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Beyond Freud

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INTRODUCTION AND BIOGRAPHY

By the time of his sudden death in 1971 at age 53, George S. Klein had already made many compelling contributions to psychology and psychoanalysis. He was then working on what was probably his most important contribution, a reexamination and attempt at restatement of basic psychoanalytic theory which was published posthumously as *Psychoanalytic Theory: An Exploration of Essentials* (1976) under the editorship of Merton M. Gill and Leo Goldberger. Although this book was in a still incomplete form, many consider that its daring sweep and powerful insights will have an enduring impact on psychoanalysis.

That Klein was a man of great personal magnetism, energy, and leadership ability, as well as a scientist and theoretician, is given ample testimony by the numerous activities his friends, students, and colleagues have dedicated to his personal and professional memory. Preceding each meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association is a meeting of the George S. Klein Research Forum, dedicated to the advancement of research in psychoanalysis; the main lecture at the annual meeting of Psychologists Interested in the Study of Psychoanalysis (a group of American Psychological Association members) is the George S. Klein

Memorial Lecture; and annually in his beloved Stockbridge, Massachusetts, researchers and psychoanalysts meet in the George S. Klein-David Rapaport Study Group. In addition, there have been a number of panels, symposia, and memorial publications dedicated to the advancement of Klein's work (Gill and Holzman, 1976; Mayman, 1982; Reppen, 1980).

George Klein was born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1919. He was educated at the City College of New York and Columbia University, where he developed what was to be a lifelong interest in the study of perception. After receiving his doctorate, Klein served during World War II in the United States Army Air Force, where he performed statistical studies and co-authored several reports on selection, diagnosis, and prediction of outcome in patients.

In 1946, Klein joined the staff of the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas, under the supervision and instruction of David Rapaport. The few years he spent there were to have a profound impact on the rest of his intellectual life. At that time, the Menninger Foundation provided the best available clinical psychological training to nonphysicians and was alive with the clinical and theoretical ferment stimulated by Rapaport and his colleagues. To this exciting atmosphere were attracted a number of people, including Philip Holzman, Herbert Schlesinger, Lester Luborsky, and many others who have continued to be among the foremost leaders in psychoanalytically oriented clinical psychology, as well as a number of outstanding medical psychoanalysts. Klein quickly became an important figure

and guiding spirit in this group. He studied Rapaport's diagnostic psychological testing procedures and took some patients in psychotherapy, but his main contributions at the Menninger Foundation were in the area of research. In this first major phase of his career, as a result of the joining of his experimental background with his exposure to psychoanalysis, Klein and his colleagues produced a series of studies of individual consistencies in perceptual and cognitive behavior that added the terms "cognitive control" and "cognitive style" to the technical lexicon. The fact that Klein was the leader in this research was obscured by the alphabetical listing of the authors of the major comprehensive publication on the subject (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959; see also Holzman, 1982).

In 1949, Klein began a personal psychoanalysis while still at the Menninger Foundation. In 1950, he went to Harvard as a visiting professor and continued analysis there. While at Harvard, Klein became interested in an organismic view of psychology in which neurological mechanisms would be included along with the psychological. He later came to explicitly reject this position and made significant theoretical contributions in his attempt to disentangle the quasi-neurological speculations of metapsychology from the clinical theory of psychoanalysis.

In 1952, with Robert R. Holt, a former colleague at the Menninger Foundation, Klein founded the Research Center for Mental Health at New York University, where he remained for the rest of his career.

This center became the heart of an outstanding graduate program in clinical psychology and clinical research laboratory, producing research on the interface between psychoanalytic and experimental issues. Klein also started his own clinical practice at this time and began to turn to more purely psychoanalytic theoretical concerns in his writings. He wrote his paper on consciousness (Klein, 1959a), which developed yet another perspective on the ways in which ego processing of perceptual and cognitive data can vary independently of drives and needs, and began to develop his theoretical critique of the psychoanalytic drive theory. His clinical experience broadened as he became affiliated with the Austen Riggs Center in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and his efforts to distinguish the psychological from the metapsychological within psychoanalytic theory increased.

During this time, Klein founded the *Psychological Issues* monograph series, which continues to be the major publication vehicle aimed at fulfilling the goals that Klein (1959b) enunciated in his first issue: "To develop its theoretical potentialities psychoanalysis must scrutinize data from all fields of psychological and psychiatric inquiry" (pp. iii-iv). Klein also continued his experimental investigations of such varied fields as dream content and the effects of drugs and cultural deprivation. He undertook a formal psychoanalytic education and was graduated from the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. There he was a leader in obtaining the right of nonmedical graduates to have full privileges to conduct a psychoanalytic practice. During this final period of his life, Klein's primary scholarly interests moved more fully in the direction of clinical psychoanalytic

theory, and he produced the papers (and papers in progress) that were published in the posthumous volume on *Psychoanalytic Theory* (1976).

In reviewing Klein's odyssey from research to psychoanalytic theorist, certain themes consistently appear. First is Klein's energy, innovative talent, and leadership ability. A second theme is the persisting influence of his academic psychological studies of perception. These became the vehicle through which he first expressed his interest in the ego's autonomous role in directing behavior, in contrast to theories stressing needs or drives as the main controlling forces. This view, heavily influenced by David Rapaport, ultimately evolved into Klein's criticism of the drive theory of psychoanalysis. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, along with this criticism Klein also produced a telling critique of the tenets of ego psychology, many of which had been formulated by his mentor, Rapaport. It may be said that as Klein absorbed the insights of ego psychology, he at first found them liberating, but later began to find them constricting and limiting as his appreciation of clinical data and theory grew. Even in his final works, however, Klein's emphasis as a psychoanalytic theorist was always on the broad group of phenomena that make up what had been called the ego—those autonomous processes, structures, and motives that he believed were important contributors to personality functioning independent of the driving power of sensual needs. In this respect, he was trying to broaden the scope of psychoanalytic inquiry beyond the limited data base provided by the patient on the couch.

