THE SELF AND THERAPY

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is simultaneously one of the most difficult and one of the most intriguing and stimulating of philosophers. He is also one of the most human. Kant was the son of a poor saddle maker. His family had emigrated from Scotland to East Prussia several generations before Kant's birth. He grew up and lived almost all of his life in Konigsberg, a member of the Hanseatic League, a group of Baltic seaports important in commerce from the Middle Ages on. Konigsberg was not only a lively commercial center, it was also a university town. For a relatively small place, it was cosmopolitan and had a good-sized educated class. The adult Kant's friends included resident English businessmen and other representatives from the world beyond the flat plains of East Prussia. Kant's family were Pietists. The Pietists were a Protestant denomination that emphasized simplicity, moral duty, and inwardness: spirituality rather than ritual. The Pietists were humanistic, intense, peaceful, and loving, at least in their ideals and frequently in their practice. They could also be stiflingly rigid and self-righteous. Kant wrote that Konigsberg was a town in which one could travel without traveling. In his mature theory of the mind, Kant held that all experience was filtered through the apparatuses of the mind, much as the experience of the world had to pass through Konigsberg. Kant was educated at the local school and continued at the university where he studied philosophy and science. After graduation, he spent several years as a tutor—the only time he left his native town. He returned to his alma mater as a lecturer at age 30, and remained there for the rest of his life. His academic advance was slow, and he suffered from poverty. He finally became a full professor in his late 40s. Kant was a man of extraordinarily regular habits: the people of the town were said to set their watches by his daily walk. One day Kant didn't emerge from his house at the usual time. All Konigsberg was aghast. Kant didn't take his walk that day because he was reading Rousseau's *Emile.* Kant was sympathetic toward the French Revolution, at least before the Terror, and Jean Jacques Rousseau was his favorite author.

Kant was a liberal in politics and religion. Kant's values, ethics, and sensibilities were congruent with the ideals of the anticlerical, antiauthoritarian principles of the European Enlightenment, the great 18th-century intellectual revolution that planted the seeds of tolerance, democracy, reasonableness, and liberalism, which he reflected, embodied, and in part created. His inwardness and moral seriousness

were derived from tradition, from his Pietist upbringing, while his critical, iconoclastic, probing philosophizing was derived from the contemporary and forward ethos of the Enlightenment. For all his solitary scholarliness, Kant was an urbane man who enjoyed socializing with the Konigsberg merchant community. He is said to have twice considered proposing, but each time tarried so long that the lady married another, and he remained a lifelong bachelor. He was a popular and lively lecturer. His presentations were both humorous and clear, but the same cannot be said for his philosophical writings, which are often turgid, ponderous, and academic. Late in his life Kant's views on religion got him into difficulties with the Prussian authorities, and he agreed to write no more on that topic. Kant's tolerance was reflected in his friendship with the German Jewish Enlightenment thinker, Moses Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn was snubbed by as great a man as Goethe because of his Jewishness, but not by Kant. Kant lectured on many subjects: physical geography, meteorology, pedagogy, and physics, as well as metaphysics and logic. His early writings were mostly scientific, and although imaginative and often prescient, they are no longer of much interest. In philosophy, he was a follower of Christian Wolfe, a disciple of Leibniz, who taught a dogmatic, almost scholastic (in the sense of medieval scholasticism) rationalism that made what Kant would later call "uncritical" claims for the ability of reason alone to discover truth, especially metaphysical truth (truth about the ultimate nature of things). Then Kant read Hume, who remained second only to Rousseau as his favorite author, and was "awakened from my dogmatic slumbers." A great deal of Kant's philosophizing is an attempt to refute Hume's skepticism about the possibilities of veridical knowledge. Hume, as we have seen, demolished the rational foundations of causality and the belief in the existence of the substantive self. Once having read Hume, Kant couldn't return to Wolfian dogmatic rationalism, but neither could he accept Hume's refutation of the possibilities of scientific knowledge. Kant's answer was his "critical philosophy," which established, at least so he thought, what could and could not be known and how it was known by the human mind. Thus, the main thrust of Kant's technical philosophizing was epistemological. He was looking at both the limits of, and the possibilities of, human knowledge, in the spirit of, but from a different vantage point than, Locke. In the course of his critical epistemological inquiries, he had important, novel things to say about the nature of the self. Before we can understand his understanding of the self, we need to understand something of his view of the mind and how it works.

