The Talking Cure

Religious Conversion or Therapy:

The Priestly Psychiatrist in T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party*

Jeffrey Berman Ph.D.

Religious Conversion or Therapy:

The Priestly Psychiatrist in T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party*

JEFFREY BERMAN

e-Book 2015 International Psychotherapy Institute

From *The Talking Cure* by Jeffrey Berman

Created in the United States of America

Religious Conversion or Therapy: The Priestly Psychiatrist in T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party*

> What is hell? Hell is oneself
> Hell is alone, the other figures in it
> Merely projections. There is nothing to escape from
> And nothing to escape to. One is always alone.
>
> The Cocktail Party[1]

In 1932, T. S. Eliot delivered four broadcast talks over the BBC in which he discussed the major challenges to religious faith: communism, psychology, and science. Of the three, psychology posed the greatest threat to him. "It is only when the psychologists tend to persuade us, first that we are all ill in mind, next that we all need to acquire something of their science in order to understand each other and ourselves, and finally that psychology will supply that guide and rule of conduct which the Christian faith used to give, and still does give to some; it is only when these three assertions appear that the modern dilemma is engaged."[2] Distressed by the growing influence of psychology, Eliot warns against the loss of religious values. "Psychology is an indispensable handmaid to theology; but, I think, a very poor housekeeper." He singles out two harmful effects of modern psychology: the danger of invoking psychological determinism to rationalize crime, and the tendency to accept primitive instincts as more real than spiritual desires. Eliot mistrusts the Oedipus complex, in particular, which he views as seeking to explain

original sin in terms of sexual drives. Up to a point, he concedes, psychoanalytic theory offers certain advantages. "To know oneself, that is good, and it is a lesson in humility to learn how primitive we are." But it does not follow, he continues, that all our suppressed desires should be satisfied or that the idea of sublimation is logically valid. " 'Sublimation' in effect means, I think, just substitution; and there is no substitute for anything." For psychology, then, to replace religion is highly dangerous. Eliot did not comment upon the opposite possibility, the belief that religion can be a substitute for psychotherapy in the treatment of mental illness.

It is clear from Eliot's writings that he identified Freud as the embodiment of the pernicious secularism assaulting age-old religious truths. In a four-page review of *The Future of an Illusion* published in his influential journal *The Criterion,* Eliot characterizes Freud's book as both shrewd and stupid. "The stupidity appears not so much in historical ignorance or lack of sympathy with the religious attitude, as in verbal vagueness and inability to reason."[3] Eliot criticizes Freud's definition of culture and illusion, correctly noting the psychoanalyst's refusal to question his boundless faith in science. Until the end of the review, Eliot wages a restrained semantic attack on psychoanalysis, in contrast to Freud's bold assault on religion. At the end, however, Eliot's restraint gives way to icy condescension in his attack on the inflated claims of the Freudians. "I have the impression that the real pundits of the real sciences, such as mathematical physics, are often less confident of

anything than Freud is of everything. But it is naturally the adepts of the parvenu sciences, in their anxiety to affirm that their science really is a science, who make the most exaggerated claims for 'science' as a whole. This is a strange book." It should be remembered that Eliot had converted to Anglicanism in 1927, just one year before his review of *The Future of an Illusion.* In 1932 he again sharpened his attack on Freud, not only in the BBC broadcasts but in "Thoughts After Lambeth," where he returned to the "quantity of nonsense" generated by humanists and scientists over the subject of religion. "Dr. Sigmund Freud, with characteristic delicacy of feeling, has reminded us that we should 'leave Heaven to die angels and the sparrows'; following his hint, we may safely leave 'religion' to Mr. Julian Huxley and Dr. Freud."[4]

Eliot was no more able to leave psychiatry to the physicians, however, than Freud was willing to leave religion to the theologians. Eliot's mistrust of psychology—which he equated with psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and psychological approaches to literature—spans five decades of writing. Before we examine the conflict between religious conversion and psychotherapy in *The Cocktail Party,* it may be helpful to recall his efforts to purify literary criticism from what he called the "curious-Freudian-social-mystical-rationalistic-higher-critical interpretation of the Classics and what used to be called the Scriptures" (*Selected Essays,* p. 62). He viewed the modern dilemma as an Edenic garden overgrown not by scholarly neglect but by an excess of

benign scrutiny. "A number of sciences have sprung up in an almost tropical exuberance which undoubtedly excites our admiration, and the garden, not unnaturally, has come to resemble a jungle" (*Selected Essays,* p. 62). To cut through the jungle to restore classical order and religious truth was Eliot's goal; to do this, he sought to show that psychiatry is as antithetical to spiritual concerns as psychological interpretation is to creative art.

Despite the enormous quantity of critical commentary on Eliot's work, surprisingly little has been written on his antipathy toward psychology. To be sure, he cannot be faulted for his insistence that a psychopathological approach to literature invariably reduces the imagination to disease, a position Freud implicitly held. Writing at a time when psychoanalysts failed to stress the creative aspects of art—the artist's ability to synthesize disparate elements and create an imaginative reality often superior to the scientist's material reality—Eliot vigorously warned against the danger of reducing an artist's work to the product of a neurosis. Baudelaire's *"ennui,"* he writes in a 1930 essay, "may of course be explained, as everything can be explained in psychological or pathological terms; but it is also, from the opposite point of view, a true form of *acedia,* rising from the unsuccessful struggle towards the spiritual life" (*Selected Essays,* p. 423). Instead of reducing spirituality to sexuality, Eliot chooses the opposite direction as he elevates anguished emotion into a higher or loftier religious preoccupation. Without ignoring Baudelaire's morbid temperament or intense personal

suffering, Eliot affirms his knowledge of good and evil, his moral consciousness. Acknowledging Baudelaire's insistence upon the "evil of love" and his "constant vituperation of the female," Eliot remains uninterested in its causes. "In this there is no need to pry for psychopathological causes, which would be irrelevant at best; for his attitude towards women is consistent with the point of view which he had reached" *(Selected Essays,* pp. 429-430). As we shall see, Eliot's comments on Baudelaire's vision of the evil of love and the constant vituperations of the female reflect the identical point of view that informs his own vision in *The Cocktail Party.* Eliot engages in what can only be called rationalization when he observes that Baudelaire "was at least able to understand that the sexual act as evil is more dignified, less boring, than as the natural, 'life-giving', cheery automatism of the modern world." That sexuality could be dignified *and* natural, life giving *and* human, is a view that remains conspicuously absent from Eliot's world. In fact, he goes out of his way to legitimize the "objective," hence universal nature of Baudelaire's vision.

In another essay on the French poet, Eliot returns to the subject of psychopathology, strongly protesting Arthur Symons' assertion that Baudelaire's work is the "direct result of his heredity and of his nerves." Great art, affirms Eliot, transcends the personal problems that may burden the artist's life. Once again he protests that an artist's mental problems are irrelevant to the objectivity of his art. "We cannot be *primarily* interested in

any writer's nerves (and remember please that 'nerves' used in this way is a very vague and unscientific term) or in anyone's heredity except for the purpose of knowing to what extent that writer's individuality distorts or detracts from the objective truth which he perceives. If a writer sees truly—as far as he sees at all—then his heredity and nerves do not matter."[5]

But despite Eliot's fear that a preoccupation with psychological questions deflects the reader's attention away from the text and onto the artist's life, he often acknowledged his fascination for the unconscious elements of art. This is one of the many curious inconsistencies in Eliot's attitude toward psychology. In "The Frontiers of Criticism" (1956), he acknowledges a definite role for the psychobiographer. "I do not suggest that the personality and the private life of a dead poet constitute sacred ground on which the psychologist must not tread. The scientist must be at liberty to study such material as his curiosity leads him to investigate—so long as the victim is dead and the laws of libel cannot be invoked to stop him."[6] He even goes so far as to suggest that the biographer have clinical experience, lest he practice armchair psychology on the artist's life. It is true that Eliot immediately qualifies his remarks in such a way as almost to rule out psycho-biographical approaches to literature. Few literary critics, after all, are also trained clinicians. Nevertheless, it is surprising how often Eliot makes passing references, usually unexpectedly, to neurologists and pathologists. In "A Dialogue on Dramatic Poetry" (1928), one of Eliot's speakers affirms the

value and mystery of verse drama. "The human soul, in intense emotion, strives to express itself in verse. It is not for me, but for the neurologists, to discover why this is so, and why and how feeling and rhythm are related" (*Selected Essays,* p. 46). A similar idea appears in his 1919 essay on *Hamlet.* "The intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without an object or exceeding its object, is something which every person of sensibility has known; it is doubtless a subject of study for pathologists" (*Selected Essays,* p. 146). Eliot's references to psychology are generally pejorative, as when he labels it an "alien or half-formed science" (*Selected Essays,* p. 347), but he sometimes uses the word in a more positive context. He esteems the two greatest masters of diction in French literature, Baudelaire and Racine, as the "greatest two psychologists, the most curious explorers of the soul" *(Selected Essays,* p. 290).

Eliot also praises Dante in psychological terms, and the great Italian medieval poet occasioned Eliot's remarkable excursion into depth psychology'. Eliot's lengthy 1929 essay reveals a startling acceptance of psychoanalytic theory, at least to the extent that he understood it. Eliot Touches upon many of the problematic religious and psychological issues that he explores more deeply in *The Cocktail Party,* including the Dantesque belief that "Hell is not a place but a *state;* that man is damned or blessed in the creatures of his imagination . . ." *(Selected Essays,* p. 250). Eliot begins by speculating whether the type of sexual experience Dante describes in the *Vita*

Nuova as occurring at the age of nine could have actually happened to the poet. "My only doubt (in which I found myself confirmed by a distinguished psychologist) is whether it could have taken place so *late* in life as the age of nine years. The psychologist agreed with me that it is more likely to occur at about five or six years of age" (p. 273). Far from isolating literature from psychology, Eliot invokes a clinical authority to confirm his intuition. He also theorizes that the lady about whom Dante writes may have been a "blind for someone else, even for a person whose name Dante may' have forgotten or never known"—in short, a Freudian screen memory. Unlike a Freudian approach to art, however, Eliot emphasizes not origins but final causes. He focuses, that is, on higher spiritual love rather than lower sexual drives. Yet he accepts the Freudian theory of sublimation and uses the word without major qualification. "At any rate, the *Vita Nuova,* besides being a sequence of beautiful poems connected by a curious vision-literature prose is, I believe, a very sound psychological treatise on something related to what is now called 'sublimation' " (p. 275). Similarly, in "Baudelaire In Our Time" Eliot speaks approvingly of the "sublimation of passion" toward which the French poet was always striving.[7]

In affirming the theory of sublimation, with its emphasis upon the dynamic transformation of sexual drives into spiritually higher or socially more acceptable activity, Eliot intuits a mysterious relationship between suffering and artistic creativity. The poet, he writes in "The Three Voices of

Poetry'" (1953),

> is oppressed by a burden which he must bring to birth in order to obtain relief. Or, to change the figure of speech, he is haunted by a demon, a demon against which he feels powerless, because in its first manifestation it has no face, no name, nothing; and the words, the poem he makes, are a kind of form of exorcism of this demon. In other words again, he is going to all that trouble, not in order to communicate with anyone, but to gain relief from acute discomfort; and when the words are finally arranged in the right way—or in what he comes to accept as the best arrangement he can find—he may experience a moment of exhaustion, of appeasement, of absolution, and of something very near annihilation, which is in itself indescribable.[8]

The metaphor of the creative process represents a striking revision of the old theory of the poet as catalyst that Eliot had enunciated in his celebrated essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919). "The poet's mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together" *(Selected Essays,* p. 19). Eliot's former mechanistic view of the artist, reminiscent of Freud's comparison of the psychoanalyst to a catalytic agent, which sets into motion a process that must inexorably proceed along its own way, now gives way to imagery of confession and therapeutic relief. Psychology replaces chemistry.[9] Eliot's analogy of sulphurous acid has quietly vaporized into the familiar psychoanalytic cloud of guilt, repression, and suffering.

Writing as rescue dominates Eliot's later theory of artistic creation, with

the artist engaged in a life or death struggle to master intolerable psychic conflict. The metaphor of exorcism dramatizes the central role of suffering in Eliot's life and art. The impetus behind artistic creation is not communication or pleasure but self-purgation. Literature thus becomes veiled confession, a working through of unresolved personal struggles. This theory of art, of course, runs counter to all the assumptions of the New Criticism which Eliot himself rigorously set forth, and which three generations of literary critics have accepted. Eliot affirms a romantic vision of art in opposition to the classical writers who, remaining detached from the creative process, neither suffer nor experience loss of life while occupied in the creation of art. There is little doubt about Eliot's uncomfortable affinity to the nineteenth-century Romantic poets he sought to repudiate. Moreover, Eliot's biography and art demonstrate the theory of creative malady in which intense neurotic suffering becomes the central driving force behind intellectual and artistic achievement. Eliot combines a mystical Christian belief in the creative process as a Dark Night of the Soul with a contemporary psychoanalytic view of writing as an adaptive and integrative strategy, a counterphobic activity. Surely his intensely moving observation about Pascal has the most profound implications for his own life and art:

> We know quite well that he was at the time when he received his illumination from God in extremely poor health; but it is a commonplace that some forms of illness are extremely favorable, not only to religious illumination, but to artistic and literary composition. A piece of writing meditated, apparently without progress, for months or years, may

> suddenly take shape and word; and in this state long passages may be produced which require little or no retouch ("The *'Pensees'* of Pascal," 1931, *Selected Essays,* p. 405).

