NARCISSISM AND CIVILIZATION: MARCUSE

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Narcissism and Civilization: Marcuse

It has been over thirty years since the publication of Eros and *Civilization,* the book that Herbert Marcuse, as well as many of his critics, regarded as his most significant work.[277] It is based almost entirely on a reinterpretation of Freudian psychology. Yet, even as it sharply attacks revisionists who would deviate from this psychology, it introduces a theme that Marcuse would develop more fully in subsequent writings, such as "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man" (1963). There Marcuse argues, as we saw in the previous chapter, that key Freudian categories such as the oedipus complex fail to capture the experience of growing up in a one-dimensional society. Today the child is socialized by the capitalist state before he has had an opportunity to develop his own ego. Marcuse and the Frankfurt school in general have been sharply criticized for idealizing the partriarchal bourgeois family. Yet, at the same time, a number of scholars, while not necessarily following Marcuse's exact line of analysis, have agreed that the character of psychopathology has indeed changed since Freud's era as a result of social changes, one facet of this transformation being the apparent rise in the number of narcissistic personality disorders.[278] Moreover, the very idea of a "culture of narcissism" draws heavily on Marcuse's analysis of the

way in which a one-dimensional society gives rise to a new personality type: outwardly adaptive and compliant, but inwardly filled with rage. Lasch has discussed at some length the relationship between Marcuse's analysis and his own.[279] His criticism of Marcuse will be taken up later.

It would be misleading, however, to view Marcuse merely as one of the first critics of the culture of narcissism. Eros and *Civilization* contains a wide-ranging reevaluation of narcissism, which shows it to be a potentially emancipatory force, not merely a regressive one, as Stanley Aronowitz has pointed out.[280] Indeed, Marcuse is perhaps the only social theorist to have labeled this progressive force "narcissism." In this respect Marcuse is in tune with the theory of narcissism, which emphasizes its dual orientation. In some respects he is also in tune with Plato, for, like Plato, he sees a transformed eros—transformed in ways that are explicable in terms of the theory of narcissism — as the means by which a higher state of being is realized. Unlike Plato, however, Marcuse values the physical expression of eros over its spiritual expression. The theory of narcissism reveals why Plato's view possesses certain advantages over Marcuse's.

Since the publication of Eros *and Civilization* in 1954, the theory of narcissism has undergone rapid development. While Marcuse anticipates aspects of this development, recent theories of narcissism can help clarify Marcuse's attempt to make narcissism the core of a new reality principle. Like

Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse seems not to have been conversant with the work of Melanie Klein or the British object relations school. He framed the issue almost exclusively in terms of Freud versus social-psychological revisionists who would trivialize Freud. Two aspects of Eros and *Civilization* are especially controversial. First, Marcuse's reinterpretation of Freud on the process of sublimation seems to involve a fundamental misrepresentation of Freudian theory. Second, and more troubling, aspects of Marcuse's erotic utopia seem terribly regressive, even infantile, in character. The goal seems to be instinctual gratification for its own sake. "Higher values" reflect not only a deflection from genuine gratification; they are nothing more than this. It is the virtue of the theory of narcissism that it can help distinguish between the progressive and regressive moments in Marcuse's ideal. Furthermore, because narcissism is not readily socialized or coopted (recall Chasseguet-Smirgel on the demanding character of the ego ideal), a reinterpretation of Marcuse's erotic utopia in the light of narcissism is not likely to lead to accommodationist or revisionist conclusions. We will sometimes have to search hard for the progressive moment in Marcuse's work, because it is not always apparent. The search should prove rewarding, though, as it will allow us to move beyond the debate over whether *Eros and Civilization* is flawed because Marcuse sticks too closely to Freud or because he does not stick closely enough.[281]

Marcuse and Narcissism

Marcuse argues that Freud's discovery of primary narcissism signified more than just another stage in the development of the libido. Narcissism reflects another orientation toward reality, one that engulfs its environment, rather than simply standing in opposition to it. It is in this vein that Marcuse quotes from *Civilization and its Discontents:* "Originally the ego includes everything, later it detaches itself from the external world. The ego-feeling we are aware of now is only a shrunken vestige of a far more extensive feeling—a feeling which embraced *the* universe and expressed an *inseparable connection of the ego with the external world."*[282] Freud, as is well known, goes on to say that he has never experienced such an oceanic feeling and finds it difficult "to work with these almost intangible quantities." Marcuse is less circumspect, arguing that the fundamental relatedness to reality expressed in narcissism might, under the proper social conditions, "generate a comprehensive existential order. In other words, narcissism may *contain the germ of a different reality* principle: the libidinal cathexis of the ego (one's own body) may become the source and reservoir for a new libidinal cathexis of the object world."[283]

This view holds out the possibility of an entirely different mode of sublimation, one that derives from an extension rather than a "constraining deflection of the libido."[284] Much of the rest of *Eros* and *Civilization* is speculation about how such a nonrepressive sublimation might become the

basis of an entirely new order resting on the pleasure principle. It should not be overlooked that in framing the issue in this way, Marcuse must to some extent misrepresent Freud. For Freud allows the possibility that sublimation may heighten pleasure by finding more reliable, realistic, and ego-syntonic (where erotic cathexes are in accordance with ego tendencies) means to its realization.[285] Such a view is alien to Marcuse. For him, repression and Freudian sublimation hang together, because both deflect eros from its ultimate aim, which is the sole issue for Marcuse.

In formulating the possibility of nonrepressive sublimation, Marcuse turns to "The Ego and the Id," where Freud asks "whether all sublimation does not take place through the agency of the ego, which begins by changing sexual object-libido into narcissistic libido, and then, perhaps, goes on to give it another aim."[286] If this is the case, says Marcuse, then perhaps "all sublimation would begin with the reactivation of narcissistic libido, which somehow overflows and extends to objects. The hypothesis all but revolutionizes the idea of sublimation: it hints at a non-repressive mode of sublimation."[287] However, as many critics, including Schoolman, Berndt, and Reiche have pointed out, there is virtually no evidence in Freud for such a concept of nonrepressive sublimation.[288] Even in the passage that Marcuse quotes in support of his claim that "sublimation would begin with the reactivation of narcissistic libido, which somehow overflows and extends to objects," Freud suggests that the ego is the agency (mediator) involved.