The first of Kant's critical works to reflect his post-Humeian awakening from his dogmatic slumbers

was his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1990). Kant was disappointed by its reception. Its style is so forbidding that few read, and fewer understood, it. Kant revised it, and also wrote a sort of popularization of it: his *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science* (1783/1953). We are about to see what Kant had to say about mind and about self in his first *Critique*. He followed the first critique with the *Critique of Pure Practical Reason* (1786/1949a), a treatise on the possibility of moral knowledge; the *Critique of Judgement* (1793/1952), a work on aesthetics; *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793/1949b), which got him in trouble with the authorities; and *Perpetual Peace* (1795/1986), in which he proposed a world federation based on the principles of the Enlightenment.

The purpose of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to determine how science is possible. Clearly science was successful; it did work in the sense of generating predictions that were verifiable and verified. Yet Hume had shown that there is no rational ground to believe that any antecedent entailed any consequence, that there were any causal connections in nature. As we have seen, Hume thought that he had demonstrated that just as there are no intrinsic connections between the sequential presentation of impressions and ideas in the theater that doesn't exist, which is our mind, there is no intrinsic connectiveness, no substantive self, in the recipient of those representations. Kant realized that Hume's destructive analysis vitiated the possibility of scientific knowledge based on reason and replaced it with habit, custom, and sentiment. This Kant found unacceptable. That wasn't science, that was faith; yet the science of the 17th and 18th centuries had solid accomplishments that metaphysics had to account for. Physics did exist, yet clearly could not on Hume's premises, so Kant asked, How is physics possible? Further, Kant saw that Humeian epistemology not only made science impossible, it also rendered experience itself inexplicable. For Kant, metaphysics described the requirements for any possible experience. In this sense the *Critique of Pure Reason* is metaphysical. Metaphysics cannot, however, describe what cannot be experienced by the senses (e.g., God, immortality, freedom, or morality), although there may be other reasons to believe in them. That is why Kant's metaphysics is critical: it describes only the conditions necessary for experience; it doesn't, unlike traditional, precritical metaphysics, say anything about what cannot be experienced. Kant's metaphysics is *transcendental,* to use his technical term, in the sense that it transcends, is a condition of, is logically but not necessarily temporally, prior to any possible experience. Kant starts by analyzing Hume's categories of judgment. To

Hume, all judgments (knowledge) are either matters of fact (e.g., the table is red) or relations of ideas (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4). The first is empirical; the second, logical. Matters of fact are a posteriori, after experience. Relations of ideas are a priori; they do not depend on experience, although they are elicited by it and perhaps in some sense derived from it. Matters of fact are synthetic: they synthesize, or make connections, as between table and redness. Relations of ideas are analytic in the technical sense that their conclusions are contained in their premises. They merely elucidate our concepts. Logically, though not necessarily psychologically, they tell us nothing new. Analytic judgments also tell us something about the meaning of our concepts—in this example, about the meanings of addition, number, and equality. However, given these meanings, the conclusion is entailed in the premises. If the calculations in our mathematical example were highly complicated, the conclusion would tell us something we didn't know before (i.e., it would be psychologically novel), but would nevertheless be entailed in its premises and in that sense would not tell us anything that was not "contained" in the left side of the equation. As we will see, Kant's analysis of intellectual judgment—or, if you want to depsychologize the argument (i.e., move it from the analysis of thought to the analysis of language) of propositions—is considerably more complex than Hume's. It has two dimensions: analytic-synthetic and a priori-a posteriori (empirical). This makes it possible for Kant to consider the antecedents of, logic of, and truth value of four kinds of judgment:

Analytic a priori ~~Analytic a posteriori~~

Synthetic a priori Synthetic a posteriori

I have put a line through analytic a posteriori because it is self-contradictory: in analytic propositions a conclusion is entailed in the premises, for example, tall men are tall, and no experience is necessary to confirm this. You don't have to look at tall men to confirm that tall men are tall. That leaves three classes of judgment. The analytic a priori is no problem. By definition analytic judgments are a priori. They tell us nothing new about the world; they only spin out the meanings inherent in our concepts. They are relations of ideas. In 20th-century terminology, they are tautological. The synthetic a posteriori also presents Kant with no problem. There is no way to determine whether or not a cat is gray except to look at it; such knowledge about the state of affairs in the world is never given a priori. As we shall see, Kant doesn't have Hume's difficulties with the connectedness of impressions, but even Hume would not have problems with "the cat is gray" as long as the necessity of its grayness is not part of our