Valerie Eliot erased any doubt about the autobiographical significance of this passage when she linked it to a section of "What the Thunder Said" in *The Waste Land.* According to his wife, "Eliot said he was describing his own experience of writing this section in Lausanne when he wrote in The *'Pensees'* of Pascal. . . ."[10]

Indeed, Valerie Eliot's publication in 1971 of the transcript of the original draft of *The Waste Land* provides a fascinating glimpse into the history of T. S. Eliot's struggle against mental illness prior to and during the creation of the poem that revolutionized twentieth-century literature. Mrs. Eliot quotes several letters confirming the severity of the poet's fear of losing control, his efforts to seek psychiatric help, and the medical treatment he received in a Swiss sanitarium. The letters inevitably serve as a background to *The Cocktail Party,* offering a clue to Eliot's vision of psychiatry and his belief in the importance of religious conversion as the treatment of choice for personal suffering. Although *The Cocktail Party* lacks the medical authenticity of other plays and novels dealing with a protagonist's breakdown and recovery, it is now clear to us that Eliot had at least one major psychological collapse. His portrait of the psychiatrist in *The Cocktail Party* appears to be modeled upon the actual Swiss physician who treated him in 1921, nearly

three decades before the publication of the play in 1950. Like Charlotte Perkins Gilman's fictional narration of her breakdown in "The Yellow Wallpaper," *The Cocktail Party* came into existence as a result of the writer's decision, however conscious, to recreate in disguised form the psychiatric experiences of an earlier period of his life.

What emerges from the published fragments of Eliot's early correspondence is a portrait of an artist oppressed by acute anxiety and the fear of impending psychological collapse. The letters do not throw much light on the precise causes of Eliot's breakdown, but they do indicate the severity of the crisis and his efforts to seek professional help. A letter written in 1916, when Eliot was 28, conveys the intense strain he was feeling at the time. He refers to 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" as a swansong, adding that "the present year has been, in some respects, the most awful nightmare of anxiety that the mind of man could conceive . . ." (p. xi). The voice of these letters contains a wryness that could not quite conceal the growing fear of silence which, A. Alvarez observes in *The Savage God,* may represent a form of suicide to the artist.[11] The fear may have seemed confirmed when, according to Ezra Pound, Eliot's doctors ordered him in 1918 "not to write any prose for six months" (p. xv)—a warning he fortunately disregarded, as Gilman had done years earlier.

Although we know less about Eliot's life than that of any other major

twentieth-century American writer, we do have brief accounts of his life from friends anti acquaintances. His stress during these years was heightened by a precipitous and ultimately disastrous marriage in 1915 to his first wife, Vivienne Haigh-Wood, who was also becoming seriously mentally ill. Bertrand Russell describes her as having "impulses of cruelty" toward her husband. "It is a Dostoyevsky type of cruelty, not a straightforward everyday kind. . . . She is a person who lives on a knife-edge, and will end as a criminal or a saint—I don't know which."[12] Estranged from Eliot in 1932, she became permanently schizophrenic and was hospitalized in London shortly after World War II. She died in a mental home in 1947 when Eliot was midway through writing *The Cocktail Party.* According to Stephen Spender, Eliot believed his wife's unhappiness and illness were his own fault, although she had a history of psychological problems before her marriage.[13]

There are striking similarities between the Fitzgeralds and the Eliots. Both marriages were built upon a shaky foundation of mental illness in which the husbands blamed themselves for their wives' psychotic behavior. It may be that the women's eccentricity was symptomatic of the schizophrenia that developed in later life. The pattern of illness seemed to be one of crisis, breakdown, convalescence, and relapse, with both Zelda and Vivienne suffering from a multitude of neurotic and psychotic ailments. There can be little question that the unhappy marriages contributed to the husbands' guilt, depression, and withdrawal. Whatever fears of sexual inadequacy the men

may have had before marriage, these fears apparently intensified later. Fitzgerald's doubts about his manhood show up in Hemingway's cruel portrait of him in *A Moveable Feast;* and Eliot's early poems reveal "not lack of libido," as one critic has remarked, "but inhibition, distrust of women, and a certain physical queasiness."[14] Both men remained devoted to their wives for as long as they could, but when it became apparent that their marriages were hopelessly destroyed, they made painful separations. Fitzgerald had contemplated divorce but died before he might have done so. Eliot abruptly detached himself from his wife in 1933. In 1957, he married his former secretary, Valerie Fletcher. By all accounts, this marriage provided him with much happiness in the remaining eight years of his life.

Eliot's health deteriorated sharply in 1921. His letters sketch the psychiatric odyssey that led him from London to Margate, an English resort area, and finally to Switzerland. To a friend, he admitted that he had seen a "specialist (said to be the best in London) who made his tests, and said that I must go away *at once* for three months quite alone, and away from anyone, not exert my mind at all, and follow his strict rules for every hour of the day" *(The Waste Land: A Facsimile,* p. xxi). The fear of mental illness haunted him. "I did not anticipate such a medical verdict, and the prospect does not fill me with anything but dread . . ." (p. xxi). He spent a month at Margate, but the rest cure did not help. "I went to this specialist on account of his great name," he wrote to Julian Huxley from Margate in October 1921, "which I knew

would bear weight with my employers. But since I have been here I have wondered whether he is quite the best man for me as he is known as a nerve man and I want rather a specialist in psychological troubles" (p. xxii). In the same letter, he mentions that Ottoline Morrell had strongly advised him to go to Dr. Roger Vittoz in Lausanne for treatment. She told him that Huxley had also visited the physician. Eliot was reluctant to travel to Switzerland because of the expense, and he asked Huxley whether he thought the trip was worth it. Huxley answered the letter, apparently recommended the Swiss psychiatrist, and Eliot thanked his friend in the following note. "I shall go to Vittoz. . . . He sounds just the man I want. I am glad you confirm my opinion of English doctors. They seem to specialize either in nerves or insanity!" Shortly before his departure to Lausanne, he wrote to Richard Aldington: "I am satisfied, since being here, that my 'nerves' are a very mild affair, due not to overwork but to an aboulie [lack of will] and emotional derangement which has been a lifelong affliction. Nothing wrong with my mind—" (p. xxii).[15] A letter written from Switzerland to his brother in December 1921 offers us the only clue to the type of psychiatric treatment he received under the care of Dr. Vittoz:

> The great thing I am trying to learn is how to use all my energy without waste, to be *calm* when there is nothing to be gained by worry, and to concentrate without effort. I hope that I shall place less strain upon Vivien who has had to do so much *thinking* for me. ... I am very' much better, and not miserable here—at least there are people of many nationalities, which T always like ... I am certainly well enough to be working on a poem! (p. xxii).

Eliot's description offers few specific details of his therapy, but the research of Dr. Harry Trosman, a Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Chicago, provides us with the type of treatment Eliot probably received under the supervision of Dr. Vittoz. In his two articles on Eliot published in psychiatric journals, Dr. Trosman carefully discusses the events leading to Eliot's breakdown, his probable transference relationship to Vittoz, the extent to which the creation of *The Waste Land* contributed to the poet's reintegration following his collapse, and the psychological factors involved in his religious conversion.[16] According to Dr. Trosman, the Swiss psychiatrist evolved a method of psychotherapy based on a program of cerebral reeducation. "Vittoz believed that he could determine the workings of the cerebral hemispheres by feeling their vibrations through the patient's forehead with his hand. By assessing a patient's cerebral responses to simple tasks which he proposed, he believed he could monitor the disordered vibrations and gradually educate a patient to master his brain functions" (p. 713). Far from being a psychoanalyst, Vittoz was opposed to understanding unconscious factors which, he believed, endangered the patient's unity and integration. His mistrust of psychoanalysis doubtlessly reinforced Eliot's criticisms of Freud. Similarly, the psychiatrist's belief in Christ as a paragon of self-control must have appealed strongly to Eliot.

Vittoz succeeded in restoring Eliot's health but, in Dr. Trosman's view, it was the man rather than the method of therapy that was largely responsible

for the patient's improvement. The psychiatrist served as an idealized father figure to Eliot whose real father, from whom he had been painfully estranged, died in 1919. Eliot probably invested a complicated transference symbolism onto Vittoz, who bestowed upon his patient both psychiatric and religious approval. "Vittoz preached a type of high-minded Protestantism with an emphasis on courage, sainthood, self-control and consideration of others, values reminiscent of the Unitarianism of Eliot's authoritarian grandfather whose presence permeated the St. Louis of Eliot's youth" (p. 713). Dr. Trosman does not discuss *The Cocktail Party,* but it is likely that Vittoz' combination of psychiatric and spiritual power provided Eliot with the model for the priestly Sir Harcourt-Reilly, who similarly preaches Christian values to his patients.

What was Eliot suffering from at the time of his breakdown? Dr. Trosman acknowledges the insufficiency of evidence from which to make a psychiatric diagnosis of Eliot's illness. Nor is it possible to understand fully the circumstances leading to Eliot's breakdown. Nevertheless, the psychiatrist offers several plausible observations in place of the tendency among most Eliot scholars simply to attribute his illness to overwork or mental exhaustion. "The predominant symptom complex was depression with exhaustion, indecisiveness, hypochondriasis, and fear of psychosis. His personality was vulnerable to specific injuries that disturbed his narcissistic equilibrium" (p. 712). Other symptoms apparently included compulsive

defenses against emotions, the difficulty of integrating sexual and aggressive drives, and identity diffusion. Fear of unacceptable latent homosexuality may have also been a factor. Although Dr. Trosman does not elaborate on this, literary critics have long speculated on the homosexual implications of Eliot's poetry. John Peter suggested in 1952, for example, that *The Waste Land* was written in response to the death of Eliot's beloved friend Jean Verdenal, whom Eliot met in 1910 and who died in World War L.[17] More recently, James E. Miller, Jr., has written an ingenious book length study that focuses on Eliot's tangled feelings toward Verdenal, whom Miller sees as the central love figure in Eliot's poem.[18]

To view Eliot's illness as a transitory narcissistic regression is not to pigeonhole the man into a convenient clinical category but to attempt to establish a link between the poet's illness, recovery, and the extent to which both his illness and recovery shaped the themes of his creative art. To be sure, it is admittedly dangerous to speculate on the mental illness of a man who guarded his privacy as carefully as did Eliot. Critics of psychoanalysis will argue that the entire medical model of mental illness—including symptomatology, causation, and treatment—remains an unproven myth no matter how much clinical evidence the analyst is able to amass from his patient. Eliot was himself part of the movement opposed to psychiatry, and his subsequent comments on psychotherapy remain predictably cool. The roots of his disapproval extend to many different sources, not simply to the

fact that his therapeutic improvement failed to last very long. Less than three months after Eliot left the Swiss sanitarium, a friend reported that he was "going to pieces" again.[19] He never did enter another sanitarium, although in the summer of 1927 he and his wife attended a health spa near Geneva where they received hydrotherapy.[20] But Eliot's limited success with psychiatry does not entirely account for his sharp criticisms. In "The Frontiers of Criticism" (1956), he concurs with the anti-psychiatric sentiment expressed by Aldous Huxley in a preface to the English translation of *The Supreme Wisdom,* a book written by a French psychiatrist. Contrasting Western psychiatry with the discipline of the West as found in Tau and Zen, Huxley comments that the aim of the former is "to help the troubled individual to adjust himself to the society of less troubled individuals—individuals who are observed to be well adjusted to one another and the local institutions, but about whose adjustment to the fundamental Order of Things no enquiry is made."[21] In contrast to this normality is a higher state of perfect functioning in which, notes Huxley, men are not merely adjusted to a deranged society. The fear is that, in ministering to the troubled individual, the psychiatrist may be promoting an unhealthy adaptation to a diseased society—a view upheld by contemporary psychiatrists both on the political left (R. D. Laing) and the political right (Thomas Szasz). Eliot cites Huxley's statement because it coincides with his own impression of Western psychiatry which, he believes, "is confused or mistaken as to what healing is for." The attitude of psychiatry,

Eliot insists, must be reversed.

The complaints voiced by Eliot and Huxley raise important issues implicit not only in *The Cocktail Party* but in the anti-psychiatric vision of such texts as *A Clockwork Orange, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest,* and *Equus.* These works suggest that a spiritual or religious malaise lies at the root of mental illness. Society is at fault in these books, and Western psychiatry inadvertently conspires with the repressive social and political establishment to enforce a rigid conception of normality upon the benumbed citizens of the therapeutic state. Adjustment to an insane society is the height of madness, as *Catch-22* has taught us. But what if a spiritual crisis arises from or masks psychological illness? Can we treat the human spirit without ministering to the psyche? Eliot implies in *The Cocktail Party* that the major problem is not the sick individual but the spiritually impoverished society, fatally divorced from Christian values. Nevertheless, the play dramatizes a point of view that strikes us as far from healthy either from a religious or psychological perspective. Yet how does one judge health? Although the question ultimately demands a value judgment and is therefore inherently problematic, we may apply Freud's definition of health—the ability to love and to work—to the characters in *The Cocktail Party.* To what degree do they see reality clearly and freely choose their own fates? Does the play succeed in resolving the spiritual and psychological conflicts of the central figures? In the 1932 BBC broadcasts, Eliot warns of the danger of invoking psychological determinism

to rationalize crime. Does he make the opposite error of invoking mystical religious determinism to rationalize the heroine's crucifixion at the end of the play?