Marcuse's "somehow" process if it refers to Freud at all, can refer only to the discussion that follows the passage cited by Marcuse, where the ego is said to be the agency (mediator) involved. Marcuse's "somehow" process, if his mother, by encouraging his confrontation with the reality principle as represented by his father.[289]

Marcuse misses this point because he sees repression as a social, rather than a biological, category. He takes the confrontation with the reality principle, as enforced by the father during the oedipal conflict, to be the cause of both repression and the freezing of the instincts at the genital level, so that the body is prepared (that is, desexualized) for labor. In fact, according to Freud it is not the oedipal encounter with the father, but the genital stage of libidinal development itself, that focuses the instincts at the genital level, thereby creating the need for repression in the first place.[290] Repression is an effect, not the cause, of the localization of the sexual instincts. If this is the case, then Marcuse can hardly employ Freud in support of his claim that a reactivation of primary narcissism could provide a means of nonrepressive sublimation, as Sidney Lipshires argues so clearly.[291] Furthermore, Freud's mention of narcissism in the passage quoted by Marcuse refers only to the way in which the ego abandons its libidinal attachment to objects, such as its mother. It says nothing about the way in which libido is redirected or generalized, what Marcuse refers to as the "transformation of sexuality into eros"—that is, sublimation, repressive or otherwise.[292]

Marcuse's goal is clear: that the entire body become libidinally cathected as it was before the localization of the sexual instincts in the genitals (polymorphous perversity), so that it is no longer an object of labor and the subject of political manipulation. Instead, the erotic body would come to make the whole world in its image. Our considerations suggest that this is hardly likely, or at least that there is very little support for such speculation in Freud. Nevertheless, when all these quite reasonable criticisms are said and done, there remains in Marcuse's employment of narcissism as "the germ of a different reality principle" a fascinating idea. Indeed, it is probably more fruitful to approach the whole issue of a "different reality principle" from the perspective of narcissism than from that of drive theory. A new reality principle based on a highly sublimated narcissism would not require the theoretical contortions that Marcuse must perform in order to transform Freud's drive theory into the foundation of a utopia.

Narcissism and Civilization

Marcuse claims that the "images of Orpheus and Narcissus reconcile Eros and Thanatos." He characterizes this reconciliation in terms of the "halt of time, the absorption of death; silence, sleep, night, paradise—the Nirvana principle not as death but as life."[293] Surely the reconciliation Marcuse writes of here is tantamount to a return to the womb, the paradigm of the most regressive moment of narcissistic gratification. It involves no

misrepresentation to conclude that Marcuse comes close to equating eros and narcissism. Indeed, he provides the missing term in this equation. In a society governed by the pleasure principle, says Marcuse, eros and thanatos would cease their constant struggle and together be transformed into the nirvana principle, which seeks eternal freedom from pain, stimulation, and anxiety.[294] It is the nirvana principle, in which eros and thanatos are aufgehoben, that is tantamount to narcissism. Like nirvana, regressive narcissism seeks a state of primitive gratification so complete that the distinction between self and other and hence (as Grunberger, among many other theorists of narcissism, has pointed out) between life and death is blurred.[295] It is for this reason that several theorists of narcissism have characterized narcissism in terms of its indifference to death. Further, pathological narcissism, in which later psychological development remains under the thrall of primary narcissism, is often characterized by insomnia, which some theorists see as deriving from an unconscious failure to distinguish between sleep and death.[296] As Marcuse puts it in discussing the autoeroticism of Narcissus, "If his erotic attitude is akin to death and brings death, then rest and sleep and death are not painfully separated and distinguished: the Nirvana principle rules throughout all these stages."[297] It is precisely this aspect of narcissism, of course, that accounts for its regressive potential, particularly its inability to distinguish freedom from fusion with the power of another, life from death.[298]

Marcuse's analysis epitomizes the duality of narcissism. In particular, it

exemplifies how close progressive narcissism stands to its regressive counterpart. Sometimes the difference seems to be only a matter of emphasis. The problem is that Marcuse's emphasis is almost always on the regressive form. One sees this even in his elevation of Orpheus and Narcissus as culture heroes. Marcuse is surely correct when he states that the dominant mythic culture heroes are Apollonian figures such as Odysseus and Prometheus, clever tricksters who create culture at the price of perpetual sacrifice of the Dionysian aspects of the self. The dialectic of Enlightenment is about precisely this process, of course. Marcuse is also correct in saying that figures representing the Dionysian aspect, such as Orpheus and Narcissus, can usefully be employed to represent the aspect of the self sacrificed in the struggle for existence. "They have not become the culture-heros of the Western world: theirs is the image of joy and fulfillment; the voice which does not command but sings; the gesture which offers and receives; the deed which is peace and ends the labor of conquest; the liberation from time which unites man with god, man with nature."[299]

Still, it is revealing that Marcuse neglects to tell us the full story of his heroes. Narcissus, it will be recalled, rejects the erotic charms of Echo for the autoeroticism of his own image. He finds his image so attractive that he pines away and dies while admiring it in the still water. Orpheus, Marcuse's other antihero, could charm wild beasts with his lyre. However, after striking a deal with Pluto to recover his wife Eurydice from Hades, he could not control his

own desire and anxiety sufficiently to lead her back to this world. Instead, he seeks a reassuring glance of her, and she is snatched away from him forever. Thereafter Orpheus held himself apart from women, dwelling on his lost opportunity. Thracian maidens sought to captivate him, but he resisted their erotic charms, until one day they became so incensed that they drowned out the music of his lyre with their screams and tore him to pieces.[300] That Marcuse chooses Orpheus and Narcissus as his heroes, while virtually ignoring the fate of each, is revealing vis-a-vis the psychological dynamics of his vision of liberation.[301] Is an erotic hero fixated on himself unto death really an image of fulfillment? Is someone who cannot control his own anxiety and longing sufficiently to reach safety and spends the rest of his life in mourning, rejecting eros utterly, an ideal? Surely the balance can be better struck than this.

The insight that by eros Marcuse means nirvana—that is, the reconciliation of eros and thanatos—and that the nirvana principle can be interpreted in terms of narcissism allows us to bring the theory of narcissism to bear on Marcuse's project. Doing so allows us to forge a better compromise between the Apollonian and Dionysian elements in Marcuse's work. From the perspective of the theory of narcissism the most problematic aspect of Marcuse's work is its utter separation of object mastery and gratification. Marcuse overlooks the way in which mastery can also serve to recover something of the lost omnipotence of primary narcissism, by fostering

reconciliation between ego and ego ideal. This too can be a source of gratification, if gratification is not reduced simply to instinctual relief, as it frequently is by Marcuse.