A third major theme in Klein's work is his consistent emphasis on theoretical rigor and precision, which led him ultimately to see many flaws in the classical drive and structural theories of psychoanalytic metapsychology. As part of his lifelong effort to integrate various branches of psychology, Klein proposed substituting for parts of metapsychology several concepts from the work of Piaget and cognitive psychologists, which he felt would simplify psychoanalytic theory and make it closer and more responsive to the data of observation.

A further, minor trend was Klein's enduring interest in creativity and the artistic process. His wife, Bessie Boris Klein, is a painter and Klein, too, enjoyed painting at times. He periodically returned to a consideration of the interrelationship of needs and ego processes in the "reparative" work of the creative act.

COGNITIVE CONTROLS: PSYCHOANALYTIC EGO PSYCHOLOGY IN THE RESEARCH LABORATORY

When Klein went to the Menninger Foundation following World War II, a prominent trend in research on perception was the "New Look" (Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948), a group of studies demonstrating that motives or needs could influence and significantly alter the registration and judgment of perceptual data. Prior to that time, experimental psychologists had investigated the formal details of perceptual and thought processes, but had assumed that these functions operated stably, regardless of the individual's purposes and need states. In

contrast, this new group of investigators found that in some situations, drives would "sensitize" the individual to perceive stimuli related to the drive state; in others, suppressive effects were observed as a result of "perceptual defense." Data in these studies were notoriously inconsistent, and individual differences in these effects were conspicuous but had not been explained. In Klein's (1958) view, these findings were having an exaggerated impact:

> There was at the back of our minds a feeling that while motivation-in-perception studies were rectifying older sins of omission, they were also assuming that if only a drive is intense enough it can bend any or all cognitive structures to its aim. While no one committed himself blatantly to such a statement, the drift of empirical work seemed to be moving steadily toward it. Some way had to be found in theory of providing for effective processing without renouncing the possible pervasiveness of motivational influence upon thought [pp. 87-88].

Klein's response, through his research, was to demonstrate that while it is true that needs and motives influence perception, these influences vary from individual to individual, as a result of differences in the preexisting structural characteristics of style or pattern of thinking. He and his group identified a number of what they believed to be intra-individually consistent patterns of perceiving and thinking, which could be detected in the laboratory, and showed that these patterns shaped ways in which motives or needs influenced or distorted perception. These cognitive structures—first called cognitive attitudes and later cognitive controls—were thought of "as ways of contacting reality, whereby one's intentions are coordinated with the properties, relations, and

limitations of events and objects" (Klein 1958, p. 88). In an early influential study, Klein (1954) examined the effects of thirst on perception of objects that had to do with thirstiness and drinking, comparing the performance of thirsty and nonthirsty subjects on the same tests. He divided both groups according to their performance on a cognitive test intended to detect contrasting ways in which people typically deal with distracting, intrusive feelings, such as thirstiness. Klein found that the different cognitive attitudes identified by that test did cause characteristically different kinds of distortions in thirsty subjects.[1]

Although the "New Look" studies constituted one of the first areas in which psychoanalytic ideas (i.e., the importance of needs and motives) had an impact on research in perception, Klein showed that impact to be one-sided-considering only the influence of drives (like the early psychoanalytic id psychology) and not the role of the coordinating and controlling structures of the ego. His research, which was conceptualized according to the ego psychology of Heinz Hartmann, Erik Erikson, and particularly his teacher, David Rapaport, was intended to correct this imbalance.

With his collaborators, Klein investigated various aspects of the cognitive controls to flesh out the understanding of their roles in ego functioning. Underlying the specific perceptual attitudes that were initially identified, Klein (1958) believed, were ego structures of broad generality and significance for personality functioning, which seemed "to reflect highly generalized forms of

control as likely to appear in a person's perceptual behavior as in his manner of recall and recollection" (p. 89). Studies of these control principles explored their possible relationships to other ego processes, particularly the classical defense mechanisms, patterns of personality organization as identified in projective testing, modes of handling stress, and learning and intellectual ability (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959; Gardner, Jackson, & Messick, 1960; Holzman, 1962; Holzman & Klein, 1956; Klein and Schlesinger, 1951). Klein and his coworkers (Holzman & Klein, 1956) tended to assume that while each cognitive control might undergo an epigenetic development, these structures probably had their roots in constitutional givens—what Hartmann (1939) called apparatuses of primary ego autonomy. Thus, they speculated, cognitive control patterns might form an important part of the constitutional matrix that determines the individual's character structure, reliance on particular defense mechanisms, and choice of particular symptoms and psychopathological patterns (see, for example, Shapiro, 1965, pp. 13-14). Although Klein (1958) stated that "cognitive attitudes seemed to resemble what psychoanalysts have called character defenses" (p. 88), he believed they were not actually defenses, resulting from conflicts, but precursors or predisposing conditions, which contributed to the choice of defenses. In any individual, the patterning or arrangement of cognitive controls would constitute a superordinate structure, "cognitive style."

The following cognitive control principles were studied by Klein and his group:

1. *Leveling-sharpening*. Consistent individual differences were found between people (known as sharpeners) who tend to clearly distinguish newly perceived stimuli from their previous experiences, and "levelers" who tend to show a high degree of assimilation between new percepts and old ones, resulting in judgments of current stimuli as being similar to previously perceived ones. Some data suggested that levelers might have generally hysteroid personalities and favor the use of the defense mechanism of repression (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959; Holzman, 1962). Klein and his co-workers reasoned that a tendency to assimilate new events to existing schemata was similar to Freud's (1915) definition of secondary repression as "the attraction exercised by what was primally repressed upon everything [in consciousness] with which it can establish a connection" (p. 148).