The hero of *The Cocktail Party* is Sir Harcourt-Reilly, to whom the other characters refer as a great physician. Literary critics have rightly challenged the psychiatrist's medical authenticity.[22] However, they have not analyzed him to the extent they have scrutinized his three patients, Edward Chamberlayne, his wife Lavinia, and Celia Coplestone. As in *Tender Is the Night,* we should not be surprised to discover that the psychiatrist hero also turns out to be the secret patient and a reflection of the author himself. Much of the abundant criticism of the play has centered on the rich mythic and ritual origins of Reilly's identity, unfortunately ignoring the psychoanalytic implications of the psychiatrist's Godlike behavior. Pursuing a hint offered by Eliot, Robert Heilman has demonstrated Reilly's mythic affinity to Heracles in Euripedes' classical play *Alcestis.*[23] Like Heracles, Reilly has the power to restore life to the dead: He revives the dying marriage of Edward and Lavinia and inspires Celia to give up her mundane human existence in favor of what Eliot sees as a glorious religious martyrdom. Reilly's mythic symbolism, however, clashes with his role as a modern psychiatrist. We may legitimately inquire into his ambivalence toward psychiatry and the meaning of his need to control omnipotently his patients' destinies. Both Lavinia and Celia assert in identical language that Edward is "on the edge of a nervous breakdown,"

but if we approach the play from the perspective of a psychiatric case study, which is after all the external framework of the play, we discover that Reilly also seems to be struggling against fragmentation, or at least betraying symptoms that coincide remarkably with those of his patients.

Lest we murder to dissect, however, we must acknowledge the danger of reducing literature to psychopathology and confusing literary analysis with a postmortem. The philosopher Abraham Kaplan has complained that "Psychiatrists suffer from a trained incapacity: the inability to distinguish symbols from symptoms." He warns against confusing aesthetic expression with psychological exposure. Quoting Stanley Edgar Hyman, he remarks that "When the interpretation is practiced by men of letters lacking in psychological training, they invite exposure themselves as 'amateur sexologists and Peeping Toms of criticism.' "[24] Kaplan's caveat certainly reflects Eliot's own critical precepts, but it does not invalidate the fact that literature serves as a revelation of the artist's conscious and unconscious intentions. Indeed, Kaplan's insight is double-edged: every act of interpretation reveals something about the interpreter, regardless of whether or not he has had psychological training. After counseling Edward and Lavinia, Reilly walks over to his office couch, in the middle of Act Two, and lies down. The gesture has subtle comic appeal, since he is the only character in the play to lie down on the analytic couch, the symbol of the talking cure. Several questions come to mind. How does Reilly serve as a projection screen

for Eliot's own attitude toward psychological health and illness? To what extent does the fictional psychiatrist's inner world of object relations—including his fantasies, defenses, and perceptions—correspond to the symptoms of his patients and ultimately to the playwright's? And, finally, what are the dangers of a messianic psychiatrist? In *The Ego and the Id,* Freud cautions against the "temptation for the analyst to play the part of prophet, savior and redeemer to the patient."[25] If Freud is right about the danger of succumbing to this temptation, what is the meaning of Dr. Reilly's unorthodox psychiatry in *The Cocktail Party?*

* * *

The best revelation into Reilly's character appears in the long speech he delivers to Edward early in Act One, before his identity as a psychiatrist is exposed. Informed by Edward that Lavinia has walked out on him, leaving the husband with a mystery about her disappearance, Reilly ('The Unidentified Guest") elaborates on what he calls the "loss of personality." The speech begins with an assertion of the mystery of human personality but quickly shifts to a description of dehumanization and reduction to object status:

There's a loss of personality;

Or rather, you've lost Touch with the person
You thought you were. You no longer feel quite human.

You're suddenly reduced to the status of an object—
A living object, but no longer a person.
It's always happening, because one is an object
As well as a person. But we forget about it
As quickly as we can. When you're dressed for a party
And are going downstairs, with everything about you
Arranged to support you in the role you have chosen,
Then sometimes, when you come to the bottom step
There is one step more than your feet expected
And you come down with a jolt. Just for a moment
You have the experience of being an object
At the mercy of a malevolent staircase.
Or, take a surgical operation.
In consultation with the doctor and the surgeon,
In going to bed in the nursing home,
In talking to the matron, you are still the subject,
The center of reality. But, stretched on the table,
You are a piece of furniture in a repair shop
For those who surround you, the masked actors;
All there is of you is your body
And the "you" is withdrawn (p. 307).

If we interpret Reilly's speech from a psychoanalytic object relations approach, which emphasizes an individual's relationship to his own internalized objects rather than to actual external objects in the environment, and if we read the speech as if it were a dream whose logic operates according to the bizarre laws of primary process thinking that Freud disclosed in *The Interpretation of Dreams,* several key themes emerge. The loss of personality to which Reilly refers implies a fundamental split or defect in the ego, the self-regulating psychic agency which attempts to reconcile or mediate the instinctual drives of the id with the inhibiting functions of the superego. The movement from human to object status suggests

dehumanization and the ego's failure to integrate intrapsychic conflict. The result is the fear of fragmentation, decomposition, annihilation—in short, breakdown. Although the source of the conflict remains shadowy, the tension seems to be embodied within an indefinable object that menaces the "you" in Reilly's speech. The exact nature of the menace remains ambiguous. On one level, the symptoms of the mysterious illness reflect depletion, loss of energy, emptiness—the ego's insatiable hunger for nourishment or replenishment. Reilly obliquely hints at this when he asks Edward to replenish his drink after the long speech. On another level, the fear of emptiness suggests the presence of an active force which is cruelly depleting the self. Psychological emptiness may be viewed in both ways, the absence of something desirable or, paradoxically, the presence of something harmful which threatens to empty the self.[26]

Significantly, the two extended analogies Reilly uses to describe the loss of personality both contain persecutory imagery. In the first example, he refers to the experience of falling down a flight of stairs and being "at the mercy of a malevolent staircase." It is unclear whether the evil is located within the staircase itself which has tripped up the patient or within the social mask he wears as a defense against the other people at the party. The breakdown results in paralysis. In the second example, Reilly speaks about a surgical operation in which a patient lies stretched on a table, like a piece of furniture in a repair shop. Far from leading to therapeutic recovery, the

surgery mutilates the patient by violating his body and destroying his spirit. Again, it is unclear whether the evil is located within the act of surgery or in the sadistic surgeon. There is also an ambiguity in the positioning of the masked actors: Syntactically they seem part of the repair shop, while thematically they belong with the doctors in the operating room. What is clear, however, is that Reilly's patient is victimized by forces he can neither understand nor control.

The defense against these internalized persecutory objects is loss of feeling through dehumanization, the denial of emotion, and de-realization, the belief that reality itself lacks meaning and value. It is astonishing how, throughout *The Cocktail Party,* none of the characters can openly express the aggressive emotions that inevitably accompany physical or psychological injury—rage, jealousy, hate. Reilly's speech emphasizes the need to submit passively to suffering. No protest is allowed. In the psychiatrist's world, one must stoically endure the fate of reduction to object status. Memory must be obliterated, since it serves as a reminder of past traumas. One has the sense of a past catastrophe which cannot be discussed or forgotten. Human behavior becomes little more than defensive role playing, the adoption of an "as if' personality to conform to the social expectations of others. To be sure, there is real pain in the characters' speeches, but the pain is expressed in abstract philosophical terms. Man is imprisoned in solitude and pain. Knowledge intensifies suffering. Life itself becomes unreal, illusory, hollow. One moment

it is the world itself which has become poor and empty, the next moment it is the ego which is depleted and worthless. Confronted by internal and external dangers, the individual is easily overwhelmed. The man loses Touch with himself, the partygoer stumbles down the malevolent staircase, the patient is penetrated by the surgeon. Reilly's imagery bespeaks of loss, horror, and degradation. In a brutal world, one can only stumble and fall.

There is also a submerged sexual element in Reilly's speech. According to *The Interpretation of Dreams,* a dream of ascending or descending a staircase is often symbolic of sexual intercourse. But we do not have to invoke a psychoanalyst's authority to demonstrate the suggestive nature of staircase imagery in Eliot's poems and plays. Leonard Unger points out that staircase imagery functions as a leitmotif in Eliot's writings: Of the five times in which the image appears in the *Prufrock* poems, four involve a "troubled encounter between a man and a woman."[27] Sexual anxiety, concludes Unger, characterizes the mood or context of these images. Indeed, stairs are hazardous and unreliable to Eliot's characters. The morbid sexuality contained in Reilly's image of tumbling down a staircase is reinforced in the next analogy of the surgical operation, in which a helpless patient is being stretched on a table. The patient finds himself "stretched on the table"—"like a patient etherized upon a table," we feel inclined to add. The image is, of course, Prufrockian, as scholars have realized. To cite Grover Smith: "Sir Henry continues with his comparison of Edward's discovery to the jolt at the

bottom of the staircase. His image of the Prufrockian patient stretched on the table clarifies the state of Edward's soul: he is a 'piece of furniture in a repair shop,' and Sir Henry is the craftsman who must reassemble his smashed life."[28]

Must we assume, however, that Dr. Reilly is describing the state of Edward's soul and not his own? The Prufrockian image applies to patient and psychiatrist alike, just as Reilly's allusion to "shuffling memories and desires" (p. 365) echoes the "Memory and desire" in the opening lines of *The Waste Land.* Reilly is one of Eliot's most authorial speakers, and this lends greater significance to the fact that psychiatrist and patient share almost identical visions of the world. Neither man believes in "personality," and they seek ways to transcend the monotony of everyday existence. Their imagery reveals the precariousness of the self and the threat of persecutory attack. Both affirm the value of suffering, humiliation, and resignation. "Reality"—a favorite word in the play—is always a threat to be defended against through unquestioning submission to higher authority. Both speakers have one voice, using the same diction, syntax, and cadence. There are two kinds of discourse in *The Cocktail Party,* light comedy of manners conversation in which the characters engage in witty repartee and easy gossip, and anguished confessional speech filled with unconscious revelations of the artist's life. In Act One, Scene Two, Celia asks Edward whether the returning Lavinia has prepared a trap for them. Edward replies: "No. If there is a trap, we are all in

the trap,/We have set it for ourselves. But I do not know/What kind of trap it is" (p. 319). In the beginning of Act Two, Reilly (who has been absent from the earlier scene) uses identical language to deny Edward's accusation of a trap. "Let's not call it a trap./ But if it is a trap, then you cannot escape from it" (p. 346). Eliot probably intended patient and psychiatrist to echo each other here, and, throughout *The Cocktail Party,* each character delivers major speeches which repeat the other's thoughts.

To appreciate the intense unconscious identification between patient and psychiatrist, we may examine their attitudes toward love and marriage. Upon learning of Edward's separation from Lavinia, Reilly offers him the following consolation. "You experience some relief/ Of which you're not aware," the psychiatrist tells him. The next ten lines powerfully dramatize the nature of this relief:

It will come to you slowly;
When you wake in the morning, when you go to bed at night,
That you are beginning to enjoy your independence;
Finding your life becoming cozier and cozier
Without the consistent critic, the patient misunderstander
Arranging life a little better than you like it,
Preferring not quite the same friends as yourself,
Or making your friends like her better than you;

And, turning the past over and over,

You'll wonder only that you endured it for so long (p. 306).

Purporting to read Edward's mind, Reilly betrays his own vision of marriage. He refers to a wife as the "consistent critic," the "patient misunderstander" whose taste is antithetical to her husband's. It is the wife and not the husband whom Reilly attacks. She rigidly controls life, dominates her husband, steals his friends. The best that Reilly can say in favor of marriage is that it is an experience to be endured. What makes his speech so disturbing is that these lines are among the most poetically convincing in the play, suggesting the intensity of Eliot's hostility toward marriage. Variations on this theme appear throughout the psychiatrist's speeches, as in his chilling description of marriage and family life to Celia. "They do not repine;/ Are contented with the morning that separates/ And with the evening that brings together/ For casual talk before the fire/ Two people who know they do not understand each other,/ Breeding children whom they do not understand/ And who will never understand them" (p. 364). Reilly expresses similar disdain of marriage, later in the play, when he questions the wisdom of encouraging Edward and Lavinia to revive their cheerless marriage. "What have they to go back to," he asks Julia (one of the Guardians), "To the stale food moldering in the larder,/ The stale thoughts moldering in their minds./ Each unable to disguise his own meanness/ From himself, because it is known to the other" (p. 367).

Nowhere in *The Cocktail Party* does Reilly demonstrate sympathetic insight into marriage, bearing and raising children, sharing one's love for another person. "There is no reference to the possibility of either joy or glory," Lionel Trilling has complained about the play.[29] Nor does Edward offer a corrective point of view. He has lived with his wife for five years, but after a brief separation he can neither remember what she is like nor describe her to others. He falls back upon blaming Lavinia for his own unhappiness and identity loss, accusations Reilly fails to challenge. "We had not been alone again for fifteen minutes," Edward confesses to the psychiatrist, "Before I felt, and still more acutely—/ Indeed, acutely, perhaps, for the first time,/ The whole oppression, the unreality/ Of the role she had always imposed upon me/ With the obstinate, unconscious, sub-human strength/ That some women have" (p. 349).