Narcissistic injury stems from the infant's inability either to meet his instinctual urges or to recapture narcissistic satisfaction. Object mastery can provide some degree of compensation for narcissistic injury, however, by demonstrating to the individual that he can meet his needs in a satisfactory manner. Chasseguet-Smirgel interprets object mastery in terms of reconciliation between ego and ego ideal. In the course of normal development the ideal is projected before the individual as a hope, guide, and promise. The content of this promise is that in growing up the individual will be able to recapture something of the lost perfection of the world that he experienced in the state of primary fusion, by acquiring capacities to influence the world, by integrating libidinal needs with the demands of the superego, and above all, by moving closer to the ideal.

To be sure, much of what passes for object mastery should be called by its right name: alienated labor. Marcuse is quite correct in rejecting Ives Hendrick's "Work and the Pleasure Principle," which posits a separate mastery instinct that is fulfilled in labor but makes no adequate distinction between alienated and nonalienated labor.[302] Instead, Marcuse embraces Barbara Lantos's "Work and the Instincts," which argues that play is

dominated by polymorphous sexuality, whereas labor serves only the purpose of self-preservation.[303] Yet, Marcuse misinterprets Lantos on a key point. For Lantos, the child's play represents more than just autoerotic gratification: it may also provide gratification by promoting a sense of mastery and control. It is thus quite misleading for Marcuse to suggest that Lantos provides support for his claim that eros and mastery belong to two entirely different realms of experience. Lantos's point is precisely that eros and mastery are thoroughly blended in play. She writes: "We may say that the pregenital organization of the sexual instincts has its parallel in the play organization of the ego-activities."[304] Marcuse writes of "erotic labor," which might seem to suggest that he believes that eros and mastery can be blended. However, erotic labor turns out to have little in common with labor as ordinarily understood. In particular, any activity performed under the constraint of necessity, however remote, cannot qualify as erotic labor. To be sure, Marcuse calls eros a "prop" for "work relations." But by work relations, he means primarily the social relations of building culture and only secondarily social relations among workers. In neither case does he refer to the actual act of laboring itself.[305] Marcuse states that it is the purpose, not the content of an activity that marks it as work or play,[306] which implies that under erotic social relations even such activities as ditch digging could be pleasurable. But ditch digging could be pleasurable only if it were a hobby done entirely for its own sake. The issue for Marcuse is only whether the

work is necessary. It is the necessity of work that marks it as a constraint on human freedom, thereby showing it to be labor.[307] It appears that only hobbies, performed entirely for their own sake, in utter contempt of necessity, qualify as erotic labor.

There are two reasons why Marcuse separates eros and labor so sharply. The first and most fundamental has to do with the regressive, Dionysian character of Marcuse's utopia, in which it is neither pleasurable activity nor mastery, but oceanic contentment, that is idealized. This contrasts sharply with Plato's ideal in the Symposium, in which the creative act of making virtue and beauty is the goal. The second reason concerns the internal theoretical structure of his argument, and here we see the cost of Marcuse's failure to recognize any distinction between repression and sublimation.[308]

Nonrepressive Sublimation Reconsidered

The "dialectic of civilization," according to Marcuse's interpretation of Freud, works as follows. Culture demands the sublimation of eros, so that the psychic energy that would otherwise be directed toward immediate gratification can be channeled into work. However, such repression enhances aggression, because the desire for pleasure is frustrated and because repression leads to guilt regarding desires to transgress social sanctions, and resentment at feeling guilty expresses itself as aggression. The outcome is

that erotic impulses which have the capacity to "bind" aggression by directing potentially aggressive energy toward social tasks are themselves weakened, thereby requiring even higher levels of repression to control aggression, which weakens eros still further, and so on.

> Culture demands continuous sublimation; it thereby weakens Eros, the builder of culture. And desexualization, by weakening Eros, unbinds the destructive impulses. Civilization is thus threatened by an instinctual defusion, in which the death instinct strives to gain ascendency over the life instincts. Originating in renunciation . . . civilization tends toward self-destruction.[309]

Though Marcuse employs terms such as "stabilization" or "binding" of aggression by eros, he does not elaborate on the process designated. Although he does not say so explicitly, Marcuse appears to have drawn these terms from Freud's distinction between bound nervous processes, which do not press for discharge, and mobile processes, which do.[310] In any case, Marcuse's understanding of binding is unique. Because he nowhere else explains the binding mechanism, it appears that he understands it in terms of the previously discussed process of nonrepressive sublimation, in which object-oriented libido is transformed into narcissistic libido, "which somehow [!] overflows and extends to objects," thus neutralizing aggression by transforming the world into an expression of narcissistic libido. This interpretation is supported by Marcuse's reference, immediately prior to his summary of the "dialectic of civilization," to Freud's claim that after

sublimation (a process initiated during the oedipal stage), eros no longer has the power to bind the destructive elements previously combined with it.[311]

We have already examined the problems associated with Marcuse's theory of nonrepressive sublimation. But let us assume for a moment that it is Marcuse, not Freud, who is correct —that is, that it is the necessity of labor, not the process of psychosexual development itself, that causes repression. If this is so, nonrepressive (narcissistic) sublimation requires that labor be virtually eliminated, not merely rendered more humane. Nonrepressive sublimation is based on an overflow of narcissistic eros to the entire body and world, thereby restoring a state akin to polymorphous perversity. Since, according to Marcuse, it is the father, as representative of the reality principle, who puts an end to this state, it presumably requires the elimination of the reality principle itself to restore it. This in turn requires the elimination, or utter transformation, of labor. For it is nature's scarcity, which requires man to labor, that is the ground of the reality principle in Marcuse's view.[312]

Marcuse does not shrink from this radical conclusion. In fact, it is precisely what he has in mind. He states that in a social order governed (bound) by eros, humanity's alienation from labor would be complete, for the automation of labor would so reduce labor time that individuals would no longer need to find satisfaction in their work. They could devote themselves

fulltime to seeking gratification elsewhere. Marcuse puts it baldly: "The more complete the alienation of labor, the greater the potential of freedom: total automation would be the optimum."[313] Marcuse's erotic utopia thus comes to depend heavily—perhaps more heavily than that of any theorist since Francis Bacon—on scientific and technological progress. Only such progress can create the conditions of nonrepressive sublimation: the elimination of labor, under whose constraint eros is localized in the genitals, rather than remaining free to overflow to other elements of the psyche, thus binding both aggression and eros itself. Science and technology thus become terribly important in Marcuse's project. Transformed by industry, they become the vehicles by which Marcuse's erotic utopia is to be realized.

