

*Richard Chessick*

---

**Kohut's Second Version  
of the  
Psychology of the Self**

---

*Psychology of the Self and the Treatment of Narcissism*

# **Kohut's Second Version of the Psychology of the Self**

**Richard D. Chessick, M.D.**

e-Book 2015 International Psychotherapy Institute

from *Psychology of the Self and the Treatment of Narcissism* Richard D. Chessick, M.D.

Copyright © 1985 Richard D. Chessick, M.D.

All Rights Reserved

Created in the United States of America

## Table of Contents

[The Bipolar Self](#)

[The Status of Drives” in Self Psychology](#)

[The Psychology of the Self in the Broader Sense](#)

[Problems in Definition of the Bipolar Self](#)

[Fragmentation and Cohesion of the Self](#)

[Is the Bipolar Self Complementary to Freud’s Metapsychology?](#)

[References](#)

# Kohut's Second Version of the Psychology of the Self

Quinn (1980) quotes Kohut: "I've led two totally different, perhaps unbridgeable lives." Kohut's mother was a practicing Roman Catholic. His father, though an agnostic, was of Jewish descent; therefore, under Nazi racial laws, Kohut was in danger. Although he was passionately involved with German and Austrian culture he had to leave Vienna a year after Freud; the departure of Freud from Vienna symbolized for him the loss of "everything that I had lived for." Kohut is quoted as stating that this disruption of his life alerted him to the problems of the fragmented self and how the self tries to effect a cure, but he has repeatedly reported (Goldberg 1980) that the drift of the psychology of the self from traditional Freudian psychoanalysis has been a slow process based on the gradual accretion of clinical material.

Breu (1979) reports that Kohut's father was in the Austrian army five of the first six years of Kohut's life; he is quoted as saying, "I was deprived of a young, vigorous father . . . he was replaced by an old man, a grandfather, and that was not the same. So my male teachers had a tremendous role in my formation" (p. 63). Such a person would insist that what really counts in the formation of the child's self is not what parents do but what they really are. So Kohut concludes (Breu 1979), "We need maternal and paternal responsiveness to know we are in the world. We need it from our first breath

to our last” (p. 63).

## The Bipolar Self

Kohut’s books, *The Restoration of the Self* (1977) and *How Does Analysis Cure?* (1984) contain his final views or what is generally called “the psychology of the self in the broader sense.” We have come a long way from the essay, “Forms and Transformations of Narcissism” in 1966, and we have left classical metapsychology altogether in now stressing the two “poles” of the supraordinate concept: bipolar self.

These two poles are *self-esteem*, derived from the grandiose self and its strivings for exhibitionistic ambitious acclaim and mirroring, and *guiding ideals* and the pursuit of them, derived from internalization of the idealized parent imago. In psychotherapy one pole may be strengthened to compensate for defects in the other, a process known as functional rehabilitation of the self. Defensive structures (such as common fantasies of sadistically enforced control and acclaim) may develop to mask defects, and more hopeful compensatory structures (such as the more constructive pursuits of goals and accomplishments) may make up for weakness at one pole by strengthening the other. Thus, curative process for Kohut is now thought of *either* as filling a defect in the self by transmuting internalizations in the transference, *or* as strengthening the compensatory structures by making them functionally

reliable, realistic, and autonomous, which would not constitute a cure in classical psychoanalysis. So Slap and Levine (1978) state, “Although Kohut refers to it as psychoanalysis, his therapeutic method depends on suggestion and learning, but not insight, conflict resolution, or making the unconscious conscious” (p. 507).

Another clinical example of a defensive structure would be a pseudo-vitality, in which the patient attempts to counteract by frantic mental or physical activity an inner feeling of deadness, the depleted empty self, through self-stimulation. Elsewhere (Lichtenberg and Kaplan 1983, p. 138) Kohut mentions gross identifications or gross macro-internalizations as defensive structures.

Kohut, as we have seen, contrasts “Guilty Man” of Freud’s psychoanalysis with “Tragic Man” of the narcissistic personality disorder. Tragic Man has failed to realize nuclear ambitions and ideals, and middle age becomes the crucial test; at this point, life for Tragic Man becomes meaningless. Kohut speaks of an action-promoting “tension arc” or “gradient” between the two poles of the self (in the narrow sense theory he leans to geometry, in the broader sense theory he leans to physics), in which there is an “intermediate area” consisting of the executive functions and skills needed to realize the patterns of both poles.

Therapy, by firming the sense of self, helps the patient to make the “right choices.” These consist of harnessing the patient’s talents in the service of realistic long-term goals and relinquishing fantasies of sadistically enforced acclaim. These choices obviously must be in harmony with the person’s true abilities, opportunities, and goals. They have occurred when the patient begins to experience a sense of joy in life based on meaningful creative effort, no matter how small that effort may be.

Thus we have a nuclear self which emerges in the second year of life and consists of pole one, self-esteem (ambition, exhibitionism, stemming from the grandiose self), connected by an intermediate area of executive functions and skills—a tension arc or gradient which forms an action-promoting condition—with pole two, guiding ideals (pursuit of these values after fusion with the idealized parent imago and containing a voyeuristic aspect). Eroticized exhibitionism sometimes represents a breakdown of the ambitions pole and eroticized voyeurism of the ideals pole.

A defect in the psychological structure of the self can manifest itself by certain reparative activities. These can be either defensive structures, which mask the defect (pseudo-vitality, pseudo-drama, and sadistic fantasies of power to counteract a sense of deadness), or compensatory structures, which make up for weakness at one pole of the self by strengthening the other pole.



Treatment then can either fill the defect through the self-object transferences and transmuting internalizations, offering the patient a third chance in life, or provide what Kohut calls “functional rehabilitation,” a strengthening of compensatory structures in order to make them functionally reliable and autonomous. The successful utilization of skills and talents in the service of well-established ambitions and ideals creates a sense of contentment: the self is experienced as whole and complete. In contrast, an inability to use one’s skills and talents in the service of ambitions and ideals results in the opposite phenomenon and the self is experienced as empty and worthless.

The self-object transferences are seen as a form of belated maturation and development, with therapeutic stress on the completion through transmuting internalizations of the structure of the self, or on a strengthening of compensatory structures. The self-object environment becomes critical in structure building for the self. Destructive aggression or narcissistic rage are not drives but consequences of self-pathology. Assertiveness is a healthy precursor of aggression and part of the healthy bipolar self, so that in one pole there is assertiveness and ambition, and in the other, inner values and goals with a capacity to regulate inner tensions.

As the child grows, subsequent mirroring or turning to the idealized parent imago may offer the strengthening of secondary or compensatory

structures in the self, whereas excellent early mirroring and satisfactory idealization lead to a healthy primary structure of the nuclear self. Joyful creative activity is deeply rooted in the structure of the nuclear self, which in turn is based on wholesome empathic maternal responses to the child's needs. This includes responding to the child's mounting anxiety and rage by limiting them to a signal, so that the child experiences the mother's adequate and appropriate soothing before there is a disintegration of the primitive sense of self.

## **The Status of Drives" in Self Psychology**

In this new theory narcissism is usually not thought of as a defense against the Oedipus complex. Indeed, there is a brief oedipal phase at the termination of treatment accompanied by a warm glow of joy and which arises *de novo* due to functional improvement of the self; it is not a remobilized Oedipus complex left over from infancy. For Kohut, the oedipal phase helps to firm the self and represents a positive aspect, a phase-appropriate opportunity, and requires an empathic self-object environment. In the normal situation it does not lead to an Oedipus complex. In this theory, only if there is an enfeebled or fragmented self is there a pathological fixation on oedipal strivings so that, in the transference neuroses, an abnormal Oedipus complex is revived. The ubiquitous Oedipus complex conceived by Freud is not universally present. For Kohut interpretation of material in

disorders of the self primarily as oedipal would be experienced as unempathic and represents an intolerance of the patient's forward movement when the patient attempts self-assertion.

In contrast to the traditional idea of psychoanalytic cure which represents conflict solution through the cognitive expansion of the conscious mind, Kohut's view emphasizes the attainment of cohesiveness of the self and restitution of the self through empathic closeness of responsive self-objects. The capacity for achievement and enjoyment of life becomes important evidence that such a cure has taken place. In his last book Kohut (1984) emphasizes also the capacity to develop for one's self an empathic self-object matrix to sustain one throughout life. Self-esteem becomes a function of a cohesive and well-functioning self with emphasis on self-soothing capacities and a built-in capacity for internal tension regulation that enables self-esteem to remain relatively stable.

A subtle shift in the meaning of transmuting internalization took place between 1971 and 1977. In 1971, the microstructures were thought to have been built into the fabric of the ego but now transmuting internalization is thought of as developing structure and functions within the bipolar self.

Sexual "drives" are considered to be disintegration products which may secondarily be employed to soothe or stimulate a narcissistically injured or

damaged self. Gross maternal failures in empathy are seen as leading to direct damage in the structure of the self, in contrast to the complex formulations by object-relations theorists. This led to the severe criticism that self-psychology, rather than moving toward more intense depth psychology, was moving toward the shallows of existentialism which, like the psychology of the self, tends to abrogate the importance of unconscious drives and conflicts. Remember that “acceptance of the idea of drives which set the activity of the psychic apparatus in motion . . . has become the litmus test for the ‘orthodox’ psychoanalyst” (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, p. 304).

The psychology of the self in the broader sense represents a highly controversial theoretical system quite different than classical psychoanalysis. The student will have to do a great deal of self-scrutiny and return to patients in order to decide whether this represents a useful and valid contribution. It represents an important psychological and philosophical system with ramifications for philosophy and politics as well as for the practice of psychoanalysis and intensive psychotherapy.

## **The Psychology of the Self in the Broader Sense**

The psychotherapist working with narcissistic and borderline disorders must have a thorough grasp of the process of working through, in which minor disappointments in the narcissistic transferences, followed by

characteristic reactions in the patient, must be explained calmly to the patient. Without this conceptual understanding, the temptation occurs to launch all kinds of extra-therapeutic activities toward the patient. Some of these temptations are based on countertransference hostility, others on reaction formations to this hostility. The principle, however, remains that the therapist's temptation to step outside the role of the calm, benign craftsman is based on a misunderstanding of what is happening in the therapy and what is motivated by countertransference. There is no end to the rationalizations which the unanalyzed psychotherapist may present to justify the exploitation of and retaliation toward the patient.

