learn again to be in touch with it, will prove to be an organized, adaptive, and social

approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of us" (p. 441).

Hence modern man must be unafraid to be "what he is." He cannot allow science to define him or to control him. To be what Rogers calls the fully functioning person (Maslow's selfactualized individual), the human being must trust to his feelings and to the feelings of others. Science may tell the person that he is under the control of outwardly determined natural laws, but what does he subjectively perceive (phenomenally) if not a sense of personal decision and self-direction? Rogers moved from individual therapy to a concern with group encounter based on this naturalistic ethic. The point of sensitivity training is to make one aware of his personal contributions to the phenomenal reality of others. By turning in on himself and discovering a pattern of natural feelings very similar to others, the individual can drop the facades of social niceties and the masks of social defenses. The person as enacted in overt behavior can become "one" or congruent with the feeling tones he has been ignoring or denying in the past. With everyone in the group 100 percent in tune with their sincere feelings, a higher level of phenomenal living is achieved.

In one sense Rogers has avoided the dualism of mind-body in his uniting phenomenal field construct; but in another he has brought on a second dualism of the "feeling versus symbolizing" variety. Although clearly a Kantian and having the typical existentialistic-phenomenologistic approach to

man, Rogers comes back to a firm basis for ethics in the physical reactions of the body. Material causes (feelings) somehow clue us to what is "best" (final cause) through a patterning of sensations (formal cause). They tell us when we feel this way or that, and no further "reason" —reduction to substrate stimulus-responses, or Freudian fixations—is needed for a more healthy pattern to emerge. If everyone listened to their feelings and behaved genuinely, in time behaviors would seek their level. The bully would acknowledge his hostility and the coward would express his fears in a way never before possible. The result would be a more genuine, sincere, fully functioning life for all.

Boss's "Meaning Disclosing" Dasein

In developing our phenomenological tradition we have made it appear that all theorists in this line are clearly Kantian, that they take on some such "spectacles" notions as Binswanger's world designs, Kelly's constructs, or Piaget's schemata. Actually there are positions that are not this easy to classify within the phenomenological camp. Medard Boss is an excellent case in point. Although both he and Binswanger were stimulated by the philosophy of Heidegger, Boss's interpretation of the latter's philosophy seems closer to accuracy. Heidegger—at least in his later writings—was trying to avoid the separation of Dasein (existence, experience) into the *a priori* (Kantian spectacles) and the *a posteriori* (the resultant existence as

phenomenally gleaned). The meanings of Dasein for Binswanger and other classical Kantian views are "endowed" by the world designs that frame in experience. For Boss, on the other hand, Dasein is always "disclosed." Boss liked to speak of it as *luminating* or shining forth, disclosing itself to man's awareness rather than vice versa (p. 39).

This has the practical effect of making Boss's existentialism appear more Lockean in the sense that Dasein is issuing toward awareness in a quasi-input sense. Actually, of course, this is not the intent of Boss's construction. What he is emphasizing here is the completely free and unbiased nature of phenomenal experience. Even a Kantian "category of understanding" is to that extent forming experience. It is pressing on experience something that is not part and parcel of that experience, much in the way that science presses its arbitrary efficient causes onto teleological behavior or Freud presses his infant analogues onto mature behavior. We must not reduce one level to another in a truly phenomenological-existential approach.

This "purity criticism" can be taken back in the history of modern existentialism to Kierkegaard's ridicule of Hegelian logic (see Rychylak, p. 390). Hegel had concocted a logic that was a brilliant example of how the mind can create "a position." But when Hegel now took this to be "the" position he made himself ridiculous on the fact of things, said Kierkegaard. In

like fashion the very heart of existentialistic positions has always been to undermine the pat, the set, the rigid certainties of contrived experiences. What it seeks is “pure” experience, as immediately luminated to the mind’s eye. The anthropomorphizing child is therefore not “primitive”; he is entirely “human” (see Piaget, above). Man is teleological in his essence, and he must therefore take responsibility for what he does. Existentialists catchwords like commitment, engagement, and confrontation flow from this philosophical premise.

The Final Question: What Is Personality?

It should be clear now that the reason it was impossible to write this chapter around "the" personality is because of the interlacing classical issues framed by our opening questions. It does seem that a personality term borrows greatest meaning from the pattern or style of behavior witnessed among people. This would make it predominantly a "formal cause" term. Such styles are usually first identified in terms of the "total" person, so that the personality scheme is likely to begin as a typology. We study individuals and construe an oral or anal personality picture. Then, as surely as anything, the type gradually develops into a trait theory as we begin seeing signs of orality and anality in other and then all people "more or less." This is not to say that trait theories cannot begin as such; it is to suggest that the usual historical pattern has been to move from typologies to trait theories.