Edward's hostility toward women must be recognized as misogyny, and, although Eliot uses elaborate defenses and disguises to conceal his own mistrust of women in *The Cocktail Party,* there is too much evidence to ignore. In fact, the psychiatrist's unconscious defenses against women and marriage give him away. He uses questionable logic that he passes off as profound psychological truth, as when he rationalizes Edward's inability to explain why he wants to return to his wife. "The fact that you can't give a reason for wanting her/ Is the best reason for believing that you want her" (p. 309). A real psychiatrist would, of course, wince at this explanation. Edward indulges

in the same mystifying logic when he tries to explain to Celia (with whom he has been having an affair) how Reilly has changed his feelings toward his wife. "I have a very clear impression/ That he tried to persuade me it was all for the best/ That Lavinia had gone; that I ought to be thankful./ And yet, the effect of all his argument/ Was to make me see that I wanted her back" (p. 322).

Sometimes Reilly will agree with a perceptive remark but then perversely reach the opposite conclusion. When Lavinia correctly fears that what she and Edward have in common "Might be just enough to make us loathe one another," Reilly concludes: "See it rather as the bond which holds you together" (p. 356). Several times the psychiatrist maddeningly contradicts himself. After cataloguing the horrors of marriage, he answers Celia's alarmed question of whether marriage is the best life by responding: "It is a good life" (p. 364). Without seeing any irony or contradiction in his remarks, he tells her that neither existence, grim marital domesticity' or joyous Christian martyrdom, is superior to the other.

Reilly's most conspicuous error is his mistrust and abuse of psychiatry. He makes extraordinary efforts to deny his patients' psychological problems, voicing Eliot's thesis that "The single patient/ Who is ill by himself, is rather the exception" (p. 350). The psychiatrist pretends to encourage his patients' confessional disclosures, but when Edward actually attempts to begin a

therapeutic dialogue, Reilly retreats on the grounds that such disclosures are a "luxury." In fact, Reilly repeatedly closes off potentially useful exchanges. Edward has been literally dying to talk to someone about his unhappy life; but no sooner does he begin to open up about his past, than the psychiatrist warns him not to "strangle each other with knotted memories" (p. 330). Reilly confides to a friend that he has kept Edward waiting for several days, since it was "necessary to delay his appointment/ To lower his resistance" (p. 345). It is the psychiatrist, though, who resists the talking cure. During the psychiatric interview, Edward tries to focus on the origins of his disbelief in his own personality, but just as he recalls his childhood experiences, Reilly peremptorily cuts him off:

I always begin from the immediate situation
And then go back as far as I find necessary.
You see, your memories of childhood—
I mean, in your present state of mind—
Would be largely fictitious; and as for your dreams,
You would produce amazing dreams, to oblige me.
I could make you dream any kind of dream I suggested,
And it would only go to flatter your vanity
With the temporary stimulus of feeling interesting (p. 348).

Reilly condemns psychiatry as nothing less than the deadly art of mind

control. He rejects nearly all the assumptions of modern psychotherapy: the belief that childhood experiences shape adult behavior; the recognition that dreams are a reflection of inner reality; the existence of transference, countertransference, and resistance; the importance of empathic mirroring. Mistrusting his profession, Reilly assumes that all psychiatrists are intent on manipulating their patients and exerting limitless power over them. Recall his Prufrockian metaphor of a patient stretched on a table while doctors perform a sinister operation on the anesthetized body. "All there is of you is your body/ And the 'you' is withdrawn."

The countertransference implicit in Reilly's earlier speech to Edward now becomes clearer to us. Foreshadowing Peter Shaffer's ambivalent psychiatrist in *Equus,* who reduces psychiatry to castration, Eliot's therapist unconsciously reveals contradictory urges: the wish to penetrate and to be penetrated, to humiliate and to be humiliated, to control omnipotently and to be controlled. The difference between Edward and Reilly is not their state of mind but their situation. Whereas Edward remains fearful and passive, on the verge of psychic disintegration, Reilly has inexplicably managed to achieve reintegration. His choice of profession suggests counterphobic motivation. Unlike the patient, the psychiatrist has converted weakness into apparent strength. This is the reason Reilly intuitively grasps Edward's point of view. Yet the psychiatrist's own psychic health seems precarious in the rigidity of his defenses. It is no wonder that he almost drives his patients crazy.

Indeed, to the extent that Reilly's therapy demands blind submission to higher authority, we must question the psychiatrist's prescription for health. Reilly's intense over-identification with Edward's state of mind suggests that he is both the Prufrockian patient stretched on the dissecting table and the Godlike psychiatrist who promises to release the patient from an oppressive personality. Reilly diagnoses everyone, patients and others alike, as spiritually ill, and the only prescription for cure is to be "trans-humanized," Eliot's term for redemption through suffering. There are several paradoxes surrounding Reilly's therapy. Rejecting the manipulation and mind control associated with psychiatry, he nevertheless exerts omnipotent control over his patients' destinies, including what turns out to be a glorified death sentence for Celia. Despite his repudiation of dream interpretation on the grounds of its excessive subjectivity, he never questions the religious assumptions he imposes upon his patients. Preaching humility and resignation, he tolerates no dissent. The salvation he offers is based on absolute submission to religious authority—although Eliot studiously avoids any reference to God. Whereas Fitzgerald's Dr. Dick Diver attempts to heal his patients not through the expansion of their self-insight but through the physician's love and Christ-like martyrdom, Eliot's Sir Harcourt-Reilly encourages his patients to transcend personality and submit themselves to religious authority. Tragically, the psychiatrist affirms the loss of personality from which Edward and the others suffer. Reilly insists that the pretense of

human knowledge, psychological and otherwise, must be abandoned. Instead of analyzing his patients' destructive defenses, in this case, the reliance upon dehumanization and de-realization, the psychiatrist urges renewed repression and self-abnegation.

The issue here is not religious as opposed to psychiatric approaches to human unhappiness, nor the mythic versus medical origins of Reilly's identity. Eliot's hero alarms us because of the rigidity and harshness of his value judgments, the rapid shifts between over-idealizing and devaluating, and the erratic nature of his empathy. He dichotomizes reality in terms of redemption and damnation, omnipotent control and fragmentation. There is no capacity for ambiguity or ambivalence in his imagination: Inflexible control is the only defense against chaos. Personality is evil and must be transcended; the ego is weak and must be subordinated to God; relationships are painful and must be denied. What is missing from Reilly's personality is the broad middle range of human emotion.

Can we infer the psychiatrist's past on the basis of the countertransference he brings into his therapeutic sessions? Without divulging specific details about his life, Reilly makes several observations which hint at deep disappointment and pain over past relationships. In one of his most revealing speeches, he talks about the necessity to approach close relatives and friends as if they were strangers. This is less painful, he says,

than to maintain the pretense that they are not strangers. 'The affectionate ghosts: the grandmother,/ The lively bachelor uncle at the Christmas party,/ The beloved nursemaid—those who enfolded/ Your childhood years in comfort, mirth, security—/ If they returned, would it not be embarrassing?" (p. 329). Surely one can imagine emotions other than embarrassment in this situation—deep feelings of love and gratitude and joy as well as the inevitable sadness of personal loss. One suspects that Reilly is concealing something here, perhaps idealizing the past excessively. If his ghosts are truly "affectionate," why does he express the wish to harden himself to them? We defend ourselves against painful memories, not happy ones. Over-idealization nearly always disguises disappointment and pain. Significantly, Edward agrees with the psychiatrist that "There are certainly things I should like to forget." "And persons also," Reilly quickly adds, not only missing the opportunity to open a potentially crucial therapeutic exchange but actually reinforcing the patient's illness. The psychiatrist's advice is that "You must face them all, but meet them as strangers" (p. 330). What Reilly seems to be advocating throughout *The Cocktail Party* is not only repression but the defense of isolation of feeling—the denial of one's emotions, especially the aggressive and unruly emotions of anger, jealousy, bitterness.

Insofar as Reilly succumbs to what Freud calls the analyst's temptation to play the role of prophet, savior, and redeemer to his patients, we may call him messianic. But the word is not nearly precise enough to describe the

structure of his unconscious fantasies and defenses, a structure which appears to indicate in Reilly's case a narcissistic personality disturbance. Although there is sharp disagreement among contemporary psychoanalytic theoreticians over the meaning and treatment of narcissism, including whether the grandiose self reflects a developmental fixation of an archaic though normal primitive self (the view of Heinz Kohut), or whether the grandiose self is pathological and thus clearly different from normal infantile narcissism (the view of Otto Kernberg), all analysts agree upon the crucial importance of narcissism as a personality structure. We may cite Kohut's definition here. "In the narcissistic personality disturbances . . . the ego's anxiety relates primarily to its awareness of the vulnerability of the mature self; the dangers which it faces concern either the temporary fragmentation of the self or the intrusions of either archaic forms of subject-bound grandiosity or of archaic narcissistically aggrandized self-objects into its realm."[30] Kohut speaks about the ego's inability to regulate self-esteem, the sudden rapid shifts between anxious grandiosity, on the one hand, and extreme self-consciousness, hypochondria, and shame, on the other hand. As a consequence of severe deprivation of maternal love, the child develops a grandiose self-based upon a compensatory image of perfection and reinvents his parents, so to speak, into an idealized parent imago. The child thus recreates his insufficiently loving parents into omnipotent figures who function as transitional self-objects, extensions of himself. Kohut postulates

two major types of narcissistic transference relationships (and their corresponding countertransference relationships): the idealizing transference, based upon the therapeutic mobilization of the idealized parent imago; and the mirror transference, arising from the mobilization of the grandiose self.

Kohut's "psychology of the self," as it has come to be called, has intriguing implications to the relationship between transference and countertransference in *The Cocktail Party.* The play reveals a consistent pattern of merging with an omnipotent idealized object. Reilly's patients accord him respect and obedience as though he were a God: They defer to his authority, carry out his orders, incorporate his power. In Kohutian terms, the patients narcissistically transform Reilly into an omnipotent self-object, and the psychiatrist eagerly accepts their idealizing transference. Edward's feelings of emptiness, worthlessness, and fragmentation are counteracted by his merging with Reilly's omnipotence. The psychiatrist clearly functions as an idealized father figure to the patient. Reilly neither questions his magical power to restore life to his patients nor acknowledges the limitations of his psychiatric art. Kohut distinguishes between the analyst's ability to accept the patient's idealizing transference when offered and the analyst's indulgence in or craving for idealization. Only the former response, Kohut argues, is analytically permissible.

Reilly's countertransference reveals a dependency upon omnipotent control and inability to tolerate indecisiveness or dissent. He sternly reprimands Edward and Lavinia for their attempts to work out their own diagnosis and treatment. "But when you put yourselves into hands like mine/ You surrender a great deal more than you meant to./ This is the consequence of trying to lie to me" (p. 353). The reverse side of Reilly's omnipotent countertransference is his subordination to God, the spiritual healer with whom the psychiatrist has an idealizing transference. Reilly submits blindly and totally to divine authority, never allowing himself to voice doubts about religious truths. Interestingly, Kohut observes that the idealizing transference relationship in a narcissistic disturbance may manifest itself through "the expression of vague and mystical religious preoccupations with isolated awe-inspiring qualities which no longer emanate from a clearly delimited, unitary admired figure."[31] This accurately describes the way in which Edward, Lavinia, and Celia accept Reilly's proclamations, invested with a religious and mystical aura. There is also a parallel between the devout worshiper's relationship to his God, the incarnation of perfection, and the child's perception of the idealized parent. This does not imply that religion may be reduced to infantile wish fulfillment, as Freud concluded, but that the patients' deification of the psychiatrist in *The Cocktail Party* is analogous to the idealizing parent-child relationship that Kohut speaks about in his clinical work.

Celia Coplestone's attitude toward Reilly is no less complex than Edward's. Both patients suffer from symptoms of identity diffusion, emptiness, and de-realization. Her opening words to Reilly contain telltale denials which the psychiatrist stubbornly refuses to analyze. "Well, I can't pretend that my trouble is interesting," she says, "But I shan't begin that way. I feel perfectly well./1 could lead an active life—if there's anything to work for;/ I don't imagine that I am being persecuted;/ I don't hear any voices, I have no delusions—/ Except that the world I live in seems all a delusion!" (p. 359). Analysts speak of the importance of a patient's opening words in therapy: Celia can't make up her mind whether she or the world is worthless. She contradicts herself from moment to moment. After asserting her own worthlessness, she reverses herself, expresses wellbeing, and then deprecates the world the emptiness of which she invokes to rationalize her inability to work. Most blatant is her denial of feelings of persecution and delusion—a denial that soon gives way to her projection of persecutory and delusional impulses upon an alien world. She admits that her two major symptoms include an "awareness of solitude" and a "sense of sin," then claims that she "should really *like* to think there's something wrong" with her because if not, "then there's something wrong,/ Or at least, very different from what it seemed to be,/ With the world itself—and that's much more frightening!" (p. 359). With Reilly's immediate approval she concludes that her problems are not individual but universal (not psychological, that is, but spiritual), thus

disavowing the need for psychiatric help. Curiously, she rules out feeling "sin in the ordinary sense" regarding her adultery with Edward. She claims that immorality is not part of her generalized sense of sin and denies hurting Edward's wife. "I haven't hurt *her./* I wasn't taking anything away from her —/ Anything she wanted" (p. 361). Celia is right but in an unexpected sense: Edward's wife never does seem very interested in him.