claim to such knowledge. The real problem comes with the category of synthetic a priori judgments. When Hume says (of a book), "Does it contain matters of fact or reasoning about the relationship of ideas? If not consign it to the flames," he is eliminating the possibility of the synthetic a priori. Kant (at least the critical Kant) also wants to demonstrate that the claims of the old style metaphysics—with their obscurity, dogmatism, and implicit, when not explicit, support for authoritarianism of various stripes—are excessive and without foundation, but he believes that Hume has thrown out the baby with the bath water and that logic, mathematics, and physics consist of synthetic a priori judgments. Earlier, I used arithmetic as an example of an analytic a priori judgment, which I believe it is. Not so for Kant, who held that arithmetic is synthetic a priori; that is, it tells us something new about the world, not merely about how we use (mathematical) language, without consulting experience. Most subsequent philosophers have disagreed with Kant on this. Be that as it may, Kant did believe that a good deal of our knowledge is synthetic a priori. His first *Critique* was not only an attempt to answer the question "How is physics (science) possible?" it was also an attempt to answer the question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. That is so, because for Kant, logically grounded knowledge of the world is only possible if synthetic a priori judgments exist and give verifiable knowledge of what is the case. It is going to turn out that one of the transcendental conditions of such synthetic a priori judgment is the existence of a self that is real, ongoing, and continuous rather than unreal, sequential, and atomistic. The argument is both about the nature of experience and about the nature of the self.

Essentially, Kant's answer to the question of how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible is to make the connectiveness intrinsic by putting it inside our heads. The mind works by filtering the *manifold of sense* (i.e., that which is empirically given in experience) through the categories of the Understanding. Knowledge is not something that is passively received; we are not blank slates to be written on by experience, nor are we empty cabinets to be filled; rather, we are constitutive of both experience and knowledge. We are active in cognition. In the words of Kant's near-contemporary, the Romantic poet William Wordsworth, "The world is half created and half perceived." There are no givens in experience; everything we know is processed by, refracted through, the prism of the Understanding. The transcendental (i.e., necessary for and logically prior to any possible experience) condition of knowledge is the active input from, the structuring by the Understanding, of the manifold of sense. Kant called this his Copernican revolution. Just as Copernicus moved the center of the solar system from the earth to the

sun, Kant moved the locus of knowing from the world to the mind. In a sense, Kant's journey was in an opposite direction—from anthropocentric to "remotepocentric" for Copernicus and from world centered to mind centered for Kant—but his "revolution" was no less profound for that. Kant summarized both the critical (i.e., limiting) and affirming aspects of his analysis as follows:

> *Thoughts without content are empty, intuition without concepts are blind…These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the intuition can think nothing, only through their union can knowledge arise. (1781/1990, p. I)*

Kant's use of *intuition* is unfortunate: what he is talking about is something strikingly similar to Hume's impressions, except that these impressions are already actively organized so that sensations (the raw materials given in the manifold of sense) are experienced as perceptions.

Now knowledge is possible because any experience whatsoever is organized by us, and we can only experience the world in the way that we experience it, and that way is invariant. This is a kind of subjectivism, but it is not solipsistic, nor personally unique. All humans experience the world causally, for example, because causality is one of the categories of the Understanding. We cannot experience things as disconnected because we intrinsically connect them. It is as if we always wore blue-colored glasses so that the world always appeared blue. If that were the case, we would not need to experience future events as blue in order to know that they were blue; they would be blue and could be known to be blue transcendentally (i.e., before they, or anything else for that matter, was experienced).