In order to protect themselves against rejection and further narcissistic wounding, patients with an insufficient ego ideal tend to withdraw into grandiosity, which bothers and irritates people and produces further rejection leading to further withdrawal. In addition, such patients are much harsher on themselves because they can fall back only on the harsh critical superego, for internalization of the love of the idealized parent imago has not occurred.

Typically, narcissistic peace and clinical improvement can be established with concomitant better functioning when the idealizing transference occurs, but such transferences may also lead to a fear of loss of ego boundaries and fusion if the wish to merge with the idealized parent

imago is quite strong. A negative therapeutic reaction results. The patient must resist the threatened merging for fear of becoming more like the therapist than is tolerable for maintaining ego boundaries.

A gifted individual can actually realize some of the boundless expectations of the grandiose self but whatever successes might be achieved are never enough, and the patient is plagued by an endless demand for superb performance. For example, we see the middle-age depression so common in successful people who have been on a treadmill and achieved money and power, yet whose success brings no relief. Such patients always need continuing acclaim and more success; they have the talent to realize many of their wishes but they never get satisfaction since they are driven by a split-off grandiose self with its bizarre demands. "Lying" and name-dropping in such patients can be understood as an attempt to live up to the expectations of the grandiose self and thus must be removed from the therapist's tacit moral condemnation. As Basch (Stepanksy and Goldberg 1984) explains, "An intellectual, superficial accommodation to the reality of his relative lack of power and significance, and his less than central position is made by the child while, as far as the self is concerned, the earlier sense of narcissistic urgency holds sway" (p. 28). The reader should turn back here to Reich's (1960) case described in Chapter 3 and compare her traditional psychoanalytic explanation of the pathology with this approach. Then, for a detailed self-psychological explanation of an analogous case of a writer, "Mr.

M.," see Kohut (1977).

## **DEVELOPMENT OF THE BIPOLAR SELF**

For narcissistic patients therefore, the handling of their characteristic transferences becomes the essence of the treatment. These narcissistic "transferences" do not involve the investment of the therapist with object libido, as in the oedipal neuroses, although they do involve a crossing of the repression barrier of the mobilized grandiose self and idealized parent imago. It is therefore vital to have a clear and precise understanding of Kohut's final notion of the development and vicissitudes of these structures.

For children of 8 months to 3 years of age, Kohut postulates a normal, intermediate phase of powerful narcissistic cathexis of "the grandiose self" (a grandiose exhibitionistic image of the self) and the idealized parent imago (the image of an omnipotent self-object with whom fusion is desired). These psychic formations are gradually internalized and integrated within the psychic structure. The grandiosity, as a result of appropriate minor disappointments, is consolidated at around 2 to 4 years of age (Kohut 1977, p. 178); it forms the nuclear ambitions pole of the self, driving the individual forward. It derives most from the relationship with the mother, and in the narrow theory is thought of as forming a part of the ego. In the broader theory, the "self" and ego are separated and thus the internalized grandiose

self is thought to form the nuclear ambitions pole of the self.

At 4 to 6 years of age (Kohut 1977, p. 178) at the height of the oedipal phase, the idealized parent imago, which derives from both parents, is also internalized and integrated. In the narrow theory it was thought of as an infusion of both the superego and the ego with the love and admiration originally aimed at the idealized parent imago, which then serves as a vital internal source of self-esteem and the basis of the ego-ideal aspect of the superego. This ego-ideal forms a system toward which the person aspires; thus the individual is driven from below by nuclear ambitions, and pulled from above by the ego-ideal. In the psychology of the self in the broader sense, the consolidation of the idealized parent imago forms the other pole of the self, the nuclear ideals pole. This notion of the bipolar self is the crucial concept of the psychology of the self.

Later, Kohut (1984) adds a third “separate line of self-object development” (p. 198) involving important twinship (alter-ego) experiences from about 4 to 10 years of age (known in drive-psychology as early latency [p. 194]), for example, the little girl kneading dough in the kitchen next to grandmother or the little boy “shaving” or “working” next to daddy with daddy’s tools. This self-object need corresponds to and confirms the intermediate area of skills and talents which, with the ambitions and ideals poles, forms the nuclear self.



When these three major consolidations have to some extent occurred, a vigorous cohesive sense of self is formed, and the person is ready to continue by resolving the oedipal phase. In drive-psychology terms, the superego can form, and moral anxiety (from within) replaces castration anxiety. The repression barrier is established and eventually consolidated in latency and adolescence, and anxiety becomes confined to function as signal anxiety (essentially Kernberg's "fifth stage"). But for Kohut, even after adolescence still further transformations of narcissism occur, resulting eventually in mature wisdom, a sense of humor, an acceptance of the transience of life, empathy, and creativity. These transformations involve an increased firming of the sense of self, making mature love possible.

In the narrow sense theory, the idealized parent imago, when internalized, performs in the pre-oedipal ego and superego a drive-curbing function. In the oedipal superego it forms an idealized superego, which now leads the person. The infantile grandiose self forms the nuclear ambitions, and crude infantile exhibitionism is channeled and transformed into socially meaningful activities and accomplishments. Thus, narcissism, when properly transformed, is both normal and absolutely vital to mature human personality functioning; it is no longer a pejorative term.

In the "psychology of the self in the broader sense," these internalizations as explained form into a cohesive bipolar self, and a

complementary role in development beyond that described by Freud is given to the oedipal phase. Here the response of the parents to the child's libidinal and aggressive and exhibitionistic strivings—their pride and mirroring confirmation of its development—permits these internalizations to occur and integrate smoothly. In Freud's theory, for example, it is the boy's fear of castration by the father that causes him to identify with the aggressor and internalize the values of the father. For Kohut, it is *also* the father's pride in the boy's emerging assertiveness as it shows itself in the boy's oedipal strivings and imitative efforts, that softens the boy's disappointment about not possessing the mother and enables a firm internalization of the idealized parent imago as a nuclear pole of the self.

If, for example, the father or mother withdraw from the child as a response to their horror of the child's oedipal strivings, this internalization cannot occur, and the child remains fixed in development on finding some individual to which the child attaches the idealized parent imago. The child's internal self-esteem in this case remains very low, and its self-esteem and sense of self require continual and unending bolstering from the external object which has been invested with the idealized parent imago. When such bolstering is not forthcoming, profound disappointment, narcissistic rage, and even a sense of impending fragmentation of the self occur. Thus we have what self-psychologists call a complementary theory, in which new explanatory concepts and the structural theory of Freud are employed in order to make

sense of the common but puzzling aspects of the narcissistic personality.

The sense of continuity of the self emanates not only from the contents of the constituents of the nuclear self and from the activities they establish, but from the relationship of these constituents. This relationship provides “an action-promoting condition” or “tension gradient” between the two poles of the self, a person’s ambitions and ideals, “even in the absence of any specific activity” (Kohut 1977, p. 180). Kohut emphasizes ceaselessly “the pervasive influence of the personalities of the parents and of the atmosphere in which the child grew up” to “account for the specific characteristics of the nuclear self and for its firmness, weakness, or vulnerability” (Kohut 1977, pp. 186-187). The basic difference between “the psychology of the self in the narrow sense of the term” and “the psychology of the self in the broader sense of the term” is that in the former the self is a content of the mental apparatus, whereas in the latter, the self occupies “a central position” (Kohut 1977, p. 207).

## **THE BIPOLAR SELF IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND MENTAL HEALTH**

Kohut stresses two key consequences of the lack of integration of the grandiose self and idealized parent imago. First, adult functioning and personality are impoverished because the self is deprived of energy that is still invested in archaic structures. Second, adult activity is hampered by the

breakthrough and intrusion of archaic structures with their archaic claims. These nonintegrated structures are either repressed (Kohut's "horizontal split") or disavowed (Kohut's "vertical split"), and they quickly show themselves in the psychotherapy situation of both narcissistic and borderline patients.

Patients want us to respond as if we belong one hundred percent to them; a benign view of this desire, rather than an angry retort or harsh criticism, detoxifies patients' attitudes toward themselves and prevents a withdrawal into arrogant grandiosity. Outside success for such patients gives only transient good feelings but does not add to the idealization of the superego, for these patients are arrested developmentally on finding an idealized parent imago outside of themselves—a stage where they still need continuing outside sources of approval. Narcissistic injury produces great rage, which also appears if the transference self-object does not live up to the idealization. Thus narcissistic and borderline patients present a psychic apparatus ready to ignite at any time, and with their poor ego ideal they cannot neutralize the explosions and disintegrations when they occur.

Kernberg (1976) warns that in working with borderline patients "the therapist tends to experience, rather soon in the treatment, intensive emotional reactions having more to do with the patient's premature, intense and chaotic transference and with the therapist's capacity to withstand

psychological stress and anxiety, than with any specific problem of the therapist's past" (p. 179). In fact, intense and premature emotional reactions on the part of the therapist indicate for Kernberg the presence of severe regression in the patient.

The repressed or split-off grandiose self with its bizarre demands may drive the patient relentlessly and, as previously mentioned, even force him into "lying," bragging, and name-dropping in order to live up to expectations of the grandiose self. Certain types of dangerous acting-out may also occur as part of the effort to feel alive and to establish a conviction of omnipotence and grandiosity; one female patient of mine often rides a motorcycle at high speed down the highway when visibility has been obscured by fog. In working with such patients the therapist must deal with responses to separation and disappointment and stay near current experiences and strivings for omnipotence and grandiosity. Benign acceptance, conceptual explanation, and education of the patient have a major role in the psychotherapy of narcissistic and borderline patients.