Paradoxically, both Edward and Celia would rather confess their sins than try to understand them. What crime has Celia committed to warrant her crucifixion? And why does her psychiatrist express satisfaction upon learning of the details of her martyrdom? Like Reilly, Eliot believes he is treating the heroine of *The Cocktail Party* sympathetically, yet, she bears the brunt of the playwright's violence. What, then, can be the source of the aggression responsible for the violent death of a saintly woman who denies any wrongdoing to others and whom the other characters in the play apparently revere? She seems to be in flight from something or someone; the flight ends in religious crucifixion but also could have culminated in suicide or madness. Perhaps no character in literature has offered a vaguer confession than Celia. "It's not the feeling of anything I've ever *done,/* Which I might get away from, or of anything in me/1 could get rid of—but of emptiness, of failure/ Towards someone, or something, outside of myself;/ And I feel I must . . . *atone*—" (p. 362). She hints at disappointing the expectations of other people but then characteristically internalizes her failures. Yet what lies beneath Celia's

chronic self-accusations? "If one listens patiently to a melancholic's many and various self-accusations," Freud writes in "Mourning and Melancholia,"

> one cannot in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them are hardly at all applicable to the patient himself, but that with insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, someone whom the patient loves or has loved or should love. Every time one examines the facts this conjecture is confirmed. So we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient's own ego.[32]

Sexuality and aggression are the two topics conspicuously absent from any of the cocktail-party conversations in the play or from Reilly's psychiatric interviews. This does not necessarily prove the existence of repressed sex and violence in Eliot's characters; nevertheless, Celia's speeches reveal persecutor}' imagery, displaced aggression, and incestuous fantasies. Her self-reproaches hint at rage toward the lover who abandoned her. Edward's physical appearance to her changes twice as she gazes upon him early in the play. "I looked at your face: and I thought that I knew/ And loved every contour; and as I looked/ It withered, as if I had unwrapped a mummy" (p. 326). If looks could kill, in other words, Edward would be dead. Celia's morbid perceptions of Edward, it seems, disguise murderous thoughts.

There is no object constancy in any character in *The Cocktail Party:* Love dissolves into hate; good images deteriorate into bad ones; memory yields emptiness. Edward serves as the object of Celia's reproaches. She compares

his voice to the "noise of an insect,/ Dry, endless, meaningless, inhuman," and then develops the unflattering image. "You might have made it by scraping your legs together—/ or however grasshoppers do it. I looked,/ And listened for your heart, your blood;/ And saw only a beetle the size of a man/ With nothing more inside it than what comes out/ When you tread on a beetle" (pp. 326-327). Interpreting her speech according to the rules of the dream work, we find the characteristic elements of displacement, condensation, and symbolization. Edward is the beetle she longs to squash. The image of scraping his legs together—"or however grasshoppers do it"—may suggest his sexual inconsequence. Celia is certainly disgusted by the interior of Edward's body. Her pestilential image of Edward coincides with Reilly's allusion to marriage and human procreation—husband and wife "Breeding children whom they do not understand." Celia's sadistic threat to tread on the beetle-like Edward elicits his masochistic reply: "Tread on me, if you like."

Significantly, Edward's mistress and wife both stress his passivity, ineffectuality, and infantility. "You look like a little boy who's been sent for/ To the headmaster's study," Celia tells him (p. 331). Lavinia's reproach is more damaging. "Oh, Edward, when you were a little boy,/ I'm sure you were always getting yourself measured/ To prove how you had grown since the last holidays" (p. 340). Reilly also cruelly casts doubt on Edward's potency. "To men of a certain type," the psychiatrist tells him, "The suspicion that they are incapable of loving/ Is as disturbing to their self-esteem/ As, in cruder

men, the fear of impotence" (p. 355). Edward silently accepts the humiliation. Lavinia, by contrast, seems invulnerable. "I have never known anyone in my life/ With fewer mental complications than you," Edward bitterly tells his wife. "You're stronger than a . . . battleship. That's what drove me mad" (p. 352). The numerous allusions to Edward's sexual inadequacy and unmanliness lead to the conclusion of castration fear, with both his wife and mistress serving as castrating women. Like his more famous literary relative, J. Alfred Prufrock, whose seductive love song is drowned in a sea of *femmes fatale,* Edward lies etherized upon his death bed, lacking the strength to force the moment to its terrible crisis.

Edward's fear of sexual mutilation may explain the ease with which he is able to renounce his affair with Celia. Her comparison of Edward to a squashed beetle suggests both his fear of annihilation and the specific threat she poses to him. Not surprisingly, Edward easily convinces Peter Quilpe, who is also romantically interested in Celia, to avoid entangling alliances with her. Edward congratulates his rival "on a timely escape." Edward gives up his claims upon Celia because she has never meant very much to him in the first place. Indeed, Edward is temperamentally repelled by women. We remember his chilling characterization of Lavinia's formidable power—the "obstinate, unconscious, sub-human strength/ That some women have." Why then does Edward remain masochistically attached to his emasculating wife? This is one of the central weaknesses of *The Cocktail Party,* which never adequately

justifies the continuation of the Chamberlaynes' cheerless marriage. Their over-solicitousness toward each other in Act Three confirms Eliot's inability to imagine a joyful marriage, and the oblique allusions to Lavinia's pregnancy do little to offset Reilly's prior dismissal of procreation.

Reilly also renounces his claims upon Celia but in a different way. Whereas Edward's mistrust of Celia expresses itself through devaluation ("There's no memory you can wrap in camphor/ But the moths will get in," he sadly tells Peter Quilpe), Reilly uses overvaluation or idealization, which attempts to create through fantasy a perfect love object that will resist the disappointments of reality. In narcissistic personality disturbances, idealization is the primary psychic mechanism to ward off anxiety and maintain the grandiose self. Idealization is not a pathological defense, but the difficulty arises when a person shifts back and forth between virulent devaluation and impossibly lofty idealization, thus forming an identity around a rigid grandiose self which cannot tolerate weakness or its own aggression. The insatiable hunger for perfection leads only to perpetual unhappiness and depletion. Narcissistic hunger, as suggested earlier, may be viewed either as the absence of nourishing internalized objects or the presence of poisonous objects residing in die self. *The Cocktail Party* dramatizes emptiness as a plenitude of persecutory objects. Reilly makes the same point (though he uses traditional mystic religious imagery instead of contemporary psychoanalytic concepts) when he refers to his patients as "A prey/ To the devils who arrive

at their plenitude of power/ When they have you to themselves" (p. 356). Celia similarly speaks of the need to harden herself to these demons lest they overpower her. Her solution to inner horror is to reject the human condition and to prepare herself for the purgatorial suffering that will allow her to merge ecstatically with an omnipotent authority. And Reilly's solution to his own inner horror is to confer sainthood status on Celia and then offer her to God.

From a clinical point of view, Celia and Reilly are stuck in an idealizing relationship between transference and countertransference. Both patient and psychiatrist strive to maintain an image of the other's perfection, as if the only way to escape fragmentation is through merging with the other's grandiosity. Each character conceals painful truths from the other. Celia does not allow herself to express aggressive and libidinal drives, because they would destroy the psychiatrist's idealization of her. Reilly does not acknowledge these drives within himself, since they would shatter the patient's idealization of him. She renders him into a God, while he elevates her into a saint. The absence of any clinical or narrative distance between them suggests the extent of their merging. Each recreates or fictionalizes an idealized self to heal a narcissistic injury. They also act out Oedipal fantasies. By encouraging Celia to reject the imperfect human world for a spiritually perfect kingdom that lies beyond death, Reilly expresses the wish to preserve the purity of the original love object, the maternal imago. But preservation demands rejection. By urging

Celia to remove herself from the world, Reilly is thus eliminating temptation —repudiating his own incestuous fantasies and insuring that no other man will possess her. He literally idealizes her to death.

The psychosexual implications are intriguing. On an oral level, the psychiatrist is merging with the patient in a mystical union, incorporating her magical goodness. On an anal level, he is sadistically killing her off and casting her away. On a phallic level, he is sublimating his incestuous drives by offering her to the highest authority, God the father, to whom he devoutly submits himself. Similarly, Celia receives pathological gratification from this misalliance cure.[33] Her martyrdom becomes clearer once we understand that Reilly gives her only two choices, both involving death: ignoble suicide or religiously sanctioned crucifixion. Religious penance allows her to gratify a self-destructive superego the aggression of which has been expressed in symptoms of emptiness, de-realization, paranoia. By rejecting secular love for spiritual union, she is able to gratify libidinal drives while punishing herself for being human. Religious martyrdom allows her to convert rage into altruistic surrender.

The Cocktail Party reveals the contradictory wish both to destroy and then retrieve the abandoned love object, renunciation followed by restoration. It is the two-stage process Freud viewed as the structure of every neurosis and psychosis. "In neurosis a piece of reality is avoided by a sort of

flight, whereas in psychosis it is remodeled. Or we might say: in psychosis, the initial flight is succeeded by an active phase of remodeling; in neurosis, the initial obedience is succeeded by a deferred attempt at flight."[34] In Eliot's play, the psychiatrist's messianic fantasies form a perfect fit with the patient's conviction of the absolute worthlessness of human life. Jacob Arlow and Charles Brenner have provided an ego psychology interpretation of the relationship between delusions of world destruction and messianic fantasies. "One need only assume that in the case of the messianic patient, the patient's own role has changed from that of a mere observer of the destruction about him to that of an active savior, rescuer, or restorer of life and health to those threatened by the destructive forces which seem to him to be raging everywhere."[35] The messianic Reilly functions as the savior and restorer to life of the troubled patient whose entire relationship to the world of objects is unstable and threatened by mass destruction.

We are stunned, furthermore, by the violent intensity of the disturbance of the world of objects in *The Cocktail Party.* Following her psychiatrist's orders, Celia withdraws from society to devote herself to missionary work in a remote part of the world. During a heathen uprising, she is crucified "very near an ant-hill," her body presumably devoured-—psychic incorporation with a vengeance. Reilly expresses no dismay upon learning the details of her crucifixion. Quite the opposite: The expression on his face, according to Lavinia, is one of "satisfaction." The psychiatrist agrees and acknowledges

that, from the first time he saw Celia, he could intuit her violent death. She was, he claims, a woman "under sentence of death." Significantly, he affirms not the goodness of Celia's life but the sanctification of her death. What is shocking, though, is the gruesome violence of her ending. E. Martin Browne, the director of *The Cocktail Party,* reports that Eliot originally had written a more explicit description of the crucifixion. In Eliot's words, Celia was to be "smeared with a juice that is attractive to ants."[36] Eliot was persuaded to omit the grisly detail from the play, but the feeling of horror persists in *The Cocktail Party,* which is subtitled "A Comedy."

Perhaps the most controversial question in Eliot's drama is the meaning and value of Celia's religious crucifixion. The history of the literary criticism of the play reflects bitter disagreement.[37] To be sure, the audience's attitude toward her martyrdom will depend upon the religious convictions one brings to the play as well as attitudes toward psychiatry, humanism, and eschatology. *The Cocktail Party* raises a host of problematic questions concerning the relationship between religious conversion and psychological health and the issue of free will versus determinism. Eliot's characters repeatedly assert the importance of choice; Reilly insists upon the triumphant free will leading to Celia's saintly ending. Yet Reilly is characteristically evasive here: He manipulates her into martyrdom and then disclaims all responsibility for her actions. His proclamations have an incurably deterministic ring, acceptable only to those who can reconcile Celia's freedom

with religious predestination.[38]

Throughout *The Cocktail Party,* Reilly has been displaying bad faith toward his patients, profession, and religion. Nowhere does he question his own motives or resistance to the fundamental principles of any truthful therapy: insight, structural change, and growth. In interpreting his patients' suffering as a sign of the pervasive religious malaise of the time, Reilly is offering what Freud would call a secondary revision, a coherent but false decoding of a dream or symptom. One can imagine a different ending to Eliot's play, in which Celia goes off to another sanitarium to receive less expensive psychotherapy. Critics remain divided over the artistic justification of her death. Stephen Spender has argued, for example, that her death does not strike one as aesthetically inevitable. "Much of the fascination of these plays is that they make one think about the author; but that betokens some measure of failure."[39]

Indeed, despite Eliot's insistence that a work of art must be divorced from history, biography, and psychology, it is impossible not to think about the relationship between Eliot's psychiatric experiences and *The Cocktail Party.* Scholars may wish to explore two particular links between Eliot's life and art: Edward and Lavinia consult a psychiatrist after five years of marriage, the length of time Eliot was married to Vivienne before he began treatment with Dr. Vittoz; and midway through the writing of *The Cocktail*

Party, Eliot's estranged wife died in a mental hospital, an event that must have brought to the surface his complicated feelings toward her. How could he not feel guilt, anguish, mortification, and probably relief upon learning of her death? Bertrand Russell's characterization of Vivienne as a "person who lives on a knife-edge, and who will end as a criminal or a saint"[40] —has relevance to the saintly Celia, whose threat to tread on the passive lover who has abandoned her culminates in saintly martyrdom.