But, as Chasseguet-Smirgel points out, while scientific and technological progress requires secondary process thinking, in that it demands highly sophisticated versions of reality testing, such progress is nonetheless experienced at a deep psychological level as magic—that is, as primary process, in which wish and fulfillment are one. It seems to her

> legitimate to take into account the external activating factors (which nonetheless have their roots in the individual psyche of every human being) of this ancient wish for reunification of ego and ideal, by the shortest possible route, namely Illusion. The development of the pathology I have attempted to outline is to be set to the account of those factors which take progress made by science as confirmation of the possibility of an immediate reunification of ego and ideal.[314]

Nowhere is this illusion more clearly expressed by Marcuse than in his vision of science and technology, guided by eros, leading to a world which "could (in a literal sense!) embody, incorporate, the human faculties and desires to such an extent that they appear as part of the objective determinism of nature."[315] Such a vision is profoundly narcissistic, reflecting themes of grandiosity, omnipotence, and oceanic fusion with an entire universe. Andreas-Salomé interprets the myth of Narcissus in a way that captures this aspect particularly well. She writes: "Bear in mind that the Narcissus of legend gazed, not in a man-made mirror, but at the mirror of Nature. Perhaps it was not just himself that he beheld in the mirror, but himself as if he were still All."[316]

Progressive Aspects of a Regressive Ideal, and Vice Versa

Marcuse might see the charge that his ideal is terribly regressive as a compliment, given the prevailing reality principle, which sees maturity in terms of repression, sacrifice, renunciation, and control. There would be some truth in such a response. Some progressive consequences of Marcuse's regressive ideal are suggested by Martin Jay in "Anamnestic Totalization: Reflections on Marcuse's Theory of Remembrance." According to Marcuse, it is because we once knew a surfeit of gratification — "oceanic contentment"-—that we continue to demand (even if this demand is generally repressed and confined to the unconscious) happiness. It is this memory, often ineffable,

that is a primary source of revolutionary activity if it can be tapped.[317] We saw in chapter 3 that Plato seems to make a similar claim about the source of the soul's quest for transcendence (Phaedrus 248c-249d). The memory of primitive gratification thus serves not merely as a Siren call toward passivity and withdrawal: it also has the potential to spur the self to action. Jay notes an additional aspect of Marcuse's account that raises an issue not frequently addressed in psychoanalysis, at least until recently. Marcuse considers the possibility that the "memory" of primitive gratification could, at least in some measure, be the memory not of an actual experience but of an ideal, a "return to an imaginary temps perdu in the real life of mankind."[318] However, even if it were the case that the ego ideal derives from a longing for something that never was, this would not fundamentally alter my argument. For the latter depends only on the demanding character of the ego ideal, not its sources, as was pointed out in the introduction in response to Stern's The *Interpersonal* World *of the* Infant.

Marcuse's observation reminds us once again of the subtlety of his analysis. This subtlety is confirmed by the way in which he frequently approaches the ideal of primitive gratification: as an aesthetic experience. It is Orpheus and Narcissus as they are mediated by the aesthetic experience of their stories that Marcuse values so highly. He values this experience because he believes, following Kant, that the aesthetic experience is the realm in which the senses and the intellect meet. This suggests that he does not always

intend his erotic utopia to be seen as a place. Rather, it is a realm, an aesthetic dimension, of truths as valid and timeless as the truths of reason and intellect. It is the purpose of Eros and *Civilization* to champion this realm, which, of course, is not the same thing as championing regressive gratification per se. The details of an actual world in which the rational and the sensuous (the original meaning of aesthetics, according to Marcuse[319]) would meet as equals remain unclear in Marcuse's work. The guiding principle of such a world, however, is definite. The performance principle and the domination of nature would give way to play and joy as principles of civilization.[320]

It might seem that the emphasis on object mastery and control associated with the theory of narcissism is incompatible with Marcuse's insight into the truths of the aesthetic dimension. Were this so, the theory of narcissism would be incompatible with Marcuse's project and could hardly serve as the source of an immanent critique. But in fact, the theory of narcissism sharply challenges the unbounded quest for mastery that is so closely associated with the prevailing reality principle, particularly as expressed in the project that the Frankfort school called the domination of nature. Narcissism originates in the infant's symbiotic fusion with its mother, a state in which the distinction between dependence and independence is not yet meaningful. The theory of narcissism sees in the unmitigated scientific and technological quest to control nature a denial not merely of infantile dependence, but of any dependence at all, including that of humanity on

nature itself.[321] The denial of genuine, realistic dependence and relatedness is as characteristic of narcissism as is the quest for fusion. Indeed, it is the paradoxical coexistence of these two orientations that is one of the leading themes associated with the theory of narcissism.

Eros and Civilization is a striking expression of narcissism precisely because both orientations are expressed dramatically in virtually a single breath. In Marcuse's utopian vision, science, technology, and total automation are to achieve humanity's utter independence from the constraints of the natural world, so that humanity can achieve an erotic fusion with this world so extensive that human desires "appear as part of the objective determinism of nature." Narcissism, according to Grunberger, represents a time when the infant lived in a "cosmos filled solely with his own being, which is both megalomaniacal and intangible, merging with his own bliss."[322] It is this state that Marcuse's utopia seems designed to recapture, and if the theory of narcissism is correct, this is precisely what utopia should — indeed, must — recapture. The only question is whether Marcuse's utopia does not confuse progressive and regressive means to its realization, in part because he sees mastery and gratification as implacably opposed no matter how society might be organized. This, in turn, is because he sees the pleasure principle as the only alternative to the reality principle. Although he introduces the narcissism principle in order to theorize the possibility of non-repressive sublimation, he never truly captures the complexity of narcissism. It remains

a somewhat less socially disruptive— in large measure because its aims are pre-genital — version of the pleasure principle.