The vicissitudes of the transferences and the appearance of the rage provide the opportunity for the calm, nonanxious therapist, working as a careful craftsman, to help the patient understand and transform the archaic narcissism so that the aggression can be employed for realistic ambitions, goals, and ideals. The signs of successful resumption of the developmental

process and appropriate transformations of narcissism can be found in two major areas of the patient's life. First, an increase and expansion of object love will take place, due primarily to an increased firming of the sense of self. Patients become more secure in their own identity and acceptability; they become more able to offer love. The second area is in greater drive control and drive channeling and a better idealized superego, as well as more realistic ambitions and the change of crude infantile exhibitionism into socially meaningful activities. We hope to end up with a sense of empathy, creativity, humor, and perhaps ultimately, wisdom.

From the point of view of the "psychology of the self in the broader sense," the self is critical to achieving joy in life and making the right choices that are in harmony with our abilities, opportunities, and goals. We establish an empathic matrix with others if we have a cohesive self. But a functioning self may be established by achieving success in the development of compensatory structures, such as compensating for weakness in "the area of exhibitionism and ambitions by the self-esteem provided by the pursuit of ideals" (Kohut 1977, p. 1). A functioning self is defined as "a psychological sector in which ambitions, skills, and ideals form an unbroken continuum that permits joyful creative activity" (p. 63). Activity which maintains self-esteem may even take on the character of an "addiction" since it is so powerful and rewarding in the joy it brings.

“Addiction”—used here by Kohut “half-jokingly and half-seriously” (Goldberg 1980, p. 497)—refers to the “reverberating beneficial cycle” (Kohut 1977, p. 135) which becomes established:

The strengthened self becomes the organizing center of the skills and talents of the personality and thus improves the exercise of these functions; the successful exercise of skills and talents, moreover, in turn increases the cohesion, and thus the vigor, of the self. (1977, p. 135)

But we are warned (Kohut 1984, p. 161) that under such “addiction” to one’s form of mental health lies a fear of the return of former insecurities and imbalances if this activity is given up or relaxed.

It is important to keep in mind that Kohut (pp. 179-180) suggests the sense of self-continuity emanates from the content of the constituents of the nuclear self, the activities established “as a result of their pressure and guidance,” and the relationship among the constituents of the self, which produce an action-promoting condition. Continuous striving, or activities based on these creative tensions, are central in maintaining a sense of continuity and joyful living, in spite of the vicissitudes of life. As Freud (Schur 1972) wrote on his eightieth birthday, “Life at my age is not easy, but spring is beautiful and so is love” (p. 480).

## **Problems in Definition of the Bipolar Self**

Kohut stresses repeatedly the physicianly vocation of the psychotherapist or analyst, not the model of the surgeon or the computer. This is because traditional neurotics were overstimulated as children, but patients with self-pathology need less distance, and, if this is not provided, one sees the appearance of narcissistic rage. This rage, says Kohut, is an empathy problem and not, as the Kleinians say, due to inborn infantile aggression and subsequent fear and guilt. When analysts focus on conflicts regarding drives, they tend to become either educational (such as by urging self-control) or unnecessarily pessimistic about the continuing narcissistic rage.

A continuing problem is Kohut's (1977) admission:

We cannot, by introspection and empathy, penetrate to the self per se; only its introspectively or empathically perceived psychological manifestations are open to us. Demands for an exact definition of the nature of the self disregard the fact that "the self" is not a concept of an abstract science, but a generalization derived from empirical data. (p. 311)

Yet at times the self is used existentially, as if it were a choosing agent, which Kohut and his followers excuse as a method of shorthand or figure of speech (Kohut and Wolf 1978, pp. 415-416). This ambiguity in the use of the concept of the self appears in the developing thought of both Kant and Kohut (Chessick 1980a).

According to Kant (1781), we experience the mind through our "inner



sense” or “empirical apperception,” our consciousness of the flux of inner appearances of the state of the self. There is no permanent or abiding “self” in this, as both Hume and Kant agree. Thus the phenomenal self, the self studied in psychology, is known to us empirically as a succession of mental states in time, for time is the *a priori* form of our inner sense, says Kant (1781) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

This is distinguished from the noumenal or transcendental self, the self which knows, the self enduring and as it “really” is. Thus, for Kant, we can think about reality “out there” and about the “real” knowing self, but we cannot ever directly know either of them or make direct statements to describe them.

Both Kant and Freud assume that there is a reality “outside” of or “behind” the world of appearance and that there is a part of the mind behind the phenomenal self. For Freud, a concept analogous to Kant’s noumenal self, which cannot be directly known but yet profoundly influences our experienced sense of self, was, in the topographic theory, the system unconscious. In the structural theory it becomes the id (and portions of the ego and superego). Freud (1940a) writes, “The core of our being, then, is formed by the obscure *id*, which has no direct communication with the external world and is accessible even to our own knowledge only through the medium of another agency” (p. 197).

The crucial argument of Kant's fundamental "transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding" rests on the premise of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, the sense of "I am I," the cohesive sense of a single continuous self. This continuing core of self-consciousness is clearly required to distinguish one's self-boundaries and self-experiences from experiences coming from the external world. Kant points out that Hume erred fundamentally in overlooking the inextricable interdependence of self-awareness and awareness of perceptual objects. Conversely, Kant argues that, if the subjective unity of the consciousness begins to shatter for various reasons, the individual becomes confused about the distinction between one's self and self-experiences and experiences of the external world. Thus, even for Kant, fragmentation of the sense of self implies a diffusion of ego boundaries and a loss of reality testing.

When Kant is most consistent in his doctrine of noumenal self and phenomenal self, he would define these as follows: the phenomenal self consists solely of the empirically experienced self-states of classical psychology as revealed by introspective investigation of inner states or experiences; the noumenal self is a non-empirical "limiting concept" that reason leads us to from a study of our phenomenal self. The noumenal self, as a limiting concept, is experience-near, in the sense that it is directly suggested to reason by our experience; it is a regulative concept in Kant's terms, useful to reason in describing and classifying our phenomenal self-experiences.

Because it is only such a purely rational concept, nothing more can be said about it (Ewing 1967). When Kant uses the concept of noumenal self this way, he speaks of it as the noumenal self in the negative sense. This is the only non-empirical (Kant would call it transcendental) notion of self that is justifiably arrived at by the action of reason on our empirical data in its efforts to develop unifying and explanatory concepts.

In the rest of Kant's philosophy, he ignores his own arguments and uses the concept of noumenal self in quite a different sense. This unresolved contradiction in Kant's philosophy is lucidly discussed by Scruton (1982, Chapter 5). In his moral philosophy, noumenal self is employed as an independent agent, and a good deal is postulated about it. This shift is usually described as a movement on Kant's part—an incautious movement—from the noumenal self in the negative sense to the noumenal self in the positive sense. It is a shift from a notion of noumenal self suggested to reason from immediate empirical experience to a far more complex and experience-distant concept of noumenal self, a shift not justifiable by Kant's own philosophy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

This noumenal self to which Kant and others refer is used in a positive sense to justify matters of faith and approaches what Kohut (1978, pp. 659-660) refers to as an axiomatic self. When we use the notion of self in this manner, we have thus moved from the realm of science. This is the meaning

of Kohut's (1977, p. 311) statement that the self "in its essence" cannot be defined; such a definition would postulate an "axiomatic" self, which Kohut rightly considers to be unscientific and abrogates the importance of the unconscious (see Ornstein's discussion in Kohut [1978], pp. 95-96).

For Kant, as Smith (1962) points out, the self is the sole source of all unity. But Broad (1978) concludes that "Kant's account of the nature of the human self and of its knowledge of itself is extremely complicated, and it is doubtful whether a single consistent doctrine can be extracted from his various utterances" (p. 234).

Kohut (1978) explains that the fundamental advance of psychoanalytic fact-finding is to take the further step into a new methodology by which the therapist vicariously introspects with the patient and experiences the inner self and the world around the patient in a manner congruent to that of the patient. This yields important data about the state of the patient at any given time which cannot be obtained by any other approach. Kohut's early notion of the sense of self is not "axiomatic" but comes from empathic identification with the patient's sense of self at any given time. It is in truly understanding by vicarious introspection how the patient's sense of self coheres and fragments that we gain an explanation of why and how the patient perceives the inner and outer world and behaves accordingly.

This is more experience-near than Freud's metapsychology, because additional apparatuses or structures are not postulated as homunculi within the head of the individual determining the outcome of behavior. For Kohut the patient's perception and behavior are directly attributable to the patient's sense of self at any given time. His approach avoids what Freud (1937, p. 225) called "the Witch Metapsychology" to a considerable extent, but understanding then depends fundamentally on the capacity of the therapist to empathize with the patient's inner state.

Yet Kohut at times, like Kant, slips into the concept of self in the positive sense, as when he speaks of it as empty and depleted or as "yearning" for mirroring or merger. The self in these situations is used as an "as if" concept and the anthropomorphic language has been criticized. In *The Analysis of the Self* Kohut (1971, p. 130) mentions that the cohesive experience of the self in time is the same as the experience of the self as a continuum, which seems to be the same as Kant's notion of inner states. Yet, in the same paragraph Kohut also mentions the "breadth and depth" of cohesiveness of the self, but without definition.

## **Fragmentation and Cohesion of the Self**

The concept of the fragmentation of the self is never made satisfactorily clear (Schwartz 1978). It seems to be equated with psychotic-like

phenomena, at which time reality contact even with the therapist is in danger of being lost. It is characterized as a regressive phenomenon, predominantly autoerotic, a state of fragmented self-nuclei, in contrast to the state of the cohesive self which Kohut (1971) describes as “the growth of the self-experience as a physical and mental unit which has cohesiveness in space and continuity in time” (p. 118). Here Kohut seems to disagree with Kant’s contention that time is the sole form of our inner sense. Kohut speaks also of space, having in mind Jacobson’s (1964) discussion of the “development of object and self-constancy” (p. 55).

Kohut’s (1971) original notion of the cohesiveness of the self has to do with a “firm cathexis with narcissistic libido” (p. 119), leading to a subjective feeling of well-being and an improvement of the functioning of the ego. In later writings this metapsychological explanation is omitted; signs of fragmentation of the self have to do with a subjective feeling of self-state anxiety and objective and subjective signs of deteriorating ego function. As Kohut (1971) explains, this is accompanied by frantic activities of various kinds in the work and sexual areas, especially in an effort to “counteract the subjectively painful feeling of self-fragmentation by a variety of forced actions, ranging from physical stimulation and athletic activities to excessive work in . . . profession and business” (p. 119). Thus fragmentation of the self that Kohut in his early work calls “the dissolution of the narcissistic unity of the self” (pp. 120-121) is manifested by certain characteristic subjective

sensations such as hypochondria and frantic activities in order to stem the tide of regression.