Eliot might argue, though, that, in applying psychoanalytic theory to *The Cocktail Party,* we have been performing a literary autopsy on his characters that fully justifies the playwright's mistrust of Freud. Perhaps, but it is significant that Eliot viewed every act of interpretation, psychoanalytic or otherwise, as an unwarranted intrusion or violation of the text. "Comparison and analysis need only the cadavers on the table," he writes in "The Function of Criticism," "but interpretation is always producing parts of the body from its pockets, and fixing them in place (*Selected Essays,* p. 33). Any literary interpretation was illegitimate to Eliot. The most influential literary critic of his age, he sanctioned evaluation and analysis, not interpretation—as if meaning could be divorced from evaluation. This position led him to dubious assertions, as when he states in the same essay that "any book, any essay, any note in *Notes and Queries,* which produces a fact even of the lowest order about a work of art is a better piece of work than nine-tenths of the most pretentious critical journalism, in journals or in books." Facts cannot corrupt,

he claims; "the real corrupters are those who supply opinion or fancy." How astonishing this claim is in light of the colossal theoretical turmoil of our own age. Even when Eliot softened his objections to literary interpretation, as he did in his "Introduction" to G. Wilson Knight's *The Wheel of Fire,* he remained disheartened by the pluralistic nature of meaning. He views all interpretation as Satanic rebellion, an inevitable falling away from truth and innocence. He invokes the metaphor of demonism to explain the misguided quest for meaning, and he justifies literary interpretation not because of its power to illuminate the text but because of the futility to repress the instinct for knowledge. His reluctant and saddened conclusion is that it is necessary to "surrender ourselves to some interpretation of the poetry we like."[41] The act of interpretation, in other words, is analogous to an intrusive authority seeking to extract the creative essence from the artist's life and work. Additionally Eliot's mistrust of literary interpretation recalls Edward's horror of exposure or violation, a Prufrockian dread of the body or text being probed, dissected, castrated.[42] "After such knowledge, what forgiveness?"

There would seem to be a correlation, then, between Eliot's theory of aesthetics, grounded upon the attempt to avoid literary subjectivity by removing the interpreter from the text, and the "loss of personality" from which the characters suffer in *The Cocktail Party.* The assumption that literary interpretation is a violation of the text, resulting in dangerous fragmentation and loss of belief, coincides with the fear of mutilation and narcissistic injury

seem in many of Eliot's speakers—Prufrock, Gerontion, the speaker in *The Waste Land,* and Edward in *The Cocktail Party.* There is a consistency between Eliot's essentially Protestant approach to literary criticism, calling for a direct communion with the text, and Reilly's rejection of clinical distance in favor of mystical union. Similarly, the papal element in Eliot's proclamations of taste and orthodoxy in literature parallels Reilly's position as high priest of psychiatry. The text must not be corrupted by the reader's opinion or fancy, just as Celia's purity must not be compromised by imperfect human existence. Eliot's theory of art and vision of psychiatry rule out the idea that both the literary text and the therapist function as transitional objects, transformed by reader and patient alike into their unique identity theme and characterological structure.[43] Yet this is precisely what happens, despite Eliot's intentions. His literary pronouncements call attention to his personal suffering, just as his fictional psychiatrist serves as a projection screen of the artist's earlier breakdown and recovery.

A psycho-biographical approach cannot prove conclusively that Eliot's theory of the "impersonality" of art and the "loss of personality" in *The Cocktail Party* both came into existence as a defense against the artist's narcissistic injury. Correlation is not causation. Mental functioning is always multiply determined, moreover, as Robert Waelder has pointed out.[44] Nevertheless, Eliot's writings reflect both the symptoms of a man continually struggling against psychic fragmentation and, more importantly, the

successful restitutive efforts he made to resist future breakdowns. Although *The Cocktail Party* reveals signs of the playwright's narcissistic injury, the existence of the play demonstrates the artist's struggle toward health and the therapeutically beneficial nature of artistic creation. Art was, for Eliot, a way to heal a narcissistic injury, a method to achieve a magical fusion with the great tradition of literature.

We cannot say, finally, whether Eliot's treatment with Dr. Vittoz proved to have more than a temporary salutary effect on his life and art or whether, had he undergone treatment with a psychoanalyst skilled in narcissistic personality disturbances (and Freud, it must be remembered, did not believe analysts could treat narcissism), Eliot's suffering would have been diminished. It is clear, though, that Eliot's mental breakdown in 1921 and psychiatric odyssey provided him with at least the theme and the apparatus of the psychiatric case study for the play he was to write nearly three decades later. The marriage of religion and psychiatry in *The Cocktail Party* remains as shaky as the Chamberlaynes' union, however, and it is unfortunate that Eliot misunderstood both the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. "There is always an implicit psychology behind the explicit anti-psychology," Erik Erikson reminds us.[45] This remains especially true of Eliot's life and art. We do him a grave injustice by accepting at face value his repudiation of psychology, because we must then ignore his determined efforts to heal himself through art and religion. The artist who suffers a breakdown and

subsequently writes about it, in however disguised form, would seem to be engaged in a counterphobic activity, transmuting illness into psychic and literary health. Replaying his own breakdown and recovery, Eliot rejected nonspiritual forms of psychotherapy and affirmed the only cure he could believe in, religious conversion. Out of his creative malady came *The Cocktail Party,* a striking example of how "some forms of illness are extremely favorable, not only to religious illumination, but to artistic and literary composition."

Notes

1 T. S. Eliot, *The Cocktail Party,* in *The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-igso* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1952), p. 342. All subsequent references are to this edition.

2 T. S. Eliot, "The Search for Moral Sanction," *The Listener,* Vol. 7, No. 168 (30 March 1932), p. 445.

3 T. S. Eliot, "The Future of an Illusion," *The Criterion,* Vol. 8, No. 31 (December 1928), p. 350.

4 T. S. Eliot, "Thoughts After Lambeth," *Selected Essays* (London: Faber and Faber, 1932, Reprinted 1966), p. 370. All subsequent references are to the reprinted edition.

5 T. S. Eliot, "Baudelaire in Our Time," *Essays Ancient and Modem* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), p. 65.

6 T. S. Eliot, "The Frontiers of Criticism," *On Poetry and Poets* (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1957), p. 123.

7 Eliot, *Essays Ancient and Modem,* op. cit., p. 69.

8 Eliot, *On Poetry and Poets,* op. cit., p. 107.

9 The psychoanalyst, Freud writes in "On Beginning the Treatment: Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis," *Standard Edition* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1958), Vol. XII, p. 130, "sets in motion a process, that of the resolving of existing repressions. He can supervise this process, further it, remove obstacles in its way, and he can undoubtedly vitiate much of it. But on the whole, once begun, it goes its own way and does not allow either the direction it takes or the order in which it picks up its points to be prescribed for it."

10 Valerie Eliot, ed., *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original Drafts* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 129. All subsequent references are to this edition.

11 A. Alvarez, *The Savage God* (New York: Bantam, 1973).

12 Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 64.

13 Stephen Spender, T. *S. Eliot* (New York: Viking, 1975), p. 134. Bertrand Russell quotes a letter he received from Eliot in 1925, emphasizing the responsibility he felt for his wife's illness. "I will tell you now that everything has turned out as you predicted 10 years ago. You are a great psychologist. Living with me has done her so much damage" *(The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell,* op. cit., p. 255). In *Great Tom* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), T. S. Matthews cites a psychiatrist's comments after reading Vivienne's diaries. "The young girl is neurotic, feels insecure, particularly about her femininity. She suffers from psychosomatic illnesses. ... In the end there is a picture of a full-blown paranoia with delusions. Absurd and pathetic as her delusions may appear, they are her reality. Her suffering is real . . . most likely a gifted person, at the same time vivacious and morose and 'complex'—a combination which can be very attractive if difficult to live with" (p. 104m).

14 Lyndall Gordon, *Eliot's Early Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 75. Gordon suggests an intriguing link between Eliot's inhibition and his father's view of sex as "nastiness" that future biographers may wish to investigate further. "Henry Ware Sr. considered public [sex] instruction tantamount to giving children a letter of introduction to the Devil. Syphilis was God's punishment and he hoped a cure would never be found. Otherwise, he said, it might be necessary 'to emasculate our children to keep them clean' " (p. 27).

15 Bernard Bergonzi, in T. *S. Eliot* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), has connected

> Eliot's psychiatric treatment in Lausanne with these lines from *The Waste Land:* "By the waters of Leman I sat down and wept," and "On Margate sands/ I can connect/ Nothing with nothing" (p. 77).

16 Harry Trosman, M.D., "T. S. Eliot and *The Waste Land:* Psychopathological Antecedents and Transformations," *Archives of General Psychiatry,* Vol. 30 (May 1974). All page numbers refer to this article. Also see Dr. Trosman's other article on Eliot, "After *The Waste Land:* Psychological Factors in the Religious Conversion of T. S. Eliot," *International Review of Psycho-Analysis,* Vol. 4 (1977), pp. 295-304.

17 John Peter, "A New Interpretation of *The Waste Land," Essays in Criticism,* Vol. 2 (July 1952), pp. 242-266. Peter's controversial interpretation, linking Jean Verdenal to Phlebas the Phoenician in *The Waste Land,* infuriated Eliot. His solicitors succeeded in confiscating and destroying most of the copies of the issue.

18 James E. Miller, Jr., *T. S. Eliot's Personal Waste Land* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977).

19 Eliot, Valerie, ed., *The Waste Land: A Facsimile. . . ,* op. cit., p. xxiv.

20 In T. *S. Eliot: A Memoir* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971) Robert Sencourt describes meeting Eliot and his wife in a spa near Geneva, where they all received hydrotherapy. "The treatment at Divonne which the Eliots and I took and from which Tom profited more than Vivienne, was a variant of the *douche ecossaise* in which strong gushes of hot, alternating with icy cold, water were played on the naked body. The doctors on the whole deprecated drugs and avoided psychoanalysis. Their idea was that once they had gained a patient's confidence, he would soon divulge the reasons for his strain. It was evident that the strain from which my new friends were suffering was that they no longer lived together in deepest unity" (pp. 124-125).

21 Eliot, *On Poetry and Poets,* op. cit., p. 116.

22 For the earliest and best discussion of the psychiatric authenticity of Reilly, see Richard B. Hovey, "Psychiatrist and Saint in *The Cocktail Party," Literature and Psychology,* Vol. 9, Nos. 3-4 (Summer and Fall 1959), pp. 51-55. Hovey argues that Eliot's "Inadequate understanding

of depth psychology points up a limitation of his insight into Christianity" (p. 51). For Eliot's comments on Reilly, see "An Interview with T. S. Eliot," *The New York Times,* 16 April 1950, Section 2, p. 1. Eliot also discusses Reilly in "Reflections on *The Cocktail Party," World Review,* New Series 9 (November 1949), pp. 19-22. To the question whether the psychiatrist is a *deus ex machina,* Eliot observes: "The doctor could not be a god *from* the machine, since he appears throughout, and not merely at the end. He might, however, be a god *in* the machine, and he certainly bears some slight resemblance to Heracles in Euripides' *Alcestis.* He is also an exceptional doctor who uses somewhat original methods" (p. 21).

23 Robert B. Heilman, "Alcestis and *The Cocktail Party," Comparative Literature,* Vol. 5 (1953), pp. 105-116.

24 Abraham Kaplan, "Poetry, Medicine and Metaphysics," *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis,* Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 1981), pp. 106-107.

25 Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (1923), *Standard Edition* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), Vol. XIX, p. 50m

26 For a good discussion of the psychoanalytic meaning of emptiness, see Melvin Singer, "The Experience of Emptiness in Narcissistic and Borderline States, Parts I and II, *International Review of Psychoanalysis,* Vol. 4, Part 4 (1977), pp. 460-479.

27 Leonard Unger, "T.S. Eliot's Images of Awareness," in Allen Tate, ed., *T.S. Eliot: The Man and His Work* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), p. 206.

28 Grover Smith, *T.S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 223.

29 Lionel Trilling, *The Opposing Self* (New York: Viking, 1968), p. 146.

30 Heinz Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self* (New York: International Universities Press, 1977), p. 20. For a different view of narcissism, see Otto Kernberg, *Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism* (New York: Jason Aronson, 1980).

31 Kohut, op. cit., p. 85.

32 Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917), *Standard Edition* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), Vol. XIV, p. 248.

33 See Robert Langs, *Psychotherapy: A Basic Text* (New York: Jason Aronson, 1982). Langs defines misalliance as "A quality of the basic relationship between patient and therapist, or of a sector of that relationship, that is consciously or unconsciously designed to bypass adaptive insight in favor of either some other maladaptive form of symptom alleviation or the destruction of effective therapeutic work" (p. 733).

34 Sigmund Freud, 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis" (1924), *Standard Edition* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), Vol. XIX, p. 185.

35 Jacob A. Arlow and Charles Brenner, *Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory* (New York: International Universities Press, 1964), p. 168.

36 E. Martin Browne, *The Making of a Play: T. S. Eliot's The Cocktail Party* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 22.

37 The critics who approve of Celia's martyrdom include Helen Gardner, 'The Comedies of T. S. Eliot," in Allen Tate, ed., *T. S. Eliot: The Man and His Work,* op. cit. She writes: "In Celia, the romantic quest for union is directed to its true object and consummated in death. *Causa diligendi Deum Deus est; modus est sine modo.* It is a happy ending for her, for we see the alternative in her first savage reaction to Edward's cowardice and rejection of her" (p. 171). Joseph Chiari, in T. *S. Eliot: Poet and Dramatist* (London: Vision Press, 1972), uses euphemistic language and intoxicated rhythms to describe the martyrdom. "Although the death of Celia could have been less colorful, the religious theme of the play emerges steadily and ripples out, embracing all the aspects of the social life to which the characters belong, and carrying with it an aura of greater and greater light, which lifts the 'Comedy' to a high level of dramatic achievement" (p. 135). Raymond Williams, in *Drama from Ibsen to Eliot* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), expresses similar approval.