Lasch's Critique

Lasch's powerful criticism of Marcuse in effect radicalizes the preceding argument. Were Lasch entirely correct, there would be little point in using the theory of narcissism to distinguish the progressive and regressive aspects of Marcuse's ideal, for he suggests that there is little to work with in Marcuse's account. He summarizes Marcuse's argument as follows: repression originates in the subjection of the pleasure principle to the patriarchal compulsion to labor; thus, if one could abandon labor, repression could be eliminated.[323] Lasch concludes: "The achievement of 'libidinal work relations,' it appears, requires the organization of society into a vast industrial army."[324] However, our considerations point to the opposite conclusion. Machines are to do the soldering required to master scarcity, so that men can be entirely free of labor's constraint and hence of repression. Lasch is unclear on this point, perhaps because he fails to recognize how central the problem of aggression is to Marcuse.[325] It is aggression, not merely the socially disruptive character of eros itself, which requires that nonrepressive sublimation be seen as a "binding" process, a process that is incompatible with any limitations on the overflow of eros, according to Marcuse, and hence incompatible with labor.

Lasch argues that Norman O. Brown comes closer to the mark in *Life Against* Death (in his well-known article on Brown, Marcuse addresses only Brown's later, and truly mystical, *Love's* Body).[326] Brown, says Lasch, confronts the problem of scarcity in a spirit closer to that of Freud, seeing psychic conflict as a response not merely to the demands of work, but to separation anxiety and, ultimately, the fear of death. For Marcuse, the "struggle for existence necessitates the repressive modification of the instincts chiefly because of the lack of sufficient means and resources for integral, painless and toilless gratification of instinctual needs."[327] For Brown, on the other hand, scarcity stems not from a lack of sufficient means and resources, but from the very intensity and urgency of the instinctual demands themselves. For Brown, says Lasch,

> 'scarcity' is experienced first of all as a shortage of undivided mother love. (From this point of view, the Oedipus complex merely reinforces a lesson the child learns much earlier.) 'It is because the child loves the mother so much that it feels separation from the mother as death.' The fear of separation contaminates the 'narcissistic project of loving union with the world with the unreal project of becoming oneself one's whole world.' It not only 'activates a regressive death wish' but directs it outwards in the form of aggression.[328]

Brown's reading of Freud is superior to Marcuse's in several respects, says Lasch. It takes seriously Freud's later works, which emphasize separation anxiety as the prototype of all later anxiety, including castration anxiety.[329] Marcuse takes Freud's most speculative metapsychological

assumptions regarding the primal horde and makes them the basis of an "economic" account in which it is the father's authority, as representative of the world of work, that causes repression. Brown, on the other hand, sees the sources of repression as running deeper, into that Minoan-Mycenean stage of mental development that precedes the oedipal stage, at which the issues are separation, the anxiety associated therewith, rage and depression as characterized by Klein, and individuation.[330] Thus it is Brown who is the more profound critic of neo-Freudian revisionism. For the problem with such revisionism is not only that it glorifies adjustment, promoting conformity of the individual with a repressive civilization, but that it frequently employs simplistic theories of psychological conflict, according to which unhappiness and repression stem merely from frustrated desires. Because Marcuse basically shares this perspective, his work is not as well placed as Brown's to generate criticism of such revisionist accounts.[331]

Lasch's criticism is trenchant. Its most powerful aspect is perhaps the way in which it reveals that, despite Marcuse's praise of Freud's depth psychology, as well as his criticism of neo-Freudian revisionism, it is Marcuse's account that is in many respects one-dimensional, seeing all psychic conflict as centering on the repression of eros. Not unlike Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse turns from psychology to sociology and economics at precisely the point at which psychology might have been most useful: in studying the sources of human anxiety and unhappiness in utterly

nonmaterial modes of scarcity. Nevertheless, there is a complexity to Marcuse's account which Lasch ignores. One sees this just where one might have expected Lasch to look most closely, in Marcuse's account of narcissism. As Lasch notes, Freud conceptualizes narcissism in two different ways: first, as a withdrawal of libidinal interest from the outside world into the self, and second, as a state of primary perfection and wholeness, characterized by an oceanic merging with the All.

Lasch sees Freud's concern with this second aspect of narcissism as what led him to speculate, in *Beyond the Pleasure* Principle and elsewhere, that part of the mind seeks not merely gratification of instinctual desire, but primordial oceanic contentment beyond desire. Indeed, what turns the individual from this "backward path" is the experience of narcissistic injury: the insight, forced on the child by experience, that he is neither perfect nor omnipotent.[332]

Marcuse does not ignore that aspect of narcissism which Lasch finds so fruitful theoretically: narcissism as an archaic quest for merger with the All, understood as an oceanic feeling beyond all desire. Indeed, the problem is that sometimes he pursues this quest all too directly (regressively), seeking to eliminate all forces—that is, the reality principle, which inflicts narcissistic injury—that would turn the individual from this "backward path." To be sure, he often writes of eros as though the issue were simply one of inadequate

instinctual satisfaction, as in his account of nonrepressive sublimation, into which his discussion of narcissism is admittedly drawn. At other times, however, he writes of eros as though it were the precursor of the narcissism principle. It has been my approach to distinguish these two aspects of Marcuse's work, suggesting that the latter is more illuminating. Lasch is surely correct that Marcuse's analysis suffers as a consequence of his simplistic analysis of the sources of repression in material scarcity and labor. However, there are other themes in Marcuse's work that penetrate more deeply, themes that deserve to be sorted out, so that we may separate insight (narcissism as an alternative reality principle) from confusion (narcissism as a basis of nonrepressive sublimation). It is to this task that we now turn, via a reconsideration of Marcuse's utopian ideal.

Mastery and Gratification

Marcuse's erotic utopia grasps the social implications of what is ordinarily a private, indeed unconscious, quest: the pursuit of narcissistic perfection—what Marcuse calls nirvana. In so doing Marcuse reveals the incompleteness of Grunberger's claim that "one could regard all the manifestations of civilization as a kaleidoscope of different attempts by man to restore narcissistic omnipotence." Eros and *Civilization* suggests that this claim might better read: "One could regard all the manifestations of civilization as a kaleidoscope of different attempts by some men to restore

their narcissistic omnipotence by perpetuating the narcissistic humiliation of others, in the form of differential opportunities to exercise mastery and control." That such a statement could readily have been written by Marcuse reminds us that he is also a great realist. Indeed, this is why Freud's *Civilization and its* Discontents so attracted him. It states uncompromisingly that society requires far more instinctual renunciation than it ever compensates for via opportunities for secure gratification.[333] Not socialist revolution, but only an erotic utopia could ever eliminate this discomfort. Or, as Marcuse puts it in responding to Erich Fromm and other revisionists who are too easily satisfied, "socialism cannot liberate Eros from Thanatos."[334] Yet this remains the goal.