Kohut (1971) sees a regression from the cohesiveness of the self to its fragmentation as parallel to a regression “from narcissism to autoerotism” (p. 253). A clinical description of this is based on the self as “an organizing center of the ego’s activities” (pp. 296-298). When the self fragments, the personality which has not participated in the regression attempts to deal with the central fragmentation, but “the experience of the fragmented body-mind-self and self-object cannot be psychologically elaborated” (p. 30).

In *The Restoration of the Self* (1977) the self as a supraordinate concept in its bipolar nature becomes our clinical focus primarily when self-cohesion is not firm. Metapsychological energetic concepts are omitted, and the self is now seen as occupying “the central position” within the personality. Thus, fragmentation of the self is defined by the experiences which it produces. In this later book the self is finally a “supra-ordinated configuration whose significance transcends that of the sum of its parts” (p. 97).

So Kohut first presents the self in the negative sense as an experience-near abstraction from psychoanalytic experience. As his work evolves, he focuses more and more on the self, finally placing the self in a central and transcendent position. This emphasis on the self resembles Kant’s noumenal

self used in the positive sense to explain free will—a center of our being from which all initiative springs and where all experiences end—which Kohut (1978, pp. 659-660) rejects.

### **Is the Bipolar Self Complementary to Freud’s Metapsychology?**

When Kohut moves to the supraordinate bipolar self and its constituents, he introduces a new concept. The self is no longer a depth-psychological concept that can be metapsychologically defined using classical terminology, and the self is no longer thought of as either within the mental apparatus or even as a fourth “agency” of the mind. “The area of the self and its vicissitudes,” as Kohut (1978, p. 753) calls it, is essentially a separate science from Freud’s psychoanalysis, just as the study of the phenomenal world in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a separate discipline from the study of the noumenal world in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kohut (1978) himself labels this “the science of the self” (p. 752n), and the implication is inevitable that he has attempted to found a new science.

Freud would not have accepted Kohut’s theory of the psychology of the self in the broader sense as “complementary” but rather as a different although related theory which uses an alternative explanation of the treatment procedure from that of Freud’s metapsychology in psychoanalysis. The new explanation is based by Kohut (1977) on the Zeigarnik effect (1927)



(discussed below in Chapter 11), for which Kohut postulates some kind of inner motivation of undeveloped structures to resume their development when given the opportunity; the energy behind this motivation has nothing to do with Freud's instinctual drives, and the origin of it is not explained. I assume it is a sort of biological growth force. The basis of therapy in the psychology of the self postulates that proper development of "self-object transferences," or transference-like structures in the treatment, make it possible for this force to take over and thus for development of the self to resume via transmuted internalization; this is fundamentally different from the resolution of conflicts via interpretation of a transference neurosis.

This represents a different scientific paradigm. It is better for the progress of human knowledge to face this situation directly; otherwise, students of the subject will become hopelessly confused in attempting to somehow reconcile the early and the late Kohut, or to reconcile Freud's psychoanalysis and the "psychology of the self in the broader sense." Like Kant's noumenal self used in the positive sense, Kohut's self in the broader sense becomes crucial to joy in life and the making of right choices; there is no room for such an independent or supraordinate postulated entity in the *Critique of Pure Reason* or in the "psychology of the self in the narrow sense." As Kohut (1978) himself recognizes, this supraordinate self is beyond the laws of psychic determinism and outside the limits of traditional psychoanalysis. Just as Kant's ethical philosophy is developed for the moral

use of placing faith on a firm foundation, so Kohut's "psychology of the self in the broader sense" addresses itself to the moral purpose of alleviating the tragedy of modern humans suffocating in an increasingly inhuman environment they themselves continue to create.

## **COMPARISON OF DRIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND SELF PSYCHOLOGY**

Many of these concepts are discussed at great length by a variety of authors in the two published proceedings of conferences on the psychology of the self (Goldberg 1980, Lichtenberg and Kaplan 1983). In psychoanalysis the status accorded to new ideas is a very personal decision reached after much study and often with much discomfort, writes Goldberg (1980) in his introduction to *Advances in Self Psychology*. Kohut himself repeatedly asks us for prolonged immersion in the psychology of the self and for much patience in making up our minds.

The basic objection of self-psychologists to the traditional ego psychology school is in its Freudian notion that development proceeds to "independence." Kohut sees a fundamental value difference here; he insisted more and more as he reached the end of his life that the presence of an empathic self-object matrix is a crucial requirement throughout life for a cohesive sense of self; the self always requires a milieu of empathically responding self-objects in order to function effectively. The unrolling of its

nuclear aims is critical and the attainment of “independence” from self-objects at any point of life represents serious pathology—often paranoia or “Hitlerian pseudo-productivity.”

We have here a collision of the views of Kohut and Kernberg. Kernberg stresses the primacy of hostility and the Kleinian defenses and values the move from merger to autonomy via the analysis of the Oedipus complex. Kohut is interested in the sequence of self-self-object relations occurring throughout life and considers this interest to be based on a different moral system. Whenever a sustaining self-object matrix is absent, creative-productive activities cease, ego functions deteriorate, and fragmentation threatens. How many cases of so-called pseudo-dementia in lonely elderly people could be explained in this fashion?

This implies a new definition of mental health. At least one sector must be established in which ambitions, skills, talents, and idealized goals form an unbroken continuum. Since the content of these differs from person to person, health is different for each different individual and the functional preponderance of ambitions, skills and talents, and idealized goals, differs with respect to the choice of the key constituents and the degree of dominance of each constituent, leading to behavioral differences that determine mental health for each individual.

For Kohut, a mentally healthy person lives out the design of the nuclear self. This leads to socially beneficial results and the continual creation of an empathic self-object matrix; health is not merely adaptation. A person must mobilize adequate individual skills and talents in order to realize nuclear goals and must also find after protracted search a matrix of freely chosen empathic self-objects.

This is greatly emphasized by Kohut in contrast to Freud's independent "love and work" or Hartmann's "adaptation" and is elaborated in Kohut's (1984) final book, *How Does Analysis Cure?* A section of this book is devoted to replies to numerous criticisms of the *Restoration of the Self*. Kohut suggests (pp. 61-63) that self-psychology has been accepted by those who are more directly in touch with modern man's primary need of an empathic self-object matrix. He feels that a wall of secondary, prideful disavowal protects those who reject self-psychology from the narcissistic blow that a self cannot exist successfully outside of such a matrix.

He moves away from traditional psychoanalytic "conflict" explanations of all the clinical phenomena of psychiatry and diminishes the central and traditional importance of interpretation alone (the "pure gold" of psychoanalysis) as a curative factor in psychoanalysis. I will discuss this in detail in the next chapter. Kohut (1984, p. 78, p. 153) anticipates that he will be accused of advocating a form of Alexander's "corrective emotional

experience” because he presses the crucial role of empathy or vicarious introspection again and again. The traditional notions of defense and resistance are also reinterpreted by Kohut in these terms. The therapist experiences through vicarious introspection or empathy that which the patient is experiencing rather than empirically experiencing the patient’s feelings through observing the workings of a “mental apparatus.”

Kohut’s (1982) posthumous paper, “Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health,” reviews his assertions about empathy and again emphasizes Kohut’s proposal for a whole new value system upon which to base the understanding of the individual. By contrasting the parricide of Oedipus with the story he says is told by Homer<sup>1</sup> of how Odysseus protected his infant son, Kohut attempts to demonstrate that it is the primacy of parental support for the succeeding generation which is normal. Intergenerational strife and mutual wishes to kill and destroy are abnormal. He writes, “It is only when the self of the parent is not a normal, healthy self, cohesive, vigorous and harmonious, that it will react with competitiveness and seductiveness rather than with pride and affection when the child, at the age of 5, is making an exhilarating move toward a heretofore not achieved degree of assertiveness, generosity, and affection” (p. 404). Only in response to such a flawed parental self that cannot resonate with the child’s experience does the self of the child disintegrate, and do the by-products of hostility and lust constituting the Oedipus complex make their appearance. This represents

a basic challenge to Freud's emphasis on the Oedipus complex as the normal central source of conflict in every child's development and at the core of all psychoneuroses.

Kohut differentiates between an oedipal *stage*, referring to the normal state of experiences at that age, and the Oedipus *complex*, referring to the pathological distortion of the normal stage (Lichtenberg and Kaplan 1983, p. 211). In a much quoted passage Kohut continues:

I first emphasize again that self-psychology does not consider drives or conflicts as pathological. Nor does it consider even intense experiences of anxiety or guilt as pathological or pathogenic per se. Three cheers for drives! Three cheers for conflicts! They are the stuff of life, part and parcel of the experiential quintessence of the healthy self. (p. 388)

Kohut protests (p. 397) that he is still a drive psychologist in the sense that self-psychology is only offering a complementarity of perspective but not attempting to replace drive psychology. However Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) claim that "Kohut uses complementarity to obscure the necessity for choice" (p. 363). Kohut (Lichtenberg and Kaplan 1983) continues:

We must modify our perspective on the role of drive-related conflicts in such disorders to accommodate the realization that underlying self-object failures lead to the disintegration of the oedipal-stage self and thereby account for the expression of sexuality and aggression that typifies the Oedipus complex, (p. 399)

He claims only that there are no built-in primary conflicts in the psyche

from birth, but he concedes that traumatic disruptions lead to defects or deficits in structure building, which, in turn, lead to secondary conflicts that can be studied by the usual methods of psychoanalysis as a drive psychology, provided one wishes to use that vantage point at that time. Kohut insists (Goldberg 1980) that “the reasons for my assertion that drives, psychologically conceived, occur secondary to the break-up of the self are empirical. . . . It fits the data of observation while the theory of drive primacy does not” (p. 489). Kohut (Goldberg 1980) concludes that:

An outlook that puts the drives in the center of the personality will use a model in which the quality of drive processing becomes the yardstick with which to measure therapeutic success; an outlook that puts the self in the center of the personality will use a model in which the degree of fulfillment of the basic program of the self (the nuclear self) becomes this yardstick, (p. 509)

### Notes

- 1 This story is not found in Homer but is from *Fabulae* (Graves 1955), a collection of mythological legends from the works of Greek tragedians since lost. *Fabulae*, usually wrongly attributed to the Latin scholar Hyginus, was produced by an unknown author in the second century A.D.