2. *Scanning*. Individuals high on scanning were thought to "deploy attention to relatively many aspects of stimulus fields...[they are] constantly scanning the field" (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959, p. 47) and were also said to "narrow awareness and keep experiences discreet; and...to separate affect from idea" (p. 46). These characteristics were considered cognitive analogues to the defense mechanism of isolation, which was found to be correlated to scanning in some people, as rated in the Rorschach test (Gardner, Holzman,

Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959).

3. *Equivalence range*. Equivalence range denoted a dimension of individual differences in preference for using broad and inclusive versus narrow and precise categories in classifying objects and events. No connection was suggested between this control principle and defenses.

4. *Tolerance for unrealistic experiences*. People were found to differ in the flexibility and efficiency with which they accepted and dealt with ambiguous situations, with situations that "controvert conventional reality," and perhaps also with affects (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, and Spence, 1959).

5. *Constricted-flexible control*. Flexible controllers were considered to be individuals who function efficiently on tasks even when experiencing strong drives, feelings, or other distractions; constricted controllers' adaptive functioning was impaired by these things. Constricted controllers were thought to tightly suppress feelings and impulses, whereas flexible controllers were freer and less compulsive. Here too, a theoretical connection was made to the use of the defense of isolation of affect.

6. *Field articulation*. This is the field dependence-independence variable extensively studied by Witkin (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, and

Karp, 1962). It is a thoroughly explored dimension of individual differences in the tendency to focus on background versus "figure" cues in many situations. Field articulation is connected to numerous aspects of personality and cognitive functioning.

Klein conceptualized cognitive controls as quasi-motivational—he believed they direct behavior, but, unlike drives, they do not lead to discharge or consummation. Like defenses, they shape the expression of drives and control drives, but he saw them as more general than defenses—as basic, conflict-free, "positive" causes of behavior. In his research on cognitive controls, Klein attempted to broaden knowledge of primarily and secondarily autonomous ego functions. He also began to elaborate what was to become a continuing theme of his work-his view that psychoanalytic drive theory, with its basis in physiological need states, was an inaccurate and inelegant way to formulate human motivation. As he put it (Klein, 1958):

> It seems more parsimonious to follow Woodworth's (1918), Woodworth and Schlosberg's (1954), and Hebb's (1949) lead and think of drive as a construct which refers, on the one hand, to "relating" processes-the meanings-around which selective behavior and memories are organized; and in terms of which goal sets, anticipations, and expectations develop, and, on the other hand, to those processes which accommodate this relational activity to reality [p. 92],

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

A. STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Klein expanded his research into the mechanics of thought and perception as "tools" of adaptation after leaving the Menninger Foundation. Having first studied individual differences in apparently enduring, relatively autonomous cognitive structures, his attention now turned to another conflict-free area of the determination of perception and cognition: studies of the effect on thinking of variations in states of consciousness—subliminal stimulation, dream research, and the influence of drugs.

Very early in the development of psychoanalysis, Freud (1900) had pointed out that incidental experiences perceived on the periphery of awareness are processed differently by the organism than events of greater importance, which are dealt with in the focus of consciousness. Incidental experiences tend not be remembered consciously but to contribute heavily to the day residue of dreams. Unlike the contents of focal consciousness, they are more subject to the primary process than to secondary process modes of thinking. Studies of subliminal registration (by Poetzl, 1917 and Fisher, 1954 as well as by Klein, 1959a) produced findings that confirmed and elaborated Freud's early observations. Subliminal stimuli activated a range of conscious and unconscious meanings, which could be discerned in dreams, imaginative products, and various indirect aspects of verbal and nonverbal behavior but were not available to conscious recall. Thus, the state of consciousness of the individual—as affected by attention,

chemicals, and the sleep state—has significant effects on the extent to which primary process, assimilatory cognition—as opposed to secondary process, accommodative cognition—is active. This bridge between psychoanalysis and academic psychology was significant to the latter as well. Laws of perception that were developed in the laboratory were now seen as specific only to particular states of awareness. Since perception is a cognitive event, under conditions in which reality content is not prominent registrations are recruited to very different, more primitive conceptual schemata than those that are ordinarily dominant in focal attention (Klein, 1959a; 1966).

B. CRITIQUE OF METAPSYCHOLOGY

Having spent a lifetime doing both academic research and clinical psychoanalytic work, Klein found many flaws in the ways in which existing theories from both vantage points had attempted to account for the meanings of human behavior. He believed that academic psychology, in its efforts to encompass the findings of psychoanalysis, had actually found ways to omit and ignore the most salient features of Freud's insights. By directing attention to generalized conceptions of the determining influence of infantile experience on adult behavior, academicians had focused attention away from the specific issue of infantile sexuality. Phenomenological and humanistic psychological theories, which stress the present moment and conscious experience, have little place for the unconscious. This, of course, is also true of behaviorism. Social psychiatry

stresses environmental rather than intrapsychic causation. But Klein saw classical psychoanalysis as also burdened by a mechanistic theory—metapsychology—which is not only unnecessary but is actually harmful to the understanding of meanings and the practice of psychoanalysis. Other authors as well (see particularly Gill, 1976; Guntrip, 1969; Holt, 1976; Schafer, 1968; Waelder, 1962), some of them earlier than Klein, have pointed out that Freud produced both a clinical theory and a metatheory, at different levels of logical analysis, and that the existence of these two theories has created many serious problems. Although Klein was therefore not the first to espouse this point of view, his was a most compelling voice.