Of the many critics who are disturbed by Eliot's treatment of Celia's death, Rossell Hope Robbins offers the most outspoken point of view in *The T. S. Eliot Myth* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951). "The drama turns on Reilly's work as psychiatrist missionary in reconciling the Chamberlaynes to their hopeless inferiorities and to living with them and with themselves in dreary resignation; and in dispatching Celia, who has nobler stuff,

into a convent and later on a mission where she will be privileged with the martyrdom of being eaten alive by ants nailed to a crucifix. This 'martyrdom' is the outstanding example in the play of Eliot's callous disregard for people" (pp. 21-22). Other critics who disapprove of the crucifixion include Philip Rahv, "T. S. Eliot: the Poet as Playwright," *Literature and the Sixth Sense* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 350; Trilling, *The Opposing Self,* p. 147; W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., "Eliot's Comedy," *Sewanee Review,* Vol. 58 (Autumn 1950), p. 667; Denis Donoghue, *"The Cocktail Party,"* in Hugh Kenner, ed., *T. S. Eliot: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 183-184.

38 For a discussion of the rigid determinism in *The Cocktail Party* and the failure of Celia's attempted salvation, see William Lynch, S. J., "Theology and the Imagination," *Thought* (Spring 1954), pp. 66-67. Walter Stein argues in "After the Cocktails," *Essays in Criticism,* Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1953) that Eliot's vision of the play is "not that of a humane . . . Christianity" but of a disturbing Manichean world. For an analysis of Eliot's tendency toward determinism, see Yvor Winter's essay in Leonard Unger, ed., *T. S. Eliot: A Selected Critique* (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1948), pp. 97-113.

39 Stephen Spender, *T. S. Eliot,* op. cit., p. 218. Other critics concur. Subhas Sarkar, in *T. S. Eliot the Dramatist* (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1972), remarks: "No one can escape the feeling that the playwright has, rather, forced upon Celia a cruel fate she does not deserve" (pp. 180-181). He quotes another critic's observation of Celia's martyrdom: "She was bullied into sainthood—Shanghaied" (p. 181).

40 If Vivienne lived on a "knife-edge," as Russell suggested, Eliot must have wondered at whom the blade was pointed. His biographers have acknowledged his unconscious aggressive impulses toward women, a conclusion that is consistent with the misogyny in *The Cocktail Party.* Matthews notes: "Eliot's sense of guilt seems not only to have been built into him but to have centered on two peculiar obsessions which he stated as general truths: that every man wants to murder a girl; that sex is sin is death" (*Great Tom,* op. cit., p. 98). In "After *The Waste Land,"* op. cit., Dr. Trosman writes that "there are indications of increasing preoccupations with unconscious aggression directed towards his wife in the years prior to his conversion" (p. 302). Given Eliot's aggression toward women, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that both the playwright and Dr. Reilly are projecting the identical death wish in the form of glorious martyrdom upon Celia. See also George Whiteside, "T. S. Eliot: The Psycho-biographical Approach," *The Southern Review* (University of Adelaide, Australia), Vol. 6 (March 1973), pp. 3-26. Curiously, even so

excellent a psychological literary critic as C. L. Barber has defended the belief that Reilly's actions are only slightly unusual. "But if his conduct is sometimes unprofessional —or para-professional—his attitude towards himself and his powers is more human, more humble, than that of many an actual professional man on whom we force the role of medicine man." See "The Power of Development" in F. O. Matthiessen, *The Achievement of T. S. Eliot* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 235-236). The distinguished literary critic and biographer Leon Edel makes the same mistake when he observes that "The interpersonal strategy used by the psychoanalyst in *The Cocktail Party* springs also out of a familiarity with modem psychoanalytic theory." See "Psychoanalysis and the 'Creative' Arts" in Judd Marmor, ed., *Modem Psychoanalysis: New Directions and Perspectives* (New York: Basic Books, 1968, p. 636). The truth is not that Eliot goes "beyond psychiatry," as too many readers have assumed, but that he never comes close to imagining the art of psychiatry, with its limitations and therapeutic possibilities.

41 T. S. Eliot, "Introduction" to G. Wilson Knight, *The Wheel of Fire* (London: Methuen and Company, 1962), p. xx.

42 Eliot's fear of self-exposure may explain his reluctance to speak about the "meaning" of his art and the extreme defensiveness of his remarks when he does offer commentary. An example is his often-quoted dismissal of the meaning of *The Waste Land.* "Various critics have done me the honor to interpret the poem in terms of the contemporary world, have considered it, indeed, as an important bit of social criticism. To me it was only the relief of a personal and wholly insignificant grouse against life; it is just a piece of rhythmical grumbling" *(The Waste Land: A Facsimile,* p. 1). By contrast, recall D. H. Lawrence's shrewd observation: never trust die teller, only the tale.

43 See D. W. Winnicott, "Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena" (1953) and "The Location of Cultural Experience" (1967), both reprinted in *Playing and Reality* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971).

44 Robert Waelder, 'The Principle of Multiple Function," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly,* Vol. 5 (1936), pp. 45-62.

45 Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York: Norton, 1958), p. 36.

Bibliography

Alvarez, A. *The Savage God.* New York: Bantam, 1973.

Arlow, Jacob A., and Charles Brenner. *Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory.* 1964; rpt. New York: International Universities Press, 1979.

Aycock, Linnea. "The Mother-Daughter Relationship in the *Children of Violence* Series." *Anonymous: A Journal for the Woman Writer,* 1 (Spring 1974), pp. 48-55-

Barnhouse, Ruth Tiffany, and Urban T. Holmes, III, eds. *Male and Female: Christian Approaches to Sexuality.* New York: Seabury, 1976.

Barnhouse, Ruth Tiffany. *Homosexuality: A Symbolic Confusion.* New York: Seabury, 1977.

Barth, John. *The End of the Road.* 1967; rpt. New York: Bantam, 1969.

Berman, Jeffrey. "Sylvia Plath and the Art of Dying." A *New Anatomy of Melancholy: Patterns of Self Aggression Among Authors.* Eds. Leonard F. Manheim, M. D. Faber, and Harvey L. P. Resnick. *University of Hartford Studies in Literature,* 10 (Nos. 1, 2, 3 Fall 1978), pp. 137-155.

---- . "The Multiple Faces of *Eve* and *Sybil:* 'E Pluribus Unum.' " *Psycho-cultural Review,* 2 (Winter 1978), pp. 1-25.

---- . *"Equus:* 'After Such Little Forgiveness, What Knowledge?' " *The Psychoanalytic Review, 66 (Fall 1979), pp. 407-422.*

Bettelheim, Bruno. "Portnoy Psychoanalyzed." *Midstream,* 15 (June/July, 1969), pp. 3-10.

Blanton, Smiley. *Diary of My Analysis with Sigmund Freud.* New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971.

Boyers, Robert, ed. *R. D. Laing & Anti-Psychiatry.* New York: Octagon, I974-

Bram, Frederick M. "The Gift of Anna O." *British Journal of Medical Psychology,* 38 (1965), pp. 53-58.

Browne, E. Martin. *The Making of a Play: T.S. Eliot's The Cocktail Party.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Bruccoli, Matthew J. *The Composition of Tender Is the Night.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963.

---- . *Some Sort of Epic Grandeur.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981.

Bryer, Jackson R. "A Psychiatrist Reviews 'Tender Is the Night.' " *Literature and Psychology,* 16, 3-4 (1966), pp. 198-199-

Burton, Mary E. "The Countertransference of Dr. Diver." *English Literary History,* 38 (September 1971), pp. 459-471.

Butscher, Edward. *Sylvia Plath: Method and Madness.* New York: Seabury, 1976.

Crews, Frederick. *Out of My System.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Degler, Carl N. "Charlotte Perkins Gilman on the Theory and Practice of Feminism." *American Quarterly,* 8 (Spring 1956), pp. 21-39.

Earnest, Ernest. *S. Weir Mitchell: Novelist and Physician.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950.

Edel, Leon. "Psychoanalysis and the 'Creative' Arts." *Modern Psychoanalysis: New Directions and Perspectives,* ed. Judd Marmor. New York: Basic Books, 1968, pp. 626-641.

Ehrenwald, Jay. *The History of Psychotherapy*. New York: Jason Aronson, 1976.

Eliot, T. S. "The Future of an Illusion." Review of *The Future of an Illusion* by Sigmund Freud. *The Criterion,* 8 (December 1928), pp. 350-353-

---- . "Introduction" to *The Wheel of Fire,* by G. Wilson Knight. London: Methuen and Company, 1962, xiii-xx.

---- . *Selected Essays.* London: Faber and Faber, 1966.

---- . 'The Search for Moral Sanction." *The Listener,* 7 (30 March 1932), pp. 445-446; 480.

---- . *Essays Ancient and Modem.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936.

---- . *"Reflections on The Cocktail Party." World Review, New Series,* 9 (November 1949), pp-19-22.

---- . "An Interview with T. S. Eliot." *The New York Times,* 16 April 1950, Section 2, p. 1.

---- . *The Cocktail Party. In The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1952.

---- . *On Poetry and Poets.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957.

---- . *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original Drafts,* ed. Valerie Eliot. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971.

Ellenberger, Henri. *The Discovery of the Unconscious.* New York: Basic Books, 1970.

Epstein, Lawrence, and Arthur Feiner, eds. *Countertransference.* New York: Jason Aronson, 1979.

Erikson, Erik H. *Young Man Luther.* 1958; rpt. New York: Norton, 1962.

---- . *Insight and Responsibility. New York: Norton, 1964.*

---- . *Gandhi's Truth.* New York: Norton, 1969.

Farber, Leslie H. "Lying on the Couch." *Lying, Despair, Jealousy, Envy, Sex, Suicide, Drugs, and the Good Life.* New York: Basic Books, 1976, pp. 205-220.

Feder, Lillian. *Madness in Literature.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Fiedler, Leslie. "Some Notes on F. Scott Fitzgerald." *F. Scott Fitzgerald: A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. Arthur Mizener. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 70-76.

Field, Andrew. *Nabokov: His Life in Art.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

---- . *Nabokov: His Life in Part. New York: Viking, 1977.*

Fitzgerald, F. Scott. *Tender Is the Night.* 1934; rpt. New York: Scribner's, 1962.

---- . *The Crack-Up,* ed. Edmund Wilson. New York: New Directions, 1956.

---- . "Babylon Revisited." *The Fitzgerald Reader,* ed. Arthur Mizener. New York: Scribner's, 1963, pp. 302-322.

---- . *The Letters of F. Scott Fitzgerald, ed. Andrew Turnbull. New York:* Scribner's, 1963.

---- . *In Our Own Time: A Miscellany,* eds. Matthew J. Bruccoli and Jackson R. Bryer. New York: Popular Press, 1971.

---- . *The Notebooks of F. Scott Fitzgerald,* ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.

---- . *Correspondence of F. Scott Fitzgerald*, eds. Matthew J. Bruccoli and Margaret M. Duggan. New York: Random House, 1980.

Fitzgerald, Zelda. *Save Me the Waltz.* New York: Signet, 1968.

Fraiberg, Louis. *Psychoanalysis and American Literary Criticism.* Detroit: Wayne State University Press, i960.

Freeman, Lucy. *The Story of Anna O.* New York: Walker, 1972.

Freeman, Walter. *The Psychiatrist: Personalities and Patterns.* New York: Grune and Stratton, 1968.

Freud, Sigmund. *The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess,* eds. Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris; trans. Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey. New York: Basic Books, 1977.

---- . *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,* trans. James Strachey, et al. 24 Volumes. London: The Hogarth Press, 1958-1974.

---- . *The Letters of Sigmund Freud,* ed. Ernst L. Freud; trans. Tania Stern and James Stern. New York: Basic Books, 1975.

Frey-Rohn, Liliane. *From Freud to Jung*, trans. Fred E. Engreen and Evelyn K. Engreen. New York: Delta, 1976.

Fromm, Erich. *The Forgotten Language.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951.

Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda. *Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.

---- . *Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy,* ed. Dexter M. Bullard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.

[Gilman] Charlotte Perkins Stetson. *Women and Economics.* Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, 1899.

. *The Yellow Wallpaper.* New York: The Feminist Press, 1973.

. *Concerning Children.* Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, 1901.

---- . *The Home: Its Work and Influence.* 1903; rpt. Urbana: University

of Illinois Press, 1972.

----. "Why I Wrote The Yellow Wallpaper." *The Forerunner,* 4 (1913), p. 271.

---- . "Parasitism and Civilized Vice." *Woman's Coming of Age,* eds. Samuel D. Schmalhausen and V. F. Calverton. New York: Liveright, 1931, pp. 110-126.

---- . *The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman: An Autobiography. 1935;* rpt. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

Gordon, Lyndall. *Eliot's Early Years.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Greenberg, Joanne. *I Never Promised You a Rose Garden.* 1964; rpt. New York: Signet, no date.

Greenberg, Joanne [Hannah Green]. "In Praise of My Doctor—Frieda Fromm-Reichmann." *Contemporary Psychoanalysis,* 4 (Fall 1967), PP-73-77.

H.D. *Tribute to Freud.* 1956; rpt. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.

Heilman, Robert B. "Alcestis and *The Cocktail Party." Comparative Literature,* 5 (1953), pp. 105-116.

Hemingway, Ernest. *A Moveable Feast.* New York: Scribner's, 1964.

Hill, Mary A. Charlotte Perkins Gilman: The Making of a Radical Feminist 1860-1896. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980.

Hoffman, Frederick J. *Freudianism and the Literary Mind,* 2nd ed. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967.

Holbrook, David. *Sylvia Plath: Poetry and Existence.* London: Athlone Press, 1976.

Holland, Norman N. "An Identity for the Rat Man." *International Review of Psycho-Analysis,* 2 (1975), PP-157-169.

---- . *5 Readers Reading.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.

---- . "UNITY IDENTITY TEXT SELF." *PMIJs,* 90 (1975), pp. 813-822.