## References

- Abend, S., Porder, M., and Willick, M. (1983). *Borderline Patients: Psychoanalytic Perspectives*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Abraham, K. (1919). A particular form of neurotic resistance against the psychoanalytic method. In *Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis*. London: Hogarth Press, 1949.
- Adler, G. (1981). The borderline-narcissistic personality disorder continuum. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 138:1-50.
- Aichorn, A. (1955). *Wayward Youth*. New York: Meridian Books.
- Akhtar, S., and Thomson, J. (1982). Overview: Narcissistic personality disorder. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 139:1-20.
- Alexander, F. (1950). *Psychosomatic Medicine*. New York: Norton.
- Amis, M. (1985). *Money: A Suicide Note*. New York: Viking.
- Appels, A., Pool, J., and vander Does, E. (1979). Psychological prodromata of myocardial infarction. *Journal of Psychosomatic Research* 23: 405-421.
- Arlow, J., and Brenner, C. (1984). *Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Arnold, M. (1869). *Culture and Anarchy*, ed. R. Super. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980.
- Bach, S. (1975). Narcissism, continuity and the uncanny. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 56:77-86.
- (1977). On the narcissistic state of consciousness. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 58:209-233.
- (1977a). On narcissistic fantasies. *International Review of Psycho-Analysis* 4:281-293.



- Bak, B. (1973). Being in love and object loss. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 54:1-8.
- Balint, M. (1953). *Primary Love and Psycho-Analytic Technique*. New York: Liveright.
- (1968). *The Basic Fault: Therapeutic Aspects of Regression*. London: Tavistock.
- Barnes, H. (1980-1981). Sartre's concept of the self. *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* 17:41-66.
- Basch, M. (1980). *Doing Psychotherapy*. New York: Basic Books.
- (1981). Self-object disorders and psychoanalytic theory: A historical perspective. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 29: 337-351.
- (1983). Empathic understanding: A review of the concept and some theoretical considerations. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 31:101-126.
- Bettelheim, B. (1982). *Freud and Man's Soul*. New York: Knopf.
- Bick, E. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object-relations. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 49:484-486.
- Bion, W. (1963). *Elements of Psycho-Analysis*. New York: Basic Books.
- (1967). *Second Thoughts: Selected Papers on Psycho-Analysis*. London: Heinemann.
- Blanck, G., and Blanck, R. (1973). *Ego Psychology*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- (1979). *Ego Psychology*, vol. II. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bornstein, M. (1984). Commentaries on Merton Gills's Analysis of Transference. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 4:391-392, 446.
- Breu, G. (1979). Medics: Heinz Kohut. *People Weekly* 11:60-63.
- Breuer, J., and Freud, S. (1893-1895). Studies on Hysteria. *Standard Edition* 2:1-305.

- Broad, C. (1978). *Kant: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, L., and Hausman, A. (1981). Intentionality and the unconscious: A comparison of Sartre and Freud. In *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. P. Schilpp. La Salle, 111.: Open Court.
- Bruch, H. (1973). *Eating Disorders*. New York: Basic Books.
- (1974). *Learning Psychotherapy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- (1975). Anorexia nervosa. In *American Handbook of Psychiatry*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. IV, ed. S. Arieti. New York: Basic Books.
- (1979). *The Golden Cage*. New York: Vintage Books.
- (1982). Anorexia nervosa: Therapy and theory. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 139:1531-1538.
- Buie, D. (1981). Empathy: Its nature and limitations. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 29:281-308.
- Butler, C. (1984). Commentary. In *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. C. Butler and C. Seiler. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Calder, K. (1980). An analyst's self-analysis. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 28:5-20.
- Calef, V., and Weinschel, E. (1979). The new psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic revisionism. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 48:470-491.
- Cannon, W. (1953). *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*. Boston: Branford.
- Cantwell, D., Sturzenberger, S., Burroughs, J., Salkin, B., and Breen, J. (1977). Anorexia nervosa: An affective disorder. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 34:1087-1096.
- Carruthers, M. (1974). *The Western Way of Death*. New York: Pantheon Books.

- Casper, R. (1983). On the emergence of bulimia nervosa as a syndrome. *International Journal of Eating Disorders* 2:3-16.
- , and Davis, J. (1977). On the course of anorexia nervosa. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 134:974-978.
- , Halmi, K., Goldberg, S., Eckart, E., and Davis, J. (1979). Disturbances in body image estimation as related to other characteristics and outcome in anorexia nervosa. *British Journal of Psychiatry* 134: 60-66.
- , Offer, D., and Ostrov, J. (1981). The self-image of adolescents with acute anorexia nervosa. *Journal of Pediatrics* 98:656-661.
- Cassimatis, E. (1984). The "false self": Existential and therapeutic issues. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 11:69-77.
- Chessick, R. (1960). The "pharmacogenic orgasm" in the drug addict. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 3:545-556.
- (1965). Empathy and love in psychotherapy. *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 19:205-219.
- (1966). Office psychotherapy of borderline patients. *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 20:600-614.
- (1968). The "crucial dilemma" of the therapist in the psychotherapy of borderline patients. *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 22:655-666.
- (1969). *How Psychotherapy Heals*. New York: Science House.
- (1971). *Why Psychotherapists Fail*. New York: Science House.
- (1971a). The use of the couch in psychotherapy of borderline patients. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 26:306-313.
- (1972). The development of angiospastic retinopathy during the intensive psychotherapy of a borderline patient. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 27:241-244.

- (1972a). Externalization and existential anguish. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 27:764-770.
- (1973). Contributions to ego psychology from the treatment of borderline patients. *Medikon* 2:20-21.
- (1974). *The Technique and Practice of Intensive Psychotherapy*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1974a). Defective ego feeling and the quest for Being in the borderline patient. *International Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy* 3: 73-89.
- (1974b). The borderline patient. In *American Handbook of Psychiatry*, 2nd ed., vol. 3, ed. S. Arieti. New York: Basic Books.
- (1976). *Agonie: Diary of a Twentieth Century Man*. Ghent, Belgium: European Press.
- (1977). *Intensive Psychotherapy of the Borderline Patient*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1977a). *Great Ideas in Psychotherapy*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1978). Countertransference crises with borderline patients. *Current Concepts in Psychiatry* 4:20-24.
- (1979). A practical approach to the psychotherapy of the borderline patient. *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 33:531-546.
- (1980). *Freud Teaches Psychotherapy*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- (1980a). The problematical self in Kant and Kohut. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 49:456-473.
- (1980b). Some philosophical assumptions of intensive psychotherapy. *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 34:496-509.
- (1982). Intensive psychotherapy of a borderline patient. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 39:413-422.
- (1982a). Psychoanalytic listening: With special reference to the views of Langs. *Contemporary*

*Psychoanalysis* 18:613-634.

- (1983). *A Brief Introduction to the Genius of Nietzsche*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.
- (1983a). Problems in the intensive psychotherapy of the borderline patient. *Dynamic Psychotherapy* 1:20-32.
- (1983b). Marilyn Monroe: Psychoanalytic pathography of a preoedipal disorder. *Dynamic Psychotherapy* 1:161-176.
- (1983c). *The Ring*: Richard Wagner's dream of preoedipal destruction. *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 43:361-374.
- (1984). Sartre and Freud. *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 38: 229-238.
- (1984a). Was Freud wrong about feminine psychology? *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 44:355-368.
- (1984b). A failure in psychoanalytic psychotherapy of a schizophrenic patient. *Dynamic Psychotherapy* 2:136-156.
- (1984c). Matthew Arnold, the death instinct, and the future of man. *Cogito* 2:31-48.
- (1985). Prolegomena to the study of Paul Ricoeur's "Freud and Philosophy." In press.
- (1985a). The search for the authentic self in Bergson and Proust. In. *Psychoanalytic Perspectives in Literature and Film*, eds. J. Rep-pen and M. Charney. Madison, N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.
- (1985b). Clinical notes towards the understanding and intensive psychotherapy of adult eating disorders. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 13:301-322.
- (1985c). Psychoanalytic listening II. *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 39:30-48.
- (1986). Transference and countertransference revisited. *Dynamic Psychotherapy*. In press.

- (1986a). Heidegger for psychotherapists. *American Journal of Psychotherapy*. In press.
- (1986b). Kohut and the contemporary continental tradition: A comparison of Kohut with Lacan and Foucault. *Dynamic Psychotherapy: Theoretical and Clinical Contributions*, ed. P. Buirski. New York: Brunner/Mazel. In press.
- , and Bassan, M. (1968). Experimental approaches to the concept of empathy in psychotherapy. In *An Evaluation of the Results of Psychotherapy*, ed. S. Lesse. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas.
- Clement, C. (1983). *The Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan*, trans. A. Goldhammer, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Clements, C. (1982). Misusing psychiatric models: The culture of narcissism. *Psychoanalytic Review* 69:283-295.
- Collier, A. (1977). *R. D. Laing: The Philosophy and Politics of Psychotherapy*. Hassocks, England: Harvester Press.
- Crease, R., and Mann, C. (1984). How the universe works. *Atlantic Monthly*, 254:66-93.
- Crews, F. (1980). Analysis terminable. *Commentary* 70:25-34.
- Dally, P. (1969). *Anorexia Nervosa*. New York: Grune & Stratton.
- Darwin, C. (1965). *The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Davis, G. (1976). Depression: Some updated thoughts. *Journal of the Academy of Psychoanalysis* 4:411-424.
- De Beauvoir, S. (1984). *Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Dembroski, T., MacDougall, J., Williams, R., Haney, T., and Blumenthal, J. (1985). Components of Type A, hostility, and anger-in: Relationship to angiographic findings. *Psychosomatic Medicine* 47:219-233.