Kant thought that we process sensory input, structure the manifold of sense, in two ways, which he called the *aesthetic* and the *categorical*, respectively. Let us see what Kant's aesthetic consists of.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant uses *aesthetic* in a sense different from its ordinary usage. His "aesthetic" (theory of the function and nature of art and of what constitutes beauty) is contained in his *Critique of Judgement*, while the "Transcendental Aesthetics" of the first *Critique* is a demonstration that space and time are subjective in the sense that they are "forms of intuition" under which the manifold of sensation is organized. For Kant, sense experience is not a pure given, something coming from the outside that inscribes on a receptor; on the contrary, the receptors (the senses) themselves organize any possible sensations spatially and temporarily. Thus, any experience whatsoever must be spatial and temporal, must have a location in space and in time. Instead of blue glasses, we wear spatial-temporal

glasses that cannot be removed. The forms of space and time are transcendental in Kant's sense of being logically antecedent to any possible experience. According to Kant, the pure intuition of the outer senses is space (i.e., outer sensations are organized spatially), while time is the pure intuition of inner sense (i.e., any introspective sensation is organized temporally; it is preceded by something and followed by something). Kant's arguments to prove that this is so are elaborate, obscure, and difficult. Their exposition and evaluation are beyond the scope of this book. Later philosophers have split in the degree, if any, to which they have been persuaded by Kant's analysis. However, the subjectivity (this subjectivity is not personal, it is universal, built into each and every human mind) of time and space receives some support from modern relativity theory, but there it is the perspective of the observer, which could be an instrument, that organizes space and time rather than a mental structure.

Once he has established his transcendental aesthetics, Kant draws the reasonable conclusion that we can only know the world as we know it, that is, under the aspects of space and time, and not as it is itself. The world as we know it Kant calls the *phenomenal* world; the world in itself he calls the *noumenal* world.

Phenomenal reality is spatial-temporal; noumenal reality is, according to Kant, whatever else it may be, not spatial-temporal (not in space and in time). Since he argues that what he calls the *ding-an-sich,* the thing-in-itself, is unknowable, I don't see how he can consistently say anything whatsoever about it, including that it is not spatial-temporal in nature, but he does.

After his analysis of sensory representation in the transcendental aesthetic, Kant proceeds to subject the Understanding to a similar analysis. For Kant, the mental apparatus—the mind—has three aspects: the Senses that contribute the pure intuitions of space and time; the Understanding that contributes the categories—extremely general conceptual schemata—by which, or perhaps better *through which*, any experience whatsoever is organized; and finally the Reason, which provides the synoptic vision, the integration and capacity for self-awareness and self-criticism.

In the section of the first *Critique* called "Transcendental Logic," Kant comes up with a table of categories: of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality. All experience must be organized by the four categories, which explicitly include causality under relation. So Hume's analysis that there is no

necessary connection between things, nothing within them that constitutes them, becomes irrelevant, since the connections are necessarily supplied by the Understanding. It is as if we had replaced our blue spectacles with unremovable bifocals, one lens of which organizes sensations into spatial-temporal perceptions and the other of which organizes perceptions into categories. Since phenomenal events are causally determined, or at least experienced as causally determined, there is no freedom in the phenomenal realm; the noumenal world is not causally connected and is a realm of freedom. Just as Kant argued that the thing-in-itself is outside space and time because the mind is the source of their spatial-temporal organization, he argues that noumena, things-in-themselves (including the self-in-itself), are free because causality (determination) is contributed by the Understanding. As with space and time, I don't see any reason to say that real connections cannot reside in things-in-themselves just because the mind makes connections. By definition we can't know noumena, so we can't know what they aren't, any more than, given Kant's premises, we can know what they are. This brings us to Kant's analysis of the self. First, however, I would like to say something about what Kant calls the *transcendental dialectic*.

In the transcendental dialectic, Kant demonstrates what results when a rationalist thinker using reason alone attempts to draw conclusions about matters beyond the limits of experience. Such reasoning ignores Kant's demonstration that thoughts without sensations are empty and results in what he calls the *antinomies of reason:* mutually contradictory statements such as "the world has a beginning in time and the world does not have a beginning in time." Both conclusions can be proved by metaphysics. To push reason beyond its legitimate realm is to come up with contradictions and absurdity. The transcendental dialectic is the destructive part of Kant's philosophizing in which he demonstrates that the traditional proofs of God's existence, along with the traditional claims of metaphysics (knowledge about that which we do not and cannot experience) is illusionary. Kant is clearing the forest of the accumulated tangle of the weeds of generations of pretension and dogmatism much as Descartes, Locke, and Hume did in their respective ways. Here the *Critique* is indeed critical. The result is to free the human mind of the bonds of ignorance raised to certainty, and from all the catastrophic consequences flowing from each and all dogmatisms, inflicting their certainties on "nonbelievers" and "heretics."