Klein's first step toward rectifying this situation was to search for the "essential theoretical understructure that constitutes 'clinical psychoanalysis' " (1976, p. 1). Clinical theory, he specified, attempts to organize and explain psychoanalytic data from the viewpoint of the patient's experiences and motivations, both conscious and unconscious. This approach contrasts to the body of theory that attempts, as Klein (1976) put it, "to place psychoanalysis in the realm of natural science by providing an impersonal, nonteleological view of the organism as a natural object subject ultimately to the laws of physics, chemistry, and physiology. Teleological considerations—the patient's standpoint—are irrelevant to this level of explanation" (p. 2).[2] For Klein (1976), purposive considerations were at the very heart of clinical theory, which does not "distinguish sharply between description and explanation; to describe a person's

intention or aim is to say that what a person is doing is also why he is doing it" (p. 2). In view of these convictions, Klein attempted to carefully disengage the clinical theory from the mechanistic metapsychological theory.

Like his predecessors, Klein attributed the existence of the two psychoanalytic theories to Freud's philosophy of science, which, in turn, was determined to a significant degree by the intellectual climate of the late nineteenth century. As Klein understood this philosophy, it rejected concepts of intention and meaning, considering them unacceptable terms of scientific explanation. Freud struggled to construct a neuroanatomical-physiological model, the *Project for Scientific Psychology* (1895). Although he was forced to abandon the Project, his search for neurophysiological levels of explanation continued to manifest itself, for example, in the optical apparatus model in Chapter 7 of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) and in the instinctual drive theory of motivation, with its concepts of energic excitations, cathexes, and reservoirs of energy.

Klein considered the concepts of drive and energy to be the central flaw of metapsychology, a flaw attributable to Freud's reliance upon the Brucke-Meynert value system. These concepts, he believed, are not only inherently implausible but also irrelevant to the clinical psychoanalytic enterprise. Freud's drive-reduction model, Klein (1976) stated, "is more appropriate to a rat than to a human being, and is as congenial to violently antipsychoanalytical theories as to Freud's metapsy-chological ones" (p. 47). Metapsychological concepts are not verifiable by

the clinical method and are based on the reification of such hypothetical constructs as drives and the psychic structures of id, ego, and superego. They do not deal with the basic intent of psychoanalysis—unlocking meanings—and cannot substitute for terms that are descriptive of human experience and object relations. Nonetheless, as a consequence of these dual theories, psychoanalysts have tended to assume that they actually work on the basis of clinical concepts, which they take for granted as observable or inferable phenomena, and to think of metapsychology as the underlying basic theory that explains those concepts. In contrast, Klein considered that the concepts of the clinical theory, if correctly understood, were at an appropriate level of abstraction to replace metapsychology. They are explanations in psychological terms, are personal and purposive, and are not translatable into physical or neuroanatomical models.

For Klein (1976), "the phenomenological concepts, the logic of the analyst's inferences, and the extraphenomenological concepts of function, purpose, and meaning of experience and behavior make up psychoanalytic theory" (p. 51). Within this realm he made a distinction between experiential and functional concepts. Experiential concepts are the mental contents that the analyst attributes to the patient, including both the patient's conscious experiences and unconscious fantasies. These are verifiable in the psychoanalytic situation. Functional concepts, such as projection, introjection, and repression, are inferred processes connecting the accessible and inaccessible levels of experience, and cannot be verified in the clinical setting. They "almost always have to do with purpose, function and

accomplishment" (Klein, 1976, p. 50). Using these conceptual tools, analysts are able to observe regularities in behavior that are not recognized by other students of the mind.

Psychoanalysis, for Klein, deals with the histories of meanings throughout a person's life. He understood personality as formed through syntheses that evolve out of conflicts-that is, points of crisis in the individual's life. Since there are commonalities in these crises, it is possible to specify critical developmental periods. These phenomena are not reducible to physiological and neurological processes and it would be fallacious to think that such processes are more real or valid as scientific data, than observations of people's intentions and meanings. As Klein (1976) said: "Statements of purpose or meaning and principles of physiological regulation are two mutually exclusive ways of being aware of our bodily activities" (p. 62).

1. *Sexuality and Sensuality*. Klein began his task of teasing apart the two psychoanalytic theories by examining Freud's two theories of sexuality. Freud was led by his clinical observations to expand the meaning of sexuality from its ordinary use, referring to adult procreative ability, to a wide variety of behaviors beginning in infancy and developing throughout life. The invariant factor in all sexuality (i.e., in all those experiences which Freud referred to as libidinal) Klein (1976) felt, is "a capacity for a *primary*, *distinctively poignant, enveloping experience of pleasure*" (p. 77). These experiences, which Klein felt are best termed

"sensual," do not depend simply on the removal of "unpleasure," but are positive excitatory processes. Sensual pleasure has a number of special characteristics that cause it to be a highly significant motivational force and that create a unique potential for conflict surrounding it. It can serve various functions that are not originally primarily sexual; it can be experienced in organs and activities that are usually nonsexual, and, conversely, sexual organs can lack erotic sensation at times.

Recognition of the distinction between sensuality and sexual behavior was a fundamental difference between Freud and other theorists. Sensuality has a characteristic development, which interlocks with all other developmental areas. This made it possible for Freud to understand how sexual development affected, and is affected by, a person's symbolized cognitive record of interpersonal encounters. In Klein's view, sexual needs do not exert a driving force upon behavior; instead, the experience of sensual pleasure acquires important developmental meanings, and these lead to a craving for repetition of the experience. It is in this way, rather than because of biological drive, that sexuality attains its great motivational force. Since these experiences occur originally in relationships with parents and other early objects, the sensual cravings take the form of specific object-related desires. They also are highly subject to the inevitable contradictions and conflicts arising between the plasticity of sensual arousal and the constraints of social guidance and expectations. It is this plasticity and these unavoidable contradictions that create a potential for intrapsychic

conflict surrounding sexuality.