- De Wald, P. (1964). *Psychotherapy*. New York: Basic Books.
- Dorpat, T. (1974). Internalization of the patient-analyst relationship in patients with narcissistic disorders. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 55:183-188.
- Dreyfus, H., and Rabinow, P. (1982). *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dryud, J. (1984). Sartre and psychoanalysis: What can we learn from a lover's quarrel?. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 20:230-244.
- Eagle, M. (1984). *Recent Developments in Psychoanalysis*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Edel, L. (1969). *Henry James: The Treacherous Years: 1895-1901*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- Edelson, M. (1984). *Hypothesis and Evidence in Psychoanalysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Eissler, K. (1953). The effect of the structure of the ego on psychoanalytic technique. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 1:104-143.
- (1971). Death drive, ambivalence, and narcissism. *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 26:25-78.
- (1975). The fall of man. *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 30:589-646.
- Ellenberger, H. (1970). *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ellis, H. (1898). Auto-erotism: A psychological study. *Alienist and Neurologist* 19:260-299.
- Ewing, A. (1967). *A Short Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason."* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fairbairn, W. (1963). Synopsis of an object-relations theory of the personality. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 44:224-225.

- Fairlie, H. (1977). Sloth or acedia. *New Republic*, October 29, 1977, pp. 20-33.
- Federn, P. (1947). Principles of psychotherapy in latent schizophrenia. *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 2:129-147.
- Fenichel, O. (1945). *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*. New York: Norton.
- Ferenczi, S. (1955). *Selected Papers. Volume III: Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psychoanalysis*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ferguson, M. (1981). Progress and theory change: The two analyses of Mr. Z. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 9:133-160.
- Finlay-Jones, R. (1983). Disgust with life in general. *Australian New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry* 17:149-162.
- Fliess, R. (1942). The metapsychology of the analyst. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 2:211-227.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. Smith. New York: Pantheon Books.
- (1973). *Madness and Civilization*, trans. A. Smith. New York: Vintage.
- (1973a). *The Order of Things*. New York: Vintage.
- (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, ed. C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books.
- (1980a). *The History of Sexuality*, vol. I, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Vintage.
- Fox, R. (1984). The principle of abstinence reconsidered. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 11:227-236.
- French, T., and Fromm, E. (1964). *Dream Interpretation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Freud, A. (1971). Difficulties in the path of psychoanalysis: A confrontation of past with present viewpoints. In *The Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. VII. New York: International



Universities Press.

- Freud, S. (1905). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. *Standard Edition* 7:125-248.
- (1905a). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. *Standard Edition* 7:3-124.
- (1911). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). *Standard Edition* 12:3-84.
- (1912). Recommendations to physicians practicing psycho-analysis. *Standard Edition* 12:109-120.
- (1914). On narcissism: An introduction. *Standard Edition* 14:67-104.
- (1914a). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. *Standard Edition* 14:1-66.
- (1917). Mourning and melancholia. *Standard Edition* 14:237-258.
- (1920). Beyond the pleasure principle. *Standard Edition* 18:3-66.
- (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. *Standard Edition* 18:67-144.
- (1923). The ego and the id. *Standard Edition* 19:3-68.
- (1926). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. *Standard Edition* 20: 77-178.
- (1930). Civilization and its discontents. *Standard Edition* 21:59-148.
- (1933). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. *Standard Edition* 22:3-184.
- (1937). Analysis terminable and interminable. *Standard Edition* 23:209-254.
- (1940). Splitting of the ego in the process of defense. *Standard Edition* 23:273-278.
- (1940a). An outline of psycho-analysis. *Standard Edition* 23:141-208.

- Friedman, E., and Hellerstein, H. (1973). Influence of psychosocial factors on coronary risk and adaptation to a physical fitness evaluation program. In *Exercise Testing and Exercise Training in Coronary Heart Disease*, ed. J. Naughton and H. Hellerstein. New York: Academic Press.
- Friedman, L. (1978). Trends in the psychoanalytic theory of treatment. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 47:524-567.
- (1980). Kohut: A book review essay. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 49: 393-422.
- Friedman, M. (1969). *Pathogenesis of Coronary Artery Disease*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- , and Rosenman, R. (1974). *Type-A Behavior and Your Heart*. New York: Knopf.
- , and Ulmer, D. (1984). *Treating Type-A Behavior and Your Heart*. New York: Knopf.
- Fromm-Reichmann, F. (1950). *Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Frosch, J. (1977). The relation between acting out and disorders of impulse control. *Psychiatry* 40:295-314.
- Garner, D., Garfinkel, P., Stancer, H., and Moldofsky, H. (1976). Body image disturbances in anorexia nervosa and obesity. *Psychosomatic Medicine* 38:327-336.
- Gediman, H. (1975). Reflection on romanticism, narcissism, and creativity. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 23:407-423.
- Gedo, J. (1977). Notes on the psychoanalytic management of archaic transferences. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 25:787-803.
- (1979). Theories of object relations: A metapsychological assessment. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 27:361-374.
- (1980). Reflections on some current controversies in psychoanalysis. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 28:363-384.

- (1984). *Psychoanalysis And Its Discontents*. New York: Guilford Press.
- , and Goldberg, A. (1973). *Models of the Mind: A Psychoanalytic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gill, M. (1982). *Analysis of Transference*, vol. I. New York: International Universities Press.
- Giovacchini, P. (1977). A critique of Kohut's theory of narcissism. *Adolescent Psychiatry* 5:213-239.
- (1978). Discussion in symposium on Kohut's "Restoration of the Self." *Psychoanalytic Review* 65:617-620.
- (1979). *Treatment of Primitive Mental States*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1982). *A Clinician's Guide to Reading Freud*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- Gitelson, M. (1952). The emotional position of the analyst in the psychoanalytic situation. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 33:1-10.
- Glenn, J. (1984). Review of "Practice And Precept In Psychoanalytic Technique: Selected Papers of Rudolph M. Loewenstein." *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 53:315-322.
- Glover, E. (1956). *On the Early Development of Mind*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Goethe, J. von (1774). *The Sufferings of Young Werther*, trans. B. Morgan. New York: Ungar, 1954.
- Goldberg, A. (1975). The evolution of psychoanalytic concepts of depression. In *Depression and Human Existence*, ed. E. Anthony and T. Benedek. Boston: Little, Brown.
- (1976). A discussion of the paper by C. Hanly and J. Masson. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 57:67-70.
- (ed.) (1978). *The Psychology of the Self: A Casebook*. New York: International Universities Press.

- (ed.) (1980). *Advances in Self Psychology*. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1980a). Letter to the editor. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 61:91-92.
- (1982). Obituary: Heinz Kohut. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 63:257-258.
- (ed.) (1983). *The Future of Psychoanalysis*. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1983a). On the scientific status of empathy. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 11:155-159.
- Goldberg, D. (1985). Panel: On the concept "object" in psychoanalysis. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 33:167-186.
- Goodsitt, A. (1985). Self-psychology and the treatment of anorexia nervosa. In *Handbook of Psychotherapy for Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia*, ed. D. Garner and P. Garfinkel. New York: Guilford Press.
- Graves, R. (1955). *The Greek Myths*, vol. I. Baltimore: Penguin.
- Greenberg, J., and Mitchell, S. (1983). *Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Greene, M. (1984). The self-psychology of Heinz Kohut. *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic* 48:37-53.
- Greenson, R. (1960). Empathy and its vicissitudes. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 41:418-424.
- Grinker, R., and Werble, B. (1975). *The Borderline Patient*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- Grünbaum, A. (1983). Freud's theory: the perspective of a philosopher of science. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* 57:5-31.
- (1984). *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gunther, M. (1976). The endangered self: A contribution to the understanding of narcissistic determinants of countertransference. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 4:201-224.

- Guntrip, H. (1974). Psychoanalytic object relations theory: The Fairbairn-Guntrip approach. In *American Handbook of Psychiatry*, 2nd ed., vol. 1, ed. S. Arieti. New York: Basic Books.
- (1975). My experience of analysis with Fairbairn and Winnicott. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 2:145-156.
- Hamburger, W. (1951). Emotional aspects of obesity. *Medical Clinics of North America* 35:483-499.
- Hanly, C. (1979). *Existentialism and Psychoanalysis*. New York: International Universities Press.
- , and Masson, J. (1976). A critical examination of the new narcissism. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 57:49-66.
- Hartmann, H. (1927). Understanding and explanation. In *Essays on Ego Psychology*. New York: International Universities Press, 1964.
- (1950). Comments on the psychoanalytic theory of the ego. In *Essays on Ego Psychology*. New York: International Universities Press, 1964.
- Heimann, P. (1966). Comment on Dr. Kernberg's paper. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 47:254-260.
- Hoffman, N. (1984). Meyer Friedman: Type A behavior cardiovascular research continues. *Journal of the American Medical Association* 252:1385-1393.
- Holzman, P. (1976). The future of psychoanalysis and its institutes. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 45:250-273.
- Hunter, P. (1977). Sartre's existential humanism and Freud's existential naturalism. *Psychoanalytic Review* 64:289-298.
- Hurst, J., Logue, R., Schlant, R., and Wenger, N., eds. (1974). *The Heart: Arteries and Veins*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

- Husserl, E. (1913). *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. Gibson. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
- Imber, R. (1984). Reflections on Kohut and Sullivan. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 20:363-380.
- Ingram, D. (1976). Psychoanalytic treatment of the obese person. *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 36:227-235.
- Innaurato, A. (1977). *The Transfiguration of Benno Blimpie*. London: T. Q. Publications.
- Jacobson, E. (1964). *The Self and the Object World*. New York: International Universities Press.
- James, M. (1973). Review of *The Analysis of the Self*. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 54:363-368.
- Janik, A., and Toulmin, S. (1973). *Wittgenstein's Vienna*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Jaspers, K. (1972). *General Psychopathology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jenkins, C. (1971). Psychological and social precursors of coronary disease. *New England Journal of Medicine* 28:244-255, 307-317.
- (1976). Recent evidence supporting psychological and social risk factors for coronary disease. *New England Journal of Medicine* 294:987-994, 1033-1038.
- Jones, E. (1955). *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 2. New York: Basic Books.
- Joseph, E., and Wallerstein, R., eds. (1982). *Psychotherapy: Impact on Psychoanalytic Training*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Jung, C. (1933). *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Kainer, R. (1984). From “evenly-hovering attention” to “vicarious introspection”: Issues of listening in Freud and Kohut. *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 44:103-114.
- Kant, E. (1781). *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965.