It is when we begin to explicate why there are such "individual differences" among people that our other causes come into play. A classical solution here is to fall back on genetic-hereditary explanations, as in the morphogenotype of Sheldon. There is almost no rebuttal to this proclamation that people differ because they are born that way. Enlarging upon this we can say that people differ because they have different needs, or that their needs (instincts, drives, etc.) have been differentially met. We can now extend this to in- elude learned needs, and even Rotterian expectancies that serve to

influence behavior in one direction rather than another. The behavioral approach of stimulus-response psychology has been fundamentally opposed to the study of individual differences in behavior. Individual differences are merely differential controls being exerted on the basic organism that itself follows common (basic) laws. Needs are reinforcers when met, and insofar as the term "personality" has any meaning at all, it refers to the habit hierarchy that results when these reinforced behaviors have been fashioned or "shaped" (formal cause) by experience.

The social milieu is extremely important to the behaviorist's formulations, since it must be assumed that the inputs that fashion behavior are prompted by one's culture, social group, and so forth. In the final analysis every behaviorist psychologist is a social psychologist. Cattell's test-based conceptions of personality are no different, for he would think of personality as a set of source characteristics employed by a psychologist to predict how person X behaves in situation Y. This is a fairly general attitude among laboratory psychologists, who have moved away from the more classical personality grand theory formulations to rely increasingly on measurement and methodological test to substantiate a more restricted area of study, which is sometimes called a miniature theory. But the upshot is that individual differences and uniqueness in the study of personality have given ground to the more common formulations of behavior. This "common" behavior is well-captured in efficient cause terms, such as the S-R construct. But what of the

style of such behaviors? And how much influence docs the individual himself have on this styling of his personal behavior?

Those theorists who reject the more passive, Lockean conceptions of the human condition argue that behavior is also shaped by the individual, who formulates personal constructs (Kelly) or furthers schemata (Piaget) over his lifetime. Man is a potentially higher animal for some (Maslow), and hence we can not find his unique humanity in the reductive common substrate of a lower form of behavior. The phenomenologists and existentialists take this a good deal further, and staunchly defend the thesis that only man can be the measure for man.

When we now focus on that most human of all animals we must of necessity ponder the corollary to our present question: “What is human?” And here it would seem that, by science’s own standards, if the world of natural events is not to be anthropomorphized, then the anthrop is not to be naturalized! Existentialism is most eloquent in this argument, but we must surely see in every attempt to account for human behavior a kind of teleology being espoused; or at least a good deal of theoretical effort put into a substitute for this kind of description. Continuing in this vein, it would seem to us that to be human is to be responsive to final causation.

But how is this to be conceptualized? Is it not unquestionably certain

that man responds to his past antecedents? Does not learning fashion his present behavioral predilections? Without denying the fact of antecedent events we must point out that antecedents can be such things as the Adlerian "life plans," which are, when put into effect, done so "for the sake of" their intended goals. But are these not simply mediators, plans themselves put into the so-called human being just as mediating stimuli are programmed into a rat? The final rejoinder here is: "No, not if meanings are bipolar and man as a human animal can reason dialectically. If this is true then that state of 100 per cent control from outside the organism that theorists like Skinner speak about is flatly impossible." Hence the heuristic device that a theorist *must* fall back on at some point if he is to ascribe humanity to man is the dialectic. One cannot program an animal that reasons by opposites!

So, in closing this chapter, it would be our argument that the term "personality" is superfluous without the predicate assumptions of a humanly dialectical intelligence, which can take in meaningful experience, consider alternatives by way of opposite implication in this experience, and then project a plan, hypothesis, goal, aim, intention, purpose—call it what you will! —"for the sake of which" it behaves. This behavioral pattern is not simply the result of control, nor is it even mediated behavior. Rather it is created, conformed to, and premised upon. Here again the reader is under the persuasion—*not* the control—of a neo-Kantian theorist. He can reason to the opposite of the argument now being summarized, and—we firmly believe—

come up with an alternative that will best suit him. But if he can do that, he can also "be" a distinct, unique person. Terms used to describe him in these creative efforts are properly thought of as personality concepts.

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