Sexuality *feels* as though it is a drive—in Klein's (1976) words, "as if an alien pressure were developing from within" (p. 96)—but it is neither necessary nor logical to assume that this feeling of impulsion reflects the presence of an actual, concrete drive quantity or mechanism. In this respect, the concept of libidinal drives is a theoretical reification of an experience—a "hybrid concept" (Slap and Levine, 1978). The strength of a sexual motive is not based on some drive force, but on the functional significance of the sexual appetite in cognitive terms-the meaning of the activated schema of sensuality. In drive theory, said Klein (1976) the essence of sexuality "is not an experience, but a contentless physiological event" (p. 110), and the clinical and drive concepts of sexuality imply different biological formulations. In one it is a pleasurable experience that is sought repetitively in order to reexperience the pleasure, and in the other it is a need to relieve pressure and tension. In the clinical theory the focus is on sensuality as a higher mental function; in the metapsychological theory, sensuality is a peripheral function. As Klein (1976) phrased it: "The critical difference of emphasis between the two viewpoints…[is] that in the drive theory pleasure is derived not from the pursuit of drive, but from the getting rid of it" (p. 119). Klein believed that the theoretical preeminence of the drive model led to a failure to fully test the implications of the clinical theory and impeded efforts to enlarge clinical understanding.

2. *Ego Psychology*. Klein traced the problems of the two psychoanalytic theories in his analysis of the theory of the ego (1976), which he considered "a concept in search of an identity" (p. 121). Freud had formulated the ego unsystematically as the representative of reality, essentially a set of functions and processes standing for survival and self-preservation. As is still the case for many clinicians, Klein (1976) noted, Freud was "inclined to regard the ego mainly in the light of its participation in conflict and in its partnership with instinctual drives pressing for discharge. [He paid] scant attention to the adaptive functions of the ego as a system" (p. 130). This was satisfactory, in Klein's view, within the framework of the early psychoanalytic conception of drives as blind motivational forces controlled by some structure. With the expansion of motivational theory initiated by the conception of the active role of signal anxiety as a motivating, directive factor, however, Freud assigned an enlarged and elaborated role to the ego, but left crucial issues unsettled. These included the questions of what energy is employed by the ego in its activities; the energic basis of signal anxiety; and whether primary process functions such as condensation and displacement are within the scope of the ego. In addition, Klein believed that Freud had hinted at the possibility of autonomous structures and motivations in the ego, and thus, Klein was convinced that this required further development. Freud fell short in that he did not see the ego as "positive creator" of behavior, and did not confront "the crucial issue of the independence of the ego processes from libidinal control" (Klein, 1976, p. 131).

Following Freud, ego psychological theorists, especially Hartmann, Erikson, and Rapaport, proposed solutions for these problems. These solutions often involved a broadened focus of psychoanalytic interest from psychopathology to general psychological questions, and to "all psychological 'disequilibria,' whether specifically psychopathological or not" (Klein, 1976, pp. 145-146). They placed greater emphasis on the adaptive point of view and on independent, conflict-free motivations and structures within the ego. Klein characterized the changes in psychoanalysis as: (1) from a narrow concern with conflict to concern with dilemma and crisis; (2) from concern with defense to an interest in adaptational controls; (3) from concern with sexual and aggressive drives to general motives such as mastery and the synthetic principle; and (4) from giving priority to the unconscious to greater priority for conscious phenomena such as affects.

Klein saw these as salutary new emphases for psychoanalytic theory. However, he believed that they were not done justice by the metapsychology of Hartmann and Rapaport, which is essentially an expanded theory of ego controls, established to compensate for the deficiencies of the drive theory of motivation. Ego psychology tended to see the ego either as a reified entity or simply as an unsystematic grouping of functions. (Klein considered this a throwback to faculty psychology.) The ego's relationship to drives remained ambiguous. Drive was spoken of as both independent of the ego and involved with ego development. Drives develop and have structure, but it is not clear whether they are part of the ego. Finally and centrally, like all metapsychological explanations and like

academic psychology as well, these theories suffer from a focus on process rather than motivation. According to Klein (1976), "To the extent that we pursue the process explanation, we are distracted from the need to improve upon psychoanalytic propositions regarding the aims, motives and goals of behavior" (p. 158).

> Ego psychology is torn between two objectives of explanation: It offers a half-hearted and half-annotated commitment to explanation in terms of purpose on the one hand and to mechanism on the other. It faces the choice either of trying to sophisticate a conception of a regulatory mechanism, building into it ever more detailed assumptions of processes to implement its heretofore implied reifications, or of frankly restricting the scope and the terms of ego theory to the level of motivational explanation that brought psychoanalysis into being in the first place—an endeavor exclusively concerned with understanding behavior in relation to psychological dilemma, conflict, task, and life history, an enterprise that explores, in Waelder's (1936) terms, the "multiple functions" of action. This is the shoemaker's last of the psychoanalyst. Sticking to it and pointing his theorizing in this direction, the psychoanalyst would shed all pretense of offering a nonteleological, mechanistic picture of ego processes, such as is implied by such impersonal terms as homeostasis, equilibrium, cathexis, energy and its modifications, and the like [pp. 159-160].