- Kaplan, H., Freedman, A., and Sadock, B. (1980). *Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry*, 3rd ed. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
- Katz, R. (1963). *Empathy, Its Nature and Uses*. New York: Glencoe Free Press.
- Kaufmann, W. (1980). *Discovering the Mind*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Kernberg, O. (1972). Critique of the Kleinian school. In *Tactics and Techniques in Psychoanalytic Therapy*, ed. P. Giovacchini. New York: Science House.
- (1974). Contrasting viewpoints regarding the nature and psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic personalities: a preliminary communication. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 22:255-267.
- (1974a). Further contributions to the treatment of narcissistic personalities. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 55:215-240.
- (1975). *Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1975a). Further contributions to the treatment of narcissistic personalities: A reply to the discussion by Paul H. Ornstein. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 56:245-248.
- (1976). *Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1980). *Internal World and External Reality*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1980a). Melanie Klein. In *Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry*, 3rd ed., ed. H. Kaplan, A. Freedman, and B. Sadock. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
- (1982). Self, ego, affects and drives. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 30:893-917.
- (1982a). Review of *Advances In Self Psychology*. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 139:374-375.
- Kierkegaard, S. (1859). *The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History*, trans. W. Lowrie. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

- Klein, M. (1975). *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963*. New York: Delta.
- Klein, M., and Tribich, D. (1981). Kernberg's object-relations theory: A critical evaluation. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 62:27-43.
- Kleist, H. (1976). *The Marquise of O—and Other Stories*, trans. M. Greenberg. New York; Ungar.
- Kohut, H. (1966). Forms and transformations of narcissism. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 14:243-272.
- (1968). The psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic personality disorders. *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 23:86-113.
- (1971). *The Analysis of the Self*. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1977). *The Restoration of the Self*. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1978). *The Search for the Self*, ed., P. Ornstein. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1979). The two analyses of Mr. Z. *International Journal of Psycho- Analysis* 60:3-27.
- (1982). Introspection, empathy, and the semi-circle of mental health. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 63:395-407.
- (1984). *How Does Analysis Cure?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- , and Wolf, E. (1978) The disorders of the self and their treatment: An outline. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 59:413-425.
- Kolb, L., and Brodie, H. (1982). *Modern Clinical Psychiatry*. Philadelphia: Saunders.
- Krystal, H. (1982). Adolescence and the tendencies to develop substance dependence. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 2:581-618.
- , and Raskin, H. (1970). *Drug Dependence: Aspects of Ego Function*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.



- Kuhn, T. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (1977). *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lacan, J. (1968). *Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*, trans. A. Wilden. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- (1977). *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. A. Sheridan. New York: Norton.
- (1978). *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. A. Sheridan. New York: Norton.
- Laing, R. (1960). *The Divided Self*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Langs, R. (1981). *Resistances and Interventions*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1982). *Psychotherapy: A Basic Text*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- Lasch, C. (1978). *The Culture of Narcissism*. New York: Norton.
- Leavy, S. (1980). *The Psychoanalytic Dialogue*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Leider, R. (1983). Analytic neutrality: A historical review. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 3:655-674.
- (1984). Panel report on the neutrality of the analyst in the analytic situation. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 32:573-586.
- Lemaire, A. (1981). *Jacques Lacan*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Leon, G. (1982). Personality and behavioral correlates of obesity. In *Psychological Aspects of Obesity*, ed. B. Wolman. New York: Van Nostrand and Reinhold.
- Levine, M. (1961). Principles of psychiatric treatment. In *The Impact of Freudian Psychiatry*, ed. F. Alexander and H. Ross. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Levy, S. (1985). Empathy and psychoanalytic technique. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 33:353-378.
- Lichtenberg, J. (1973). Review of *The Analysis of the Self*. *Bulletin of the Philadelphia Association of Psychoanalysis* 23:58-66.
- (1978). Is there a line of development of narcissism?. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 5:435-447.
- , and Kaplan, S., eds. (1983). *Reflections on Self Psychology*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press.
- , Bornstein, M., and Silver, D. (1984). *Empathy*, vol. I. Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytic Press.
- , Bornstein, M., and Silver D. (1984a). *Empathy*, vol. II. Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytic Press.
- Lipton, S. (1977). The advantages of Freud's technique as shown in his analysis of the Rat Man. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 58: 255-273.
- (1979). An addendum to "The advantages of Freud's technique as shown in his analysis of the Rat Man." *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 60:215-216.
- Little, M. (1981). *Transference Neurosis and Transference Psychosis*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- Loewald, H. (1962). Internalization, separation, mourning, and the superego. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 31:483-504.
- (1973). Review of *The Analysis of the Self*. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 42:441-451.
- (1980). *Papers on Psychoanalysis*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Loewenstein, R., Newman, L., Schur, M., and Solnit, A., eds. (1966). *Psychoanalysis—A General Psychology*. New York: International Universities Press.
- London, N. (1985). An appraisal of self-psychology. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 66:95-108.

- Maass, J. (1983). *Kleist: A Biography*. Trans. A. Manheim. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Maccoby, M. (1976). *The Gamesman: The New Corporate Leader*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Mahler, M., Pine, F., and Bergman, A. (1975). *The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant*. New York: Basic Books.
- Malcolm, J. (1981). *Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession*. New York: Knopf.
- Masson, J. ed. (1985). *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess: 1877-1904*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Masterson, J. (1976). *Psychotherapy of the Borderline Adult: A Developmental Approach*. New York: Brunner/Mazel.
- Mead, G. (1962). *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Meissner, W. (1978). Notes on some conceptual aspects of borderline personality organization. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 5:297-311.
- (1978a). Theoretical assumptions of concepts of the borderline personality. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 26:559-598.
- (1978b). *The Paranoid Process*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- (1980). Classical psychoanalysis. In *Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry*, 3rd ed., ed. H. Kaplan, A. Freedman, and B. Sadock. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
- (1980a). The problem of internalization and structure formation. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 61:237-248.
- (1984). *The Borderline Spectrum*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- Menninger, B. (1958). *Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique*. New York: Basic Books.
- Meyers, S. (1981). Panel on the bipolar self. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*

29:143-160.

Mischel, T. (1977). *The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Mitchell, S. (1981). Heinz Kohut's theory of narcissism. *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 41:317-326.

---- (1984). The problem of the will. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 20: 257-265.

Modell, A. (1963). Primitive object relations and the predisposition to schizophrenia. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 44:282-292.

---- (1968). *Object Love and Reality*. New York: International Universities Press.

---- (1976). The holding environment and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 24:255-307.

Moldofsky, H. (1984). Clinical research at the interface of medicine and psychiatry. In *Psychiatry Update*, vol. III, ed. L. Grinspoon. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press.

Money-Kryle, B. (1974). The Kleinian school. In *American Handbook of Psychiatry*, 2nd ed., vol. I, ed. S. Arieti. New York: Basic Books.

Montgomery, P. (1981). Obituary—Heinz Kohut. *New York Times*, October 10, 1981, p. 17.

Moore, B., and Fine, D., eds. (1967). *A Glossary of Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts*. New York: American Psychoanalytic Association.

Muller, J., and Richardson, W. (1982). *Lacan and Language: A Reader's Guide to Écrits*. New York: International Universities Press.

Murdoch, I. (1980). *Sartre: Romantic Realist*. New York: Barnes and Nobel.

Murphy, W. (1973). Narcissistic problems in patients and therapists. *International Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy* 2:113-124.

- Myerson, P. (1981). The nature of the transactions that occur in other than classical analysis. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 8:173-189.
- Nacht, S. (1962). The curative factors in psychoanalysis. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 43:206-211.
- Odiar, C. (1956). *Anxiety and Magic Thinking*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Offenkrantz, W., and Tobin, A. (1974). Psychoanalytic psychotherapy. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 30:593-606.
- Ornstein, P. (1974). A discussion of the paper by Otto F. Kernberg on "Further contributions to the treatment of narcissistic personalities." *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 55:241-247.
- (1981). The bipolar self in the psychoanalytic treatment process: Clinical-theoretical considerations. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 29:353-376.
- , and Ornstein, A. (1980). Formulating interpretations in clinical psychoanalysis. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 61:203-212.
- Ornston, D. (1985). Freud's conception is different from Strachey's. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 33:379-412.
- Ostow, M. (1979). Letter to the editor. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 60:531-532.
- Oxford (1970). *English Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Palmer, R. (1969). *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
- Pao, P. (1983). Therapeutic empathy and the treatment of schizophrenics. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 3:145-167.
- Patton, M., and Sullivan, J. (1980). Heinz Kohut and the classical psychoanalytic tradition: An analysis in terms of levels of explanation. *Psychoanalytic Review* 67:365-388.

- Peterfreund, E. (1971). *Information, Systems, and Psychoanalysis: An Evolutionary Biological Approach to Psychoanalytic Theory*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Pflanze, O. (1972). Toward a psychoanalytic interpretation of Bismarck. *American Historical Review* 77:419-444.
- Poland, W. (1974). On empathy in analytic practice. *Journal of the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis* 1:284-297.
- (1975). Tact as a psychoanalytic function. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 56:155-162.
- (1984). On the analyst's neutrality. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 32:283-299.
- Pope, H., Hudson, J., Jonas, J., and Yurgelun-Tood, D. (1983). Bulimia treated with imipramine. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 140:554-558.
- Powers, P. (1980). *Obesity: The Regulation of Weight*. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
- Proust, M. (1981). *Remembrance of Things Past*, trans. C. Moncreiff, R. Kilmartin, and A. Mayor. New York: Random House.
- Pruyser, P. (1975). What splits in "splitting"? *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic* 39:1-46.
- Quinn, S. (1980). Oedipus vs. Narcissus. *New York Times Magazine* November 9, 1980, pp. 120-131.
- Rado, S. (1926). The psychic effects of intoxication. In *Psychoanalysis of Behavior: Collected Papers of Sandor Rado*. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1956.
- Rangell, L. (1981). From insight to change. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 29:119-142.
- (1981a). Psychoanalysis and dynamic psychotherapy: Similarities and differences twenty-five years later. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 50:665-693.