Hovey, Richard. "Psychiatrist and Saint in *The Cocktail Party." Literature and Psychology,* 9, 3-4 (Summer and Fall 1959), pp.51-55.

Jacobson, Edith. *The Self and the Object World.* New York: International Universities Press, 1964.

Jensen, Ellen M. "Anna O—A Study of Her Later Life." *Psychoanalytic Quarterly,* 39 (1970), pp. 269-293.

Jones, Ernest. *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud.* 3 Volumes. New York: Basic Books, 1953-1957.

Kanzer, Mark, and Jules Glenn. *Freud and His Patients.* New York: Jason Aronson, 1980.

Kaplan, Abraham. "Poetry, Medicine and Metaphysics." *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis,* 9 (January 1981), pp. 101-128.

Karl, Frederick R. "Doris Lessing in the Sixties: The New Anatomy of Melancholy." *Contemporary Literature,* 13 (Winter 1972), pp. 15-33.

Karlinsky, Simon, ed. *The Nabokov-Wilson Letters.* New York: Harper and Row, 1979.

Karpe, Richard. "The Rescue Complex in Anna O's Final Identity." *Psychoanalytic Quarterly,* 30 (1961), pp. 1-27.

Kernberg, Otto. Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism. New York: Jason Aronson, 1980.

Kleinschmidt, Hans J. "The Angry Act: The Role of Aggression in Creativity." *American Imago,* 24, 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1967), pp. 98-128.

Kohut, Heinz. *The Analysis of the Self.* 1971; rpt. New York: International Universities Press, 1977.

---- . *The Restoration of the Self.* New York: International Universities

Press, 1977.

---- . "Reflections on *Advances in Self Psychology Advances in Self Psychology,* ed. Arnold Goldberg. New York: International Universities Press, 1980, pp. 473-554-

Kraditor, Aileen S. *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

Kris, Ernst. *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art.* New York: International Universities Press, 1952.

Kroll, Judith. *Chapters in a Mythology.* New York: Harper and Row, 1976.

Laing, R. D., and A. Esterson. *Sanity, Madness, and the Family.* 1964; rpt. New York: Basic Books, 1971.

Laing, R. D. *The Politics of Experience.* New York: Pantheon, 1967.

Langbaum, Robert. *The Poetry of Experience.* New York: Norton, 1963.

Langs, Robert. *Psychotherapy: A Basic Text.* New York: Jason Aronson, 1982.

---- . *The Psychotherapeutic Conspiracy.* New York: Jason Aronson, 1982.

Lehrman, Philip R. "Freud's Contributions to Science." *Harofé Haivri [Hebrew Physician],* I (1940), pp. 161-176.

Lesser, Simon O. *Fiction and the Unconscious.* New York: Vintage, 1957.

Lessing, Doris. *Martha Quest [Children of Violence,* Vol. 1]. 1952; rpt. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964.

---- .*A Proper Marriage [Children of Violence, Vol. 2]. 1954; rpt. New* York: Simon and Schuster, 1964.

---- . *A Ripple from the Storm [Children of Violence, Vol. 3]. 1958, rpt.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966.

---- . *The Golden Notebook.* 1962; rpt. New York: Bantam, 1979.

---- . *Landlocked [Children of Violence, Vol. 4]. 1965; rpt. New York:* Simon and Schuster, 1966.

---- . *The Four-Gated City [Children of Violence, Vol. 5]. 1969; rpt. New* York: Bantam, 1979.

---- . *Briefing for a Descent Into Hell. 1971; rpt. New York: Bantam, 1977.*

---- . *A Small Personal Voice,* ed. Paul Schlueter. New York: Vintage, 1975.

Lindner, Robert. *The Fifty-Minute Hour: A Collection of True Psychoanalytic Tales.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955.

Lovering, Joseph. *S. Weir Mitchell.* New York: Twayne, 1971.

Mahler, Margaret. *On Human Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation: Volume I, Infantile Psychosis*. New York: International Universities Press, 1968.

Mahler, Margaret, Fred Pine, and Anni Bergmann. *The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant.* New York: Basic Books, 1975.

Mann, Thomas. "Freud's Position in the History of Modern Thought." *The Criterion, 12* (July 1933); rpt. *The Collected Edition of The Criterion.* Ed. T. S. Eliot. New York: Faber and Faber/Barnes and Noble, 1967, pp. 549-570.

---- . *'The Making of The Magic Mountain." The Magic Mountain, trans.*

H. T. Lowe-Porter. New York: Vintage, 1969, pp. 717-727.

Marcus, Steven. *Representations.* New York: Random House, 1975.

Marotti, Arthur. "Countertransference, the Communication Process, and the Dimensions of Psychoanalytic Criticism." *Critical Inquiry,* 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 471-489.

Matthews, T. S. *Great Tom.* New York: Harper and Row, 1974.

Menaker, Esther. "Some Inner Conflicts of Women in a Changing Society." *Career and Motherhood,* eds. Alan Roland and Barbara Harris. New York: Human Science Press, 1979, pp. 87-101.

---- . "Self-Psychology Illustrated on the Issue of Moral Masochism: Clinical Implications." *American Journal of Psychoanalysis,* 41 (1981), pp. 297-305.

Meyer, Bernard C. *Houdini: A Mind in Chains.* New York: Dutton, 1976.

Milford, Nancy. *Zelda.* 1970; rpt. New York: Avon, 1971.

Miller, James E., Jr. *T.S. Eliot's Personal Waste Land.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977.

Mitchell, S. Weir. *Fat and Blood.* Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1884.

---- . *Wear and Tear.* 1887; rpt. New York: Arno Press, 1973.

---- . *Doctor and Patient.* 1888; rpt. New York: Arno Press, 1972.

Mizener, Arthur. *The Far Side of Paradise.* 1951; rpt. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

Moser, Tilmann. *Tears of Apprenticeship on the Couch.* New York: Urizen Books, 1977.

Nabokov, Vladimir. *Bend Sinister.* 1947; rpt. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974-

---- . *Pnin.* New York: Doubleday, 1957.

---- . *Pale Fire.* New York: Putnam, 1962.

---- . *Ada or Ardor: A Family Chronicle. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.*

---- . *The Annotated Lolita,* ed., with Preface, Introduction, and Notes by Alfred Appel, Jr. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.

---- . *The Portable Nabokov,* 3rd ed., ed. Page Stegner. New York: Viking, 1973-

---- . *Strong Opinions.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.

---- . *Lectures on Literature,* ed. Fredson Bowers. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980.

O'Neill, William. *Everyone Was Brave.* Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.

Peter, John. "A New Interpretation of *The Waste Land." Essays in Criticism,* 2 (July 1952), pp. 242-266.

Pfister, Oscar. *The Psychoanalytic Method,* trans. Charles Rockwell Payne. New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1917.

Pickering, George. *Creative Malady.* 1974; rpt. New York: Delta, 1976.

Piper, Henry Dan. *F. Scott Fitzgerald: A Critical Portrait.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

1965.

Plath, Sylvia. *The Bell Jar.* 1963; rpt. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

---- . *Letters Home,* ed. Aurelia Schober Plath. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

---- . *The Collected Poems,* ed. Ted Hughes. New York: Harper and Row, 1981.

---- . *The Journals of Sylvia Plath,* ed. Frances McCullough. New York: Dial Press, 1982.

Rein, David M. *S. Weir Mitchell as a Psychiatric Novelist.* New York: International Universities Press, 1952.

Rieff, Philip. *The Triumph of the Therapeutic.* New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

Roazen, Paul. *Freud and His Followers.* New York: New York University Press, 1985.

Robertiello, Richard C. " 'Acting Out' or Working Through?' " *Acting Out: Theoretical and Clinical Aspects,* eds. Lawrence Edwin Abt and Stuart L. Weissman. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1965, pp. 40-45-

Robitscher, Jonas. *The Powers of Psychiatry.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980.

Rogow, Arnold A. *The Psychiatrists.* New York: Putnam, 1970.

Roth, Philip. *Letting Go.* New York: Random House, 1962.

---- . *Portnoy's Complaint.* New York: Random House, 1969.

---- . *The Breast.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.

---- . *My Life as a Man.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974-

---- . *The Professor of Desire.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977.

---- . *Reading Myself and Others.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977.

Roth, Phyllis A. "Toward the Man Behind the Mystification." *Nabokov's Fifth Arc,* eds. J. E. Rivers and Charles Nicol. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, pp. 43-59.

Rubenstein, Roberta. "Doris Lessing's *The Golden Notebook:* The Meaning of Its Shape." *American Imago,* 32 (Spring 1975), pp. 40-58.

---- . *The Novelistic Vision of Doris Lessing.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979.

Rubin, Stephen E. "Conversations with the Author of 'I Never Promised You a Rose Garden.' " *The Psychoanalytic Review,* 59 (1972), pp. 201-215.

Russell, Bertrand. *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944.* Boston: Little Brown, 1968.

Savage, D. S. "The Significance of F. Scott Fitzgerald." *F. Scott Fitzgerald: A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. Arthur Mizener. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 146-156.

Schreiber, Flora Rheta. *Sybil.* New York: Warner Books, 1976.

Schur, Max. *Freud: Living and Dying.* New York: International Universities Press, 1972.

Schwartz, Murray, and Christopher Bollas. "The Absence at the Center: Sylvia Plath and Suicide." *Sylvia Plath: New Views on the Poetry,* ed. Gary Lane. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 179-202.

Searles, H. "The Effort to Drive the Other Person Crazy—An Element in the Aetiology and Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia." *Collected Papers on Schizophrenia and Related Subjects.* New York: International Universities Press, 1965, pp. 254-283.

Shaffer, Peter. *Equus.* New York: Avon, 1974-

Shechner, Mark. "Philip Roth." *Partisan Review,* 41 (1974), pp. 410-427.

Sievers, W. David. *Freud on Broadway.* New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1970.

Sinclair, Andrew. The Better Half: The Emancipation of the American Woman. New York: Harper

and Row, 1965.

Singer, Melvin. "The Experience of Emptiness in Narcissistic and Borderline States," Parts I and II. *The International Review of Psychoanalysis,* 4, Part 4 (1977), pp. 460-479.

Spacks, Patricia Meyer. *The Female Imagination.* New York: Avon, 1976.

Spender, Stephen. *T. S. Eliot.* New York: Viking, 1975.

Stanton, Robert. " 'Daddy's Girl': Symbol and Theme in 'Tender Is the Night.' " *Modem Fiction Studies,* 4 (Summer 1958), pp. 136-142.

Stegner, Page. *Escape Into Aesthetics.* New York: Dial Press, 1966.

Steiner, Nancy Hunter. *A Closer Look at Ariel.* New York: Popular Library, 1973.

Sternberg-Perrakis, Phyllis. *"The Golden Notebook:* Separation and Symbiosis." *American Imago,* 38 (Winter 1981), pp. 407-428.

Thomas, D. M. *The White Hotel.* New York: Viking, 1981.

Trilling, Lionel. "Freud and Literature." *The Liberal Imagination.* Garden City: Anchor Books, 1953, pp. 32-54-

---- . *The Opposing Self. New York: Viking, 1968.*

Trosman, Harry. "T. S. Eliot and *The Waste Land:* Psychopathological Antecedents and Transformations." *Archives of General Psychiatry,* 30 (May 1974), pp. 709-717-

---- . "After *The Waste Land:* Psychological Factors in the Religious *Conversion of T. S. Eliot." International Review of Psychoanalysis, 4 (1977), pp-295-304.*

Turnbull, Andrew. *Scott Fitzgerald.* New York: Scribner's, 1962.

Unger, Leonard. "T. S. Eliot's Images of Awareness." *T. S. Eliot: The Man and His Work,* ed. Allen Tate. London: Chatto and Windus, 1967, pp. 203-213.

Vlastos, Marion. "Doris Lessing and R. D. Laing: Psycho-politics and Prophecy." *PMLA,* 91 (March 1976), pp. 245-257.

Waelder, Robert. "The Principle of Multiple Function." *Psychoanalytic Quarterly,* 5 (1936), pp. 45-62.

Whiteside, George. "T. S. Eliot: The Psycho-biographical Approach." *The Southern Review* (University of Adelaide, Australia), 6 (March 1973), pp. 3-26.

Wilson, Edmund. *The Wound and the Bow.* 1941; rpt. New York: Oxford University' Press, 1965.

Winnicott, D. W. "Hate in the Counter-Transference." *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,* 30 (1949), Part 2, pp. 69-74.

---- . *Playing and Reality.* London: Tavistock Publications, 1971.

Wolfe, Kary K., and Gary K. Wolfe. "Metaphors of Madness: Popular Psychological Narratives." *Journal of Popular Culture,* 9 (Spring 1976), pp. 895-907.

Wolff, Cynthia. *A Feast of Words: The Triumph of Edith Wharton.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Wolf-Man. *The Wolf Man.* With *The Case of the Wolf-Man* by Sigmund Freud and *A Supplement* by Ruth Mack Brunswick. Edited, with Notes, an Introduction, and Chapters by Muriel Gardiner. New York: Basic Books, 1971.

Woolf, Leonard. Downhill All the Way: An Autobiography of the Tears 1919-1939. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967.

Woolf, Virginia. *Mrs. Dalloway.* 1925; rpt. London: Chatto and Windus, 1968.

---- . *The Letters of Virginia Woolf. Vol. IV: 1929-1931*, eds. Nigel Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.

Wortis, Joseph. *Fragments of an Analysis with Freud.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975.