However, our considerations suggest that Marcuse's embrace of Freud regarding the burden of civilization could be misleading, at least insofar as it neglects to explain why instinctual renunciation is so painful. It is not merely a matter of lost opportunities for satisfaction, but rather, as Grunberger puts it, "the instinctual sacrifices that man must make to become civilized are painful in large part because they have the nature of narcissistic injury, which is compensated for in only small measure by the cathexis of civilization as a value in itself."[335] In other words the cost of civilization is not so much absence of gratification per se, but that lost gratification is coupled with narcissistic humiliation, rather than being compensated for by mastery.

Such a perspective suggests that mundane—albeit thoroughly revolutionary—social changes could help to heal the narcissistic wound, by promoting reconciliation between ego and ego ideal. Indeed, mature forms of mastery may not only compensate for lost gratification, but may themselves become a form of gratification. Why this is so is suggested by Chasseguet-Smirgel. She notes that the ego ideal follows directly from Freud's observation that nothing is harder to give up than a pleasure once experienced. Indeed, we never give up a pleasure; we only exchange one pleasure for another. Freud suggests that the ego ideal is a substitute for the greatest pleasure of all: narcissistic perfection.[336] Reconciliation between ego and ideal, fostered by mastery, thus brings genuine pleasure, not merely satisfaction in a job well done; or to adapt a phrase of Chasseguet-Smirgel's, mastery is not merely bread, but roses.

In this regard it is well to recall Chasseguet-Smirgel's analysis of the origins of the ego ideal in the most primitive narcissistic desires for wholeness and perfection. Though later integrated with the superego, the ego ideal, like eros, continues to demand genuine, not manipulated, satisfaction. Both are driven by a fantasy that is not easily civilized: eros by the incest fantasy, the ego ideal by the fantasy of fusion with the mother as representative of the All. The ego ideal is thus driven by Dionysian, rather than Apollonian, themes, even as, ideally, it is subsequently integrated with Apollonian strivings. While the mature ego ideal accepts compromise, its

archaic, uncivilized beginnings suggest that it will not be readily sold out. This means that if lessening the distance between the ego and its ideal is made the standard of political, social, and economic change, the changes will be radical indeed.

But these changes need not be utterly utopian. They do not require the abolition of labor via total automation. Not Francis Bacon's New *Atlantis,* but E. F. Schumacher's Small Is *Beautiful* comes closer to the mark in this regard. The goal is to maximize self-determination in every aspect of life, which probably requires that political and economic units be made smaller, even if this involves a certain sacrifice in the sheer quantity of material goods and services available. Against the objection that this might involve an increase in social labor, it should be recalled that the theory of narcissism, unlike Marcuse's theory, suggests that labor undertaken to overcome natural scarcity can be pleasurable if it promotes mastery. Put simply, the goal is not to reduce labor, but to reduce the narcissistic humiliation so often associated with it. This begins to sound somewhat like Marx's critique of alienated labor in the "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in which labor is described in terms of how it alienates man from his own essential nature (*menschlichen Wesen*).[337] There are differences in emphasis, however. The theory of narcissism requires that the control exercised by workers be real, immediate, and concrete, and that it concern actual working and living conditions. Formal theoretical control of the means of production is not

enough.

The precise character of the necessary reforms cannot be addressed here; nor is this necessary. The list of reforms, from self-determination in the work-place to political empowerment of local groups, is familiar and has been addressed by a wide variety of authors: Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill (On Liberty), Carole Pate-man *(Participation and Democratic Theory],* Rudolf Bahro (The Alternative), Benjamin Barber (Strong Democracy), and Philip Green (Retrieving *Democracy),* to mention just a few. Indeed, in his last published work, Marcuse enthusiastically embraces Bahro's book.[338] The key point, of course, is that neither bureaucratic socialism nor the welfare state will suffice. Whatever the exact outlines of a society in which genuine mastery was fostered, it would have to be highly participatory and genuinely democratic in every aspect of collective life. Unlike abstract theories of the good life, the theory of narcissism directs our attention to the actual humiliation suffered by real individuals in daily life. It thus leads us to focus on mundane, concrete measures that might enhance an individual's mastery over his own life. But if the means are mundane, the goal is not. It remains that of healing the narcissistic wound and thus restoring something of the original experience of narcissistic wholeness and perfection.

Narcissistic injury stems from the discrepancy between the ego's abilities and the ego ideal. A society that fostered genuine mastery for every

citizen, by creating real—not merely formal— opportunities for self-determination in politics and in the workplace, would foster reconciliation between ego and ego ideal by reducing the distance between them. Self-determination, such a familiar cliche, would take on a new meaning: it would refer to opportunities for each citizen to exert greater mastery over his environment (the mature object world) by taking on increasingly more sophisticated responsibilities at work and in the community. A society so organized would encourage the individual to project his ego ideal forward into the possibility of his own development, rather than backward into more regressive modes of satisfaction. The path of mature narcissism should not be confused, however, with that of repression and denial. The path to mastery may be long and arduous, but it is nonetheless the path of pleasure, because it connects the most primitive narcissistic desires (particularly for the perfection of the self) with the greatest achievements of individuals and groups, those that make the world a more humane place in which to live. This last statement assumes, of course, that decent, humane values are practiced, as well as praised, in society, so that there is a real chance of their being internalized within the ego ideal in the first place. In general this is a counterfactual assumption. However, our considerations suggest that the attempt to promote, as well as realize, such values can itself be a form of mastery and hence gratification. The theory of narcissism thus does more than characterize utopia; it connects utopia with efforts to realize it. That

Marcuse is unable to make this connection has been noted repeatedly.

Although my account of narcissism connects utopia with efforts to realize it, it is nonetheless incomplete. Utopian political thought, says William Galston in *Justice and the Human Good,* "attempts to specify and justify the principles of a comprehensively good political order."[339] Among these principles will be justice. A complete account of justice will have two components: one focusing on the human good, the other on how this good and the means to its realization are to be distributed. My account has focused almost exclusively on the first aspect; it has sought to characterize the human good in terms of healing the narcissistic wound, achieving narcissistic wholeness, and so forth. I have simply assumed that it is just that this good be distributed as equally as possible. But it is more complicated than this. What if equal distribution violates Pareto-optimality? What if the "least advantaged man" would actually have greater chances for narcissistic fulfillment in a society of considerable inequality? These questions cannot be answered here; they will be elaborated on in chapter 7, but the conclusion there is the conclusion here as well. My account of narcissism is an account of the human good, not an outline of utopia. Nevertheless, my account does tell us something crucial about utopia: that it will be both incomplete and inadequate if it does not seriously confront the quest for narcissistic perfection, by whatever name it is called.