REFORMULATION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

A. THE EMERGENCE OF STRUCTURE FROM EXPERIENCED INCOMPATIBILITY: THE SELF SCHEMA

Klein's critical analysis of metapsychology was virtually complete at the time of his death, but his attempts to reformulate psychoanalytic theory at a clinically

relevant level were in a preliminary stage. In this reformulation, he took as a central tenet of Freud's genetic and structural theories the idea that structural residues of past conflicts persist as organizing principles of behavior and thought. He noted (1976): "The concept that intrapsychic order and the motives governing action arise from *experienced* disorder is basic to psychoanalytic theory" (p. 165). Crisis and conflict, then, are not only pathogenic, but also play a constructive role in personality development; and Klein felt that psychoanalysis should be broadened to encompass "normal" as well as pathological development.

Klein proposed a number of modifications and elaborations of psychoanalytic theory. First, although he recognized that intrapsychic conflicts over unacceptable wishes (those that conflict with social constraints and expectations) have a uniquely important role, he believed that there are other "incompatible experiences" (for example, the contradiction between old behavioral modes or attitudes and new ones that occur at a point of conflict-free developmental change) that are of similar developmental significance and should be dealt with by theory. All such incompatibilities present "threats to the integration" of the self and are felt as painful experiences, such as "estrangement from self." Their resolution takes the form of a cognitive-emotional schema that frames later perceptions and actions.

A key aspect of Klein's thinking in this area is his introduction of the concept of the self, or self-schema, which is certainly among the more elusive and

controversial concepts of psychoanalytic theory.[3] Klein (1976) pointed out that, as had been recognized by psychoanalytic structural theory, "conflict occurs only in relation to an integrating organization that is capable of *self*-observation, *self*-criticism, and choice, and that can regulate emotional needs and their expression" (p. 171). However, since classical theory at times sees the ego as the locus and resolver of conflict and at other times as a *party* to conflict (e.g., between an "ego aim" and a drive), some organization *beyond* or supraordinate to the ego must be conceptualized to provide for integration of aims and adjudication of contradictions. Thus, in Klein's words, "the notion of *self*…now seems indispensable" (p. 172). Klein cited Hartmann's (1950) concept of the self as a further "grade" of personality organization and H. Lichtenstein's (1964) formulation that the self is the source of the experience of successful and failed integration.

Klein conceived of the self as active in regard to the problems it confronts—both in resolving the demands made on it and in initiating purposes of its own. He cited as an early exposition of this position Waelder's view that the ego is not simply a passive, mechanistic switchboard, but has "its own peculiar activity" (Klein, 1976, p. 47), that is, "an active trend toward the instinctual life, a disposition to dominate or, more correctly, to incorporate it into its organization" (Waelder, 1936, pp. 47-48). For Klein, the synthetic function has the purpose of helping the individual to maintain integrity among conscious aims, motives, and values; and the self is the source of this feeling of integrity. The sense of the self

has two aspects in dynamic equilibrium. One is individuality—"an autonomous unit, distinct from others as a locus of action and decision" (Klein 1976, p. 178); the other is '"we-ness"—"one's self construed as a necessary part of a unit transcending one's autonomous actions" (p. 178). An example of "we-ness" is oneself as part of a family, community, or profession. Klein follows closely upon Erikson's (1963) ideas here, particularly Erikson's concept of the sense of identity, which implies an overall continuity extending from the past into the future and from a particular place in the community's past into anticipated work accomplishment and role satisfaction. Thus, the parameters of the sense of self involve conscious feelings of continuity, coherence, and integrity of thought in respect to both autonomy and "we-identity."

Having laid this groundwork, Klein proposed a redefinition of the concept of intrapsychic conflict in the broader context of "synthesizing efforts" necessitated by crises that threaten the coherence, continuity, and integrity of the self. These crises are of several kinds: wishes that are incompatible with the self-concept (intrapsychic conflict proper); traumatic experiences in which the person is passively overwhelmed; experiences inducing feelings of finiteness or loss of important roles or objects; and developmental crises "when the adaptational modes of one stage no longer suit the requirements of a new stage" (Klein, 1976, p. 190). Concomitantly, Klein (1976) reconceptualized anxiety as a signal of threat to self-identity, a feeling of discontinuity in selfhood akin to helplessness or meaninglessness:

> From such experiences of cleavage, whether of the nature of conflict, trauma, or developmental crises, arise efforts at solution in the form of a realignment of aims and goals. The more relevant a motivation is in bringing about a solution to a crisis of selfhood, the more lasting, generalized, and thereafter relied upon it is in the economy of personality. Thus the resolution of experienced incompatibility is the major basis of motivational structure. Motivations, rather than being regarded as arising from a "parallelogram of impersonal forces" defined in terms of intensity, are regarded as arising as resolutions of issues of self-integration and self-perpetuation [p. 208].

These experiences of incompatibility, conflict, or cleavage in the self, and their resolutions, are organized as cognitive structures with motivational effects. These structures, which Klein called "schemata" (a term borrowed from cognitive psychology [Bartlett, 1932]), encompass the relevant wishes, object representations, affects, and defenses-all of which together form the representation of conflict. As Klein wrote:

> "The component tendencies of a conflict are embodied as an unconsciously sustained structure (unconscious fantasy) which may be repetitively enacted throughout life ... [p. 185].
>
> …The terms of incompatibility and the solutions adopted to reduce the incompatibility are internal structures which state themselves as themes, affective positions, and styles of action and thought. The structured residues of incompatibilities are dynamisms, which organize the aims of behavior. Structurally, they are meaning schemata ... [p. 193],
>
> …Such internalized representations of conflict and their defensive aspect are features of that created inner environment which serves as the person's notions of and dispositions toward the "real world," providing the means of encoding it and making it meaningful" [p. 199],

Klein saw the efforts to preserve self-identity as falling into two main categories. One is repression, which he defined as a dissociation of the threatening conflict from the mainstream of the self-identity structure. The other is active reversal of passive experience, that is, repetition of events experienced passively, yielding a sense of active mastery.

B. MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM BASED ON PLEASURE-SEEKING

In order to replace the quasi-physiological concept of drives that originate in the soma and "push" the psyche, and the tension-reduction model of the pleasure principle, Klein conceptualized motivations as active strivings for *experienced* pleasures. He considered pleasure as an experience within the province of the ego, just as anxiety is an experience and activity of the ego, and in his formulations he relied heavily on parallels with Freud's development of the concept of anxiety. In Freud's early model, anxiety was understood as a direct consequence of the disturbance in psychic economy caused by failure of adequate discharge of libidinal energy; later, as signal anxiety, it was conceived as an anticipatory reaction of the ego to danger. As a complementary concept to signal anxiety, Klein proposed the existence of actively created, anticipatory "signal pleasures;" and just as there are basic prototypical anxiety experiences (fear of separation, fear of castration, etc.), Klein postulated six prototypical pleasure experiences. He saw these "vital pleasures" as innately given and not reducible or analyzable to simpler components. Each pleasure was seen as having its greatest impact on

development at a particular phase of the life cycle; and Klein diagramed their probable epigenetic development and interrelationships in an Erikson-like table. The six "vital pleasures" were as follows:

1. *Pleasure in reduction of unpleasant tension*. Although Klein believed that Freud had overestimated the significance of tension reduction as a motivational aim, he did nonetheless agree that it was highly important. In addition to release of drive tension and reduction of anxiety, Klein also included here numerous other experiences of relief from unpleasant feelings, such as experiences of unfamiliarity or strangeness, lack of recognition of people or situations, and task incompleteness. In all these situations, tension reduction yields positively pleasurable feelings and not just an absence of unpleasure. Consequently the experience is actively and repeatedly sought.

2. *Sensual pleasure*. This is the broad group of pleasurable psycho-sexual experiences, ranging from genital sexuality to tickling and "contact comfort" that Freud recognized as interrelated and as having a characteristic development. Here, too, Klein stressed active pleasure seeking, and not merely the removal of unpleasure. Sensuality is characterized by plasticity—i.e., displaceability in terms of zone, mode, and object choice.

3. *Pleasure in functioning*. Klein (1976) asserted that there is inherent pleasure in the exercise of many conflict-free apparatuses and functions, which is

sought for its own sake. “The gratification of bodily needs does not account for activities that an infant engages in spontaneously:…there are times when he seems to grasp, suck, babble, squeeze, and pull for no reason other than the pleasure of their repetition” (p. 223). More broadly, this is a “pleasure [in]… efficient use of the central nervous system for the performance of well-integrated ego functions” (p. 224).

4. *Effectance pleasure*. Klein (1976) said: “The component that distinguishes effectance from pleasure in functioning is the pleasure in observing the successful correspondence of *intention* and effect” (p. 225). This is pleasure in accomplishment and mastery, not merely in the exercise of capacities.

5. *Pleasure in pleasing*. Klein was impressed by the infant’s early ability to know how to act pleasing to the mother, and he believed that doing so was inherently pleasurable for the infant. As he noted (1976): “Generating pleasure in another is... an occasion... for being affirmed in one’s being” (p. 228). This form of pleasure is the basis for the need for affiliation with other people, the need to belong, which Klein considered a universal purpose, actively pursued: “The fact that pleasure arises from such a source [pleasing others] tells us too that the affiliative requirement has roots just as deep as those pleasure potentials that are more directly localized and originate in the “body ego’ ” (p. 229).

6. *Pleasure in synthesis—aesthetic pleasure*. In infant observation, animal

research, and observations of adult life, Klein (1976) saw many examples of the pleasurable effect of the "delighted contemplation of *restored* or *discovered* order" (p. 229). He saw this as an important motive for play and creative artistic activity. Klein (1976) also viewed this pleasure as closely connected to the principle of active reversal of passive experience and the "necessity in man…of having to create a self-identity" (p. 230)—two of the main conceptual pillars of his formulations.

Although Klein (1976) saw these "vital pleasures" ordinarily as fundamental motivational givens, he also recognized that there could, at times, be other unconscious motives for pursuing these aims, noting that "inherently pleasurable activity can be extrinsicallly motivated as well" (p. 234). Thus, pleasures can serve defensive functions; and behavior can at times be motivated toward excessive pleasure seeking and at other times toward excessive avoidance of pleasure.

C. THE MAINTENANCE OF SELF-INTEGRITY

1. *Repression*. Klein delineated two broad categories of activity by which the coherence, identity, continuity, and integrity of the self can be maintained in the fact of threat due to conflict, developmental incompatibility, or trauma: *repression*, and *active reversal of passive experience*. As is the case with other psychoanalytic concepts that have evolved over many years, repression is ordinarily used with both clinical and metapsychological meanings and is consequently subject to some

confusion and lack of precision. Psychoanalysis did not begin with a drive theory. Rather, in his early formulations Freud attributed psychopathhology to the preemptive power of unconscious memories and ideas; that is, to mental contents dissociated from consciousness but nonetheless active. Because the power of the repressed ideas appeared to derive from their sexual content, Freud eventually altered his emphasis from the ideas themselves to the drives that he presumed to underlie them as the sources of intrapsychic conflict. It is consistent with the *clinical* theory of psychoanalysis, however, to understand intrapsychic conflict as occurring between opposing sets of ideas (with their associated affects, object representations, and aims), or between the self-schema (the nonconflictual "main mass of ideas," feelings, attitudes, and aims) and a meaning schema that is contrary to the self, and hence threatens its maintenance, integrity, and continuity. The understanding that conflict derives from a clash between the ego and a drive is consistent only with the mechanistic concept of metapsychology. Klein saw repression, then, as one mode of coping with conflicting meaning schemata. He evolved a unique understanding of this phenomenon based largely on his orientation, derived from academic psychology, of seeing the mind as an apparatus for learning and adaptation.