Having demonstrated the antinomies (i.e., mutually contradictory conclusions) that come from the misapplication of reason, Kant turns back to what we can know and the conditions of that knowledge. One of those conditions is the existence of the self as an enduring and substantive entity. Kant says that

"the…unity of conscious…[is] a condition under which every intuition must stand *in order to become an object for me.* For otherwise ... the manifold would not be united in one consciousness." This is analytic because "all my representations must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to an identical self as my representations" (Kant, 1781/1990, p. 112). Kant, here, seems to be equating the self and consciousness, but he does not do this consistently.

So much for Hume's demonstration that the self is an illusion, that it doesn't exist. Hume says, look for it and you can't find it. Kant says, don't bother to look for it, you could not have any coherent experience whatever, and you do have some, unless you have a self that is in some sense a unity. This too is transcendental in the sense that existence of the self is logically antecedent to any experience that makes sense. If the self is merely a grammatical fiction that denotes a flow of discontinuous impressions, there could be no experience of coherence or of continuity, and there is one. Although Kant doesn't think so, this is a combination of an empirical (the world does make sense) and a logical (it couldn't if we didn't cohere) argument for the existence of a self-identical self. Kant goes on to say,

> *It must be possible for the "I think " to accompany all my representations for otherwise something could be represented in me that could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. (Kant, 1781/1990, p. 117)*

So to speak, the function of the self is synthetic, not in Hume's sense that habit and memory give us a sense of personal identity, but much more in the spirit of the modern psychoanalyst speaking of the synthetic function of the ego. Here the self is active, is constitutive of experience, just as are the *categories of the understanding.* There is a reciprocal and dialectical relationship between the intelligibility of the world and the logical necessity for the existence of the self as enduring and creative. It is both the synthesizer and the synthesized. In a famous phrase, Kant speaks of the *transcendental unity of the apperception. Apperception* for Kant is self-consciousness; so the *transcendental unity of the apperception* means that a unified awareness of self and an awareness of the self as unified is logically antecedent to any experience whatsoever that can be experienced as mine, and there is no other kind of experience. Kant himself defines the transcendental unity of the apperception as "that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation 'I think' (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations), cannot itself be represented by any further representation" (Kant, 1781/1990, p. 119).

Kant goes on to say that time is the form of the inner sense, just as space is the form of the outer senses, and "in introspection I am at times aware of myself and perceive myself after the fashion of an object, that is to say under the form of time, though not of space, and under the unity of pure apperception" (Kant, 1781/1990, p. 119).

As a result of this analysis, Kant now has two selves: the phenomenal (empirical) self that I sometimes can catch in introspection, and a noumenal self. The vicissitudes of the phenomenal self are the subject matter of scientific psychology, which may be either experimental or introspective. The phenomenal self is, in principle, knowable and is, to some extent, known. It is knowable through the inner sense as the temporal sequence that is me.

For Kant, there is a noumenal self in addition to the phenomenal self. The noumenal self is a self-in-itself, which is the *I am* that transcendentally must accompany every thought. The noumenal self is unknowable. It is thinkable but not known. The self-in-itself that becomes the *transcendental ego* in 19th- and 20th-century philosophy is without specifications; it is a purely logical condition of thought. In this way it seems much like Descartes's *cogito*, which also lacks specification, yet it is more than that. In his moral philosophy, Kant manages to say a great deal about the noumenal self that he can't say in his epistemological work. In the *Critique of Pure Practical Reason* (Kant's attempt to answer the question, "How is moral knowledge possible?"), the noumenal self is seen as free, that is, outside the realm of necessity, and as potentially immortal. It becomes something like the traditional soul, although a soul whose existence is not established by illegitimate use of reason, in the manner of the old metaphysics. Kant believes there are two realms, that of necessity and that of freedom. The noumenal self—the *I am* that must necessarily accompany every intuition—is free from the causal order, although it is the ground of my experience of that causal order. Being outside of the causal order, it is not knowable. The empirical self, on the other hand, is part of the causal order of nature and is thoroughly knowable. Although Kant didn't himself write psychology, he believed that science can explicate the richness and complexity of the empirical self.

In one of the epigrams that shine through the turgid prose of the critiques, Kant says, "Man as noumenon is free; [while] man as phenomenon is part of the causal order of nature." In the *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*, Kant demonstrates to his satisfaction that the moral sense, which exists just as

scientific knowledge does, requires that man be free and concludes that, in some sense, man stands outside of all causal chains. His critics have suggested that Kant tried to undo his critical analysis of the limits of reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in his ethical works and that they are not persuasive.