Another more practical objection might be raised at this point: that the object mastery achieved by adults, even if substantial, will not adequately compensate for the narcissistic injury they suffered as infants and young children (especially since so many idiosyncratic factors, such as tolerance of frustration, come into play). Hence, even if society were able to foster mature narcissism on a large scale, it might be a poor substitute for genuine narcissistic gratification. Even if realized, the revolutionary social changes proposed would not extend very far beyond the socialist ideals promoted by Erich Fromm and other easily satisfied neo-Freudian revisionists. This objection may or may not be valid. Since a society that fosters genuine and widespread self-determination in almost every aspect of collective life has never been realized, there is no evidence one way or the other. Needless to say, socialist revolution as currently practiced hardly promotes mastery for most individuals; instead, it promotes new forms of bureaucratic dependence, even as it may make life easier materially.

There are theoretical reasons to believe, however, that revolutionary changes promoting genuine mastery might reach deeply into the individual psyche. In particular, such changes might heighten, rather than simply deflect, instinctual gratification. Reinterpreting the discontent produced by civilization in terms that emphasize humiliation — that is, lack of mastery— as much as lost opportunities for instinctual gratification suggests that mastery is not merely compensation for lost gratification, but itself a form of

gratification. From the perspective of the theory of narcissism, lost opportunities for gratification are painful not only because of the absence of pleasure, but also because they highlight the ego's vulnerability and inadequacy. Gratification and mastery are inseparable. Or rather, mastery is the highest form of gratification, for it meets the narcissistic needs of the self for wholeness and perfection. It will be recalled that it is none other than Freud who suggests that it is the fulfillment of these needs that is the greatest pleasure of all, because it recalls the satisfaction associated with primitive narcissistic gratification.[340]

Conclusion

It is now apparent that Marcuse's misrepresentation of Freud is not a key issue. The key issue is whether doing so leads Marcuse in a fruitful direction. The proper answer would seem to be yes, but. . . . Yes, because as the theory of narcissism reveals, the narcissism principle is as fundamental as the pleasure and reality principles; indeed, it bridges the gap between them, by emphasizing the depth of pleasure possible from mastering aspects of reality. No, because Marcuse does not take this insight as far as he might. Narcissism is not merely the helpmate of eros, as Marcuse would have it; it is also the vehicle by which mature autonomy itself becomes a source of gratification, a view that leads to a quite different vision of utopia, as we have seen.

This, perhaps, is the most important point. The theory of narcissism supports a view of the utopian goal — the achievement of narcissistic wholeness and perfection — at least as radical and demanding as Marcuse's. But, unlike Marcuse's theory, the theory of narcissism does not idealize the most primitive expression of this utopia, in large measure because it views mature narcissism not merely as a detour from regressive narcissistic satisfaction, but in terms akin to the Platonic theory of sublimation, in which it is the higher pleasures that offer the greatest satisfaction, because they draw on a wider variety of human capabilities and talents, thereby promoting the perfection of the whole self. It is for this reason too that the theory of narcissism better connects utopia with efforts to realize it—namely, these talents can also be brought to bear in the discussion and creation of utopia.

Aristophanes argues that his account of eros is necessary because physical pleasure alone could never account for the things that men and women do in the name of eros, such as sacrificing their fortunes, reputations, future happiness, even life itself. This speech, as we saw, opens the door to Socrates' discussion of the something more behind eros. According to Diotima, this something more is what lies ahead of eros, what it aims at: the creation of virtue and beauty. In the contemporary discussion of eros, this insight that eros might best be understood by considering the larger purposes that it serves, rather than by reducing it to its most primitive expression, is often forgotten. Marion Oliner has the emphasis wrong when she states that

"the role of the narcissistic factor within psychosexual development rests in its bestowing a sense of worth on strivings that have a foundation in biology.[341]

Though it obviously works this way too, the emphasis should be on the fact that strivings that have their foundation in biology become important because of how they serve narcissistic needs. In other words, the emphasis should be on the primacy of narcissism and its teleological character. Narcissism, understood as the quest for wholeness and perfection, can be viewed as the telos served by eros, as well as the ego. In this way narcissism gives meaning and direction—what MacIntyre calls "narrative unity"—to human life, by connecting the mature quest for fusion with the ego ideal with the primitive quest for fusion with the All, without reducing the former to the latter or suggesting that primitive gratification is somehow more satisfying if only it were possible. Chasseguet-Smirgel's claim that it is the primitive quest (that is, fantasy) that first energizes the mature quest merely connects these two pursuits, much as the "ladder of love" connects immature with mature eros. Neither Plato nor Chasseguet-Smirgel thereby implies that the immature is more satisfying. To the contrary, both define the immature version in terms of its developmental potential for making something new: virtue and beauty in Plato's case, an ego truly worthy of its mature ideal in Chasseguet-Smirgel's.

Why does Marcuse idealize the most regressive aspects of eros and narcissism? In part because he views so-called higher and more mature pleasures as little more than expressions of humanity's alienation from itself. For Marcuse, "higher pleasures" are frequently repression by another name: at best a euphemism, but more frequently a case of self-deception and false consciousness. A related reason why Marcuse embraces the most primitive expression of eros is because, like the rest of the Frankfurt school, he is looking for a hidden potential in humanity, a potential demand for genuine freedom and happiness that cannot be totally eliminated or manipulated by a one-dimensional society. Eros, the enemy of civilization, seems to fill this bill. Indeed, its primitive character, so hostile to society's norms, recommends it.

From this perspective, it is apparent that eros theoretically fulfills expectations that the proletariat fails to fulfill: it continues to demand total freedom, total happiness. While eros may be exploited — in a process that he describes as "repressive desublimation"— its demands will not be silenced by the welfare state compromise of a merely comfortable existence. Eros remains a revolutionary force. To find in eros what was lacking in the proletariat is an extremely clever theoretical strategy. But it is also risky. In choosing what is most primitive as the key to understanding society, as well as the key to building a new society, Marcuse turns to an aspect of human experience less susceptible than most to total social control. But in turning to the most primitive, Marcuse is never truly able to transcend it, as is seen in

his regressive view of pleasure and of utopia itself.