- (1985). The object in psychoanalytic theory. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 33:301-334.
- Reich, A. (1960). Pathological forms of self-esteem regulation. *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 15:215-232.
- Reik, T. (1949). *Listening with the Third Ear*. New York: Farrar, Straus.
- Richards, A. (1982). Panel Report on psychoanalytic theories of the self. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 30:717-734.
- (1982a). The supraordinate self in psychoanalytic theory and in the self-psychologies. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 30:939-958.
- (1984). Panel report on the relation between psychoanalytic theory and psychoanalytic technique. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 32:587-602.
- Ricoeur, P. (1970). *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- (1974). *The Conflict of Interpretations*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
- Riesman, D., Glazer, N., and Denney, R. (1950). *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*. New York: Doubleday.
- Rime, E., and Bonami, M. (1979). Overt and covert personality traits associated with coronary heart disease. *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 52:77-84.
- Roazen, P. (1975). *Freud and His Followers*. New York: Knopf.
- Robbins, M. (1980). Current controversy in object relations theory as an outgrowth of a schism between Klein and Fairbairn. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 61:477-492.
- (1982). Narcissistic personality as a symbiotic character disorder. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 63:457-473.

- Rosenfeld, H. (1964). On the psychopathology of narcissism: A clinical approach. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 45:332-337.
- (1971). A clinical approach to the psychoanalytic theory of the life and death instincts: An investigation into the aggressive aspects of narcissism. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 52:169-178.
- Rossner, J. (1983). *August*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Rotenberg, C. (1983). A contribution to the theory of treatment of personality disorders. *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis* 11:227-249.
- Rothstein, A. (1980). Toward a critique of the psychology of the self. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 49:423-455.
- (1980a). Psychoanalytic paradigms and their narcissistic investment. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 28:385-396.
- Sachs, D. (1979). On the relationship between psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy. *Journal of the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis* 6:119-145.
- Sadow, L. (1969). Ego axis in psychopathology. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 21:15-24.
- Sartre, J. (1964). *Nausea*. New York: New Directions.
- (1973). *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press.
- (1976). *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. London: New Left Books.
- (1984). *War Diaries*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Satow, R. (1983). Response to Colleen Clements's "Misusing psychiatric models: The culture of narcissism." *Psychoanalytic Review* 69:296-302.
- Schafer, R. (1968). *Aspects of Internalization*. New York: International Universities Press.



- (1985). Wild analysis. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 33:275-300.
- Schneiderman, S. (1983). *Jacques Lacan: The Death of an Intellectual Hero*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Schur, M. (1972). *Freud: Living and Dying*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Schwaber, E. (1979). On the "self" within the matrix of analytic theory. Some clinical reflections and reconsiderations. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 60:467-479.
- (1981). Narcissism, self-psychology, and the listening perspective. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 9:115-131.
- (1983). Psychoanalytic listening and psychic reality. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 10:379-392.
- Schwartz, L. (1973). Panel report on technique and prognosis in the treatment of narcissistic personality disorders. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 21:617-632.
- (1978). Review of *The Restoration of the Self*. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 47:436-443.
- Scruton, R. (1982). *Kant*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Searles, H. (1985). Separation and loss in psychoanalytic therapy with borderline patients: Further remarks. *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 45:9-27.
- Segal, H. (1974). *Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein*. New York: Basic Books.
- (1980). *Melanie Klein*. New York: Viking.
- (1983). Some clinical implications of Melanie Klein's work: Emergence from narcissism. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 64: 269-276.
- Sennett, R. (1984). *An Evening of Brahms*. New York: Knopf.

- Shainess, N. (1979). The swing of the pendulum—from anorexia to obesity. *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 39:225-235.
- Shapiro, E. (1978). The psychodynamics and developmental psychology of the borderline patient: A review of the literature. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 135:1305-1315.
- Shapiro, T. (1974). The development and distortions of empathy. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 43:4-25.
- (1981). Empathy: A critical evaluation. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 1: 423-448.
- Silverman, M. (1985). Countertransference and the myth of the perfectly analyzed analyst. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 54:175-199.
- Slap, J., and Levine, F. (1978). On hybrid concepts in psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 47:499-523.
- Smith, N. (1962). *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. New York: Humanities Press.
- Solberg, L. (1984). Lassitude: A primary care evaluation. *Journal of the American Medical Association* 251:3272-3276.
- Soll, I. (1981). Sartre's rejection of the Freudian unconscious. In *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. P. Schilpp. La Salle, 111.: Open Court.
- Speer, A. (1970). *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs*. New York: Macmillan.
- Spillius, E. (1983). Some developments from the work of Melanie Klein. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 674:321-332.
- Spitzer, R., Chairperson (1980). *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.
- Spruiell, V. (1974). Theories of the treatment of narcissistic personalities. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 22:268-278.

- Stein, M. (1979). Review of *The Restoration of the Self*. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 27:665-680.
- (1984). Rational versus anagogic interpretation: Xenophon's dream and others. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 32: 529-556.
- Stepansky, P. (1983). Perspectives on dissent: Adler, Kohut, and the idea of a psychoanalytic research tradition. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 9:51—74.
- Stepansky, P., and Goldberg, A., eds. (1984). *Kohut's Legacy: Contributions to Self-Psychology*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press.
- Sterba, R. (1982). *Reminiscences of a Viennese Psychoanalyst*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Stone, L. (1961). *The Psychoanalytic Situation*. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1981). Notes on the noninterpretive elements in the psychoanalytic situation and process. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 29:89-118.
- Strachey, J. (1934). The nature of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 15:127-159.
- Stunkard, A., and Burt, V. (1967). Obesity and the body image II. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 123:1443-1447.
- (1975). Obesity. In *American Handbook of Psychiatry*, 2nd ed., vol. IV, ed. S. Arieti. New York: Basic Books.
- (1980). Obesity. In *Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry*, 3rd. ed., vol. II, ed. H. Kaplan, A. Freedman, and B. Sadock. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
- Sturrock, J., ed. (1979). *Structuralism and Since: From Levi Strauss to Derrida*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sullivan, H. (1953). *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*. New York: Norton.

- Tarachow, S. (1963). *An Introduction to Psychotherapy*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Tartakoff, H. (1966). The normal personality in our culture and the Nobel Prize complex. In *Psychoanalysis: A General Psychology*, ed. R. Loewenstein, L. Newman, M. Schur, and A. Solnit. New York: International Universities Press.
- Taylor, C. (1975). *Hegel*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Teicholz, J. (1978). A selective review of the psychoanalytic literature on theoretical conceptualizations of narcissism. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 26:831-862.
- Ticho, E. (1982). The alternate schools and the self. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 30:849-862.
- Tolpin, P. (1983). A change in the self: The development and transformation of an idealizing transference. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 64:461-483.
- Treurniet, N. (1983). Psychoanalysis and self-psychology: A metapsychological essay with a clinical illustration. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 31:59-100.
- Trilling, L. (1971). *Sincerity and Authenticity: Six Lectures*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Tuchman, B. (1984). *The March of Folly*. New York: Knopf.
- Turkle, S. (1978). *Psychoanalytic Politics*. New York: Basic Books.
- Tuttman, S. (1978). Discussion in symposium on Kohut's *Restoration of the Self*. *Psychoanalytic Review* 65:624-629.
- Volkan, V. (1976). *Primitive Internalized Object Relations*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Waelder, R. (1930). The principle of multiple function: Observations on over-determination. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 5:45-62.

- Waldron, S. (1983). Review of *Doing Psychotherapy* by Michael Franz Basch. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 52:624-629.
- Wallerstein, R. (1981). The bipolar self: Discussion of alternative perspectives. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 29:377-394.
- Webster (1961). *New International Dictionary of the English Language*. Springfield: Merriam.
- Weiss, E., and English, O. (1957). *Psychosomatic Medicine: A Clinical Study of Psycho-physiologic Reactions*. Philadelphia: Saunders.
- Williams, R., Haney, T., Lee, K., Kong, Y., Blumenthal, J., and Whalen, R. (1980). Type-A behavior, hostility, and coronary atherosclerosis. *Psychosomatic Medicine* 42:539-549.
- Williamson, A. (1984). *Introspection and Contemporary Poetry*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wilson, C., ed. (1983). *Fear of Being Fat*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- Winnicott, D. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena: A study of the first not-me possession. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 34:89-97.
- (1958). *Collected Papers: Through Pediatrics to Psycho-Analysis*. New York: Basic Books.
- (1965). *The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment*. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1969). The use of an object. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 50:711-716.
- (1971). Letter to Mme. Jeannine Kalmanovitch. *Nouvelle Revue de Psychoanalyse*, vol. 3. Quoted by M. Kahn in the Introduction to *Winnicott's Collected Papers*, 2nd ed. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1975.
- Wolf, E. (1976). Ambience and abstinence. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 4: 101-115.
- (1979). Transference and countertransference in analysis of disorders of the self.

*Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 15:577-594.

---- (1980). Tomorrow's self: Heinz Kohut's contribution to adolescent psychiatry. *Adolescent Psychiatry* 8:41-50.

----, Gedo, J., and Terman, D. (1972). On the adolescent process as a transformation of the self. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 1:257-272.

Wollheim, R. (1984). *The Thread of Life*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wood, A. (1981). *Karl Marx*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Woolcott, P. (1981). Addiction: Clinical and theoretical considerations. *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 9:189-206.

Wooley, S., and Wooley, O. (1980). Eating disorders: Obesity and anorexia. In *Women and Psychotherapy*, ed. A. Brodsky and R. Hare-Muslin. New York: Guilford Press.

Zeigarnik, R. (1927). Über das Behalten von erledigten und unerledigten Handlungen. *Psychologische Forschung* 9:1-85.