Kant's notion of the self is much richer than either Descartes's or the empiricists'. It is both a unity and a unifier; it is, in one respect, potentially knowable and in another respect, a free, albeit unknowable, moral agent.

To return to Kant's epistemology, the function of the Understanding is to structure the "output" of the manifold of sense by subsuming that output under Kant's categories. Kant derived his categories from Aristotle's logic; living in a time when there was no geometry except the Euclidean and no logic but the Aristotelian syllogistic, Kant assumed that those categories were universal and intrinsic to the operation of all minds. That is, Kant assumed that the categories of Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian logic were universal and characteristic of all minds. We now know this not to be true and Kant's categories are merely of an antiquarian interest, but the notion that experience is shaped by indwelling schemata of the mind is perfectly valid. For Kant the categories are prewired or, to change the metaphor, the software is eternal and invariant. Current scientific knowledge seems to suggest that the software is not invariant, although not easily modified, and that it is partly genetically programmed and partly laid down by early experience or, more precisely, by the internal representation of early interpersonal interactions, which are modifiable by later experience, although not easily. There is a built-in inertia in the system that makes it resistant to change. This is perhaps what Freud meant by (or is intrinsic to what he meant by) the "repetition compulsion." There is a dialectical (reciprocal) relationship between mind shaping experience and experience shaping the structural and structuring functions of the mind. The developmental psychologist Jean Piaget, who liked to call himself a *genetic epistemologist,* spoke of this dialectical relationship as assimilation (the shaping of sensory input by cognitive schemata) and accommodation (the shaping of cognitive schemata by sensory input). But these are cybernetic and psychoanalytic interpretations and modifications of Kant's salient and basically valid notion of the Understanding shaping the manifold of sense. The manifold of sense is simply the array of raw sensa (sense data) provided by experience antecedent to any perceptual or cognitive processing.

The *reason,* for Kant, is that part of (i.e., functional output of) the mind that is self-reflection and is

capable of subjecting its operations to critical analysis. It is the part of the mind that made it possible for the critiques to be written. Ideas are to the reason what concepts are to the Understanding. The reason's application of ideas permits us to philosophize and to look at how we think and to reason about the conditions necessary for that thinking. The result is Kant's a priori transcendental comprehension of the aesthetic shaping of the manifold under the forms of space and time and the categorical shaping of the manifold by the Understanding. The reason is also the source of whatever synoptic vision or overall integration we may attain of our metaphysical conditions (i.e., our way of being as abstract scientists and as moral beings, enactors of pure reason and of practical reason).

The most famous part of the first critique is the transcendental dialectic, in which Kant demonstrates that reasoning about matters of which we have no experience leads to absurdity. However, the destructive critique in the transcendental dialectic produces a paradoxical result. According to Kant, any claim to knowledge, particularly metaphysical knowledge, that goes beyond experience leads to contradictory conclusions, which he calls antinomies. The antinomies demonstrate that we land in absurdity when we try to "prove" through logical deduction that God exists or, on the contrary, that God doesn't exist; that the universe has a beginning in time or that the universe doesn't have a beginning in time; that the universe has a boundary, or that the universe doesn't have a boundary; and so forth. So to speak, ultimates can't be proved or known through the use of pure (i.e., theoretical) reason. As Ludwig Wittgenstein said, "About that which we can not speak, we must be silent." But Kant doesn't agree. On the contrary, he says that since we can neither prove nor disprove metaphysical ultimates, we should be guided by the requirements of practical reason, by that which is necessary to act morally in the world and to hope. Kant is, in this sense, a pragmatist. Kant's argument brings to mind the story from the Buddhist scriptures in which Buddha's disciple Ajunta asks the Master, "Does the world have a beginning in time? Does the world have a limit in space?" and the rest of the Kantian antinomies. In each case, the Buddha remains silent. Finally Ajunta asks, "Master, why don't you answer my questions?" The Buddha replies, "The answer to these questions makes not for salvation." Kant would have told Buddha's disciple, "My son, I am glad you asked these questions; their self-contradictory, antithetical solutions demonstrate the impotence of reason to answer them, forcing us to seek answers elsewhere, therefore, paradoxically leading us to salvation."