Whether this aspect of Marcuse's project is adequately tempered by the theory of narcissism might be questioned. Narcissism may be a useful category for analyzing certain philosophical issues, but is it an adequate basis for social theory? Evidently a decent society will be built on the grounds of mutuality and sharing, and such a society may require considerable self-sacrifice. How can narcissism, even mature narcissism, generate this? Can even the mature narcissist come to recognize that others have narcissistic needs as valid as his own? If the answer is no, then narcissism can never be the basis for progressive social theory. Even mature narcissism may be more compatible with the institutionalized selfishness of liberal individualism. Indeed, how can a philosophy of selfishness, no matter how refined and enlightened, ever get beyond this point? Isn't this problem—that the good society requires mutuality, even self-sacrifice—the ultimate limit to the theory of narcissism as social theory? These questions are addressed in the concluding chapter because they concern not only Marcuse's program, but the overall desirability of placing the theory of narcissism at the center of progressive social theory.

Notes

277 See, e.g., Barry Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation, p. 151.

278 See Joel Kovel, “Narcissism and the Family," p. 91; Joel Whitebook, "Reason and Happiness: Some Psychoanalytic Themes in Critical Theory,” pp. 22-23; Heinz Kohut, The Restoration of the Self, p. 271. But see also Colleen Clements, chap. 2, n. 3.

279 Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self, pp. 227-34 and passim. Several reviewers have argued that Lasch does not give the Frankfurt school, and especially Marcuse, sufficient credit as a source of his own views. See, e.g., Mark Crispin Miller’s review of The Minimal Self, p. 148.

280 Stanley Aronowitz, “On Narcissism.”

281 A representative of the "Marcuse sticks too closely to Freud” school is Anthony Wilden, “Marcuse and the Freudian Model,” esp. p. 197. A representative of the "Marcuse doesn't stick closely enough to Freud” school is Morton Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness, chap. 3. Perhaps the most balanced treatment of this issue is that of Gad Horowitz, Repression: Basic and Surplus Repression in Psychoanalytic Theory.

282 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 16: quoted by Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 153; emphasis original.

283 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 16: quoted by Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 153; emphasis original.

284 Ibid., p. 154.

285 Freud. "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” pp. 137-42.

286 Freud, "The Ego and the Id," p. 30.

287 Marcuse. Eros, p. 154.

288 Schoolman, Imaginary Witness, pp. 255-59: Heide Berndt and Reimut Reiche, "Die geschichtliche Dimension des Realitätsprinzips,” pp. 108-10 and passim.

289 Freud, "The Ego and the Id,” pp. 29-33.

290 Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, pp. 11-12.

291 Sidney Lipshires, Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond, p. 45.

292 Freud, "The Ego and the Id," pp. 28-31.

293 Marcuse, Eros, p. 149.

294 Ibid., pp. 24-27, 148-52.

295 Bela Grunberger. Narcissism, pp. 259-64.

296 Kohut, How Does Analysis Cure?, pp. 19-21.

297 Marcuse, Eros, p. 152.

298 Grunberger, Narcissism, pp. 2-3.

299 Marcuse, Eros, pp. 146-47.

300 Thomas Bulfinch, Bulfinch's Mythology, pp. 101-05, 185-89. The classic source of the Narcissus myth is Ovid's account in Metamorphoses, book 3. See the discussion of the myth in chap. 1, n. 5.

301 But see Marcuse, Eros, p. 155.

302 Ibid., pp. 74. 77, 199ff.; Ives Hendrick, "Work and the Pleasure Principle."

303 Marcuse, Eros, pp. 195-97; Barbara Lantos, "Work and the Instincts," p. 116.

304 Lantos, "Work and the Instincts," p. 116.

305 Marcuse. Eros, p. 195.

306 Ibid., p. 196.

307 Ibid.. p. 179.

308 This reason is examined extensively in my book Science and the Revenge of Nature, chap. 3-4.

309 Marcuse, Eros, p. 76.

310 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 43.

311 Marcuse, Eros. p. 76.

312 Ibid., pp. 31-33.

313 Ibid., p. 142; see also p. 178.

314 Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, The Ego Ideal, pp. 218-19.

315 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 31.

316 Lou Andreas-Salomé, “The Dual Orientation of Narcissism,” p. 9.

317 Martin Jay. "Anamnestic Totalization: Reflections on Marcuse’s Theory of Remembrance," pp. 9-11.

318 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 90; Jay, “Anamnestic Totalization," pp. 10-11.

319 Marcuse, Eros, p. 165.

320 Ibid., pp. 177-78.

321 Lasch, Minimal Self, pp. 244-46; Chasseguet-Smirgel. Ego Ideal, pp. 217-22. See also Chasseguet-Smirgel, “Some Thoughts on the Ego Ideal.” pp. 368-71.

322 Grunberger. Narcissism, p. 21.

323 Lasch, Minimal Self, pp. 233-34.

324 Ibid., p. 234.

325 Ibid.. pp. 232-34.

326 Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1959); Marcuse, "Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman O. Brown."

327 Marcuse, Eros, quoted by Lasch, Minimal Self, p. 235.

328 Lasch, Minimal Self, p. 235; all internal quotes are from Brown.

329 Lasch, Minimal Self, p. 282.

330 Lasch gives the Freudian sources, many of which we have considered (ibid., pp. 282-83).

331 Lasch, Minimal Self, pp. 236-37.

332 Ibid., pp. 281-82. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, pp. 15-16; idem. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pp. 47-57, esp. p. 56.

333 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, pp. 36-37.

334 Marcuse, the Aesthetic Dimension, p. 72.

335 Grunberger. Narcissism, p. 268.

336 Freud, "On Narcissism," pp. 93-94. See also idem, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," pp. 109-10; Chasseguet-Smirgel, Ego Ideal, p. 232.

337 Karl Marx. "The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," pp. 76-77.

338 Marcuse, "Protosocialism and Late Capitalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis Based on Bahro's Analysis."

339 William Galston, Justice and the Human Good, p. 15.

340 Freud, "On Narcissism," pp. 93-94: idem, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," pp. 109-

10.

341 Marion Oliner, Foreword to Narcissism, by Grunberger, p. xii.

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