Klein (1976) pointed out that repression does not necessarily operate by prohibiting the individual from having any awareness of conflicts. Rather, it leaves a gap in comprehension of the warded-off material, without impeding its behavioral expression. In fact, its function is to permit the expression of the

conflicted wish, while at the same time protecting the integrity of the self-schema by denying it "the attributes of self-relatedness…[excluding it] from the self as *agent*, self as *object*, and self as *locus*" (p. 242).

In repression, the threatening meaning schema is dissociated from the self and continues to have a motivating influence on behavior and thought. It functions in the mode that Piaget designated as *assimilation*; that is, it provides a code for understanding, reacting to, and internalizing new experiences, while its own existence and effects are uncomprehended and unchangeable because no feedback is possible about them. Repression can impede adaptation, growth, learning, accurate perception, and cognition. Undoing of repression is not only recovering the memory of traumatic event or conflictual idea, but also understanding its meaning, bringing about "comprehension in terms of a previously uncomprehended relationship, the perception of a causal link to which the person had been impervious" (Klein, 1976, p. 248).

Klein considered it more accurate to think of repression in terms of its mode of operation—the splitting off of an organization of ideas that are threatening to the self and that then function in a purely assimilative fashion—rather than in terms of the unconscious, whether conceived of as a system or as a quality of experience.

2. *Reversal of Voice*. The second major strategy available for resolution of

threats to self-coherence, according to Klein, is the principle of reversal of voice, or active reversal of passive experience. This concept has a long history in psychoanalysis. Its clearest statement occurs in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (Freud, 1920) in Freud's description of a game played by his grandson. The same concept is at the heart of the defense mechanism of identification with the aggressor. In Klein's view, it is also the essence of Freud's description of signal anxiety—an instant, miniature act of reversal, an active repetition of a trauma. Although the concept of active reversal has long been available and allusions to it occur in various contexts, however, it is fair to say that it has not before been accorded a central and important role and has not been well integrated into the main body of psychoanalytic theory. Klein proposed that it is a principle of major importance, not a defense mechanism, coordinate with and "equally vital" to repression.

In its basic form, active reversal is observed most clearly in children who respond to traumata of various kinds by actively repeating the painful experience (usually in play or fantasy), or by doing to another person what was done to them, so that they make it seem to occur under their control. In this way, the painful experience is mastered and internalized, modifying and differentiating some aspect of the selfschema by accommodation, to restore its harmony and integration. *Accommodation* is Piaget's term for a process complementary to assimilation, in which new data is recognized as different from past experiences, and the schema is changed to encompass it. As Klein (1976) explained it: "The

heart of the principle [of reversal of voice] is that when a passively endured encounter or relationship is affectively coded, a search for information is stimulated, towards two ends: a) to make the experience understandable in relation to the self; b) to position the internalized relationship within the self-schema as usable information related to the self-as-agent" (p. 285). In contrast to repression, which is a regressive solution to incompatibility that restricts the personality, Klein (1976) saw active reversal as a progressive mode, a "positive" mechanism, leading to "growth through reconstruction, innovation and integration" (p. 196) and requiring advanced development. This concept, he wrote,

> captures the essential distinction between activity and passivity which Rapaport (1953) intuitively felt to be one of the fundamental foci of psychoanalytic theory generally and of a dynamic conception of ego organization in particular. I believe it is the essential dynamic aspect of what is usually encompassed by the term "will." The principle encompasses such diverse phenomena as play, novelty, curiosity, repetitive working through of traumatic experiences, interruption phenomena, and certain aspects of art-making. From a developmental standpoint it encompasses…competence motivation; perhaps most important of all, it provides a dynamic basis for identification. In psychoanalytic therapy the positive or adaptive aspects of transference, as Loewald (1960) has emphasized, are explainable in its terms [Klein, 1976, p. 261].

In passing, Klein (1976) suggested that the principle of active reversal might also account for aggression: "Activities of reversal of voice could be considered synonymous with the 'aggressive drive'—not in the sense of a specific aggressive

motive to destroy but as manifestations of an instinctual aggressive potential" (p. 264). This idea has much in common with the concept of nonhostile aggression as employed by Marcovitz (1973). He conceived of aggression as consisting of a spectrum of interpersonal behaviors ranging from simple activity at one extreme, through such phenomena as self-assertion, dominance, and self-defense, to hatred at the other pole. This broad, dynamic view of aggression is easily reconciled with the principle of active reversal of passive experience.

D. DEVELOPMENTAL AND STRUCTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF REPRESSION AND ACTIVE REVERSAL

Klein conceived of the two mechanisms for maintaining self-integrity as a duality with widespread consequences—sometimes interacting, sometimes contrasting—throughout psychological life. He specifically called attention to the following:

1. *The repetition compulsion*. The motive to repeat phenomena can reflect either the continuing activity of repressed meaning schemas or the active reversal and repetition of passively experienced events. In one case, the repetition is assimilative and in the other, accommodative.

2. *Internalization processes—fractionation and identification*. Repression "fractionates" the self by splitting off unacceptable mental contents. Often these contents consist of the schemata of interpersonal relationships, including an

image of the object, an image of the self in interaction with the object, and an affect image.[4] According to Klein (1976), these split-off interpersonal schemata, called introjects, preserve the threatening relationship within the personality, in dissociated form: "From the subjective phenomenological (