In being allowed to look, and in looking, elsewhere, Kant asked, "What is necessary for me to act

morally?" For him the moral is a given, a datum of experience, as certain as any other datum. Further, it is something that I experience within me. For Kant, the postulates of practical reason are God, freedom, and immortality. He has gone an awfully long way to arrive at what most men believe without having written the two critiques. Kant's position is somewhat like William James's, when James, after considering whether the existence of free will or determinism can be demonstrated and concluding that they cannot, states that his first act of free will will be to believe in free will. So Kant, in a dialectical rapprochement, has managed to say something about that which we cannot know, the noumenal world of the thing-in-itself, or at least that part of it that constitutes the self-in-itself. Kant, unlike Wittgenstein, is not silent about that of which we cannot speak and, having first demonstrated that pure reason can say nothing about these matters, now demonstrates that practical reason, although it cannot demonstrate, can postulate the a priori conditions of a moral world within. Hence Kant's famous conclusion that man (i.e., the self) is, as phenomenon, part of the determined order of nature, but as a noumenon is free.

In a sense, Kant has not really answered Hume; rather, he does an end run around him. Kant does not look for the self, as does Hume, and find it (or not find it); rather, he asks what are the necessary conditions of coherent experience and of a science that successfully explains and predicts, each of which exist, and concludes that the transcendental unity of the apperception is that condition. Since self-consciousness must accompany every mental act, he concludes that the self must exist. Kant's argument is metaphysical in his sense of metaphysical (i.e., an explanation of the transcendental ground of experience), while Hume's argument is empirical—go and look.

Two of Kant's successors are worth mentioning at this point: Johan Gottlieb Fichte and Arthur Schopenhauer. Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) turned Kant's Transcendental unity of the apperception into a radical subjectivism. Fichte speaks of the Ego that "posits" itself. Kant's noumenal self doesn't postulate itself. Fichte is a typical romantic in his exultation of an extreme individuality that creates itself. Fichte was also a rabid German nationalist, and there is an inconsistency between his self-positing Ego (whatever that means) and his romantic inflation of the self as unique individual and Romantic authoritarianism. Fichte is usually seen as a proto-Fascist.

Schopenhauer (1788-1860) returns to Kant's phenomenal self, renaming it the *self as presentation.* The self as presentation stands under the forms of perception and the Understanding. Kant's noumenal

self becomes Schopenhauer's *self as will,* which is the self-in-itself understood as irrational force. Schopenhauer anticipates both Freud's theory of the instincts and the worship of force in modem totalitarianism. Apart from its political anticipation, Schopenhauer's notion of the self as blind striving underscores a real aspect of the self ignored by both the rationalists and the empiricists. It is a notion that has found much support in 20th-century thought.

To return to Kant, it has been said that he is an empirical realist, but a transcendental idealist. This is true of both his epistemology and his account of the self. Kant's moral theory is derived from his analysis of the self and from his Enlightenment values. He himself doesn't think that he is offering value judgments, but rather that he has demonstrated that we have intuition of what is right. The abstract summary of that right is given in Kant's renowned categorical imperative. He phrases it several ways: My action is moral if, and only if, "I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law"; and "act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a *universal law of nature."* He goes on to say, "Man is an end in himself," therefore "act in such a way that you treat human beings both in your own person and in the person of all others, never as a means only but always equally as an end" (1785/1959, p. 47). There are logical problems both with Kant's arguments for his moral conclusions and with their universal application that may entail conflicts Kant didn't see, but their nobility is self-evident. They embody the Enlightenment at its best. I believe that there is a dialectical (two-way) relationship between Kant's analytic establishment of the substantiality, and the centrality in knowing and experiencing, of the self and the endurance of that self and Kant's dictate of "practical reason" that each person is an end (i.e., intrinsically valuable) in himself or herself. It is the Enlightenment's defiance of the claims of all collectivities, religious or political, to subjugate or sacrifice the claims of the individual to some "greater good." This is not a romantic exultation of radical individualism as in Fichte, for each individual must take into consideration the desirability of universalizing his or her actions. There are problems with this, but it is a notion congruent with human dignity.

Kant asked and, to his satisfaction, answered three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? and What may I hope? At the end of his first critique he said, "I never cease to respond with awe and wonder when I contemplate the two certainties, the starry sky above and the moral law within." One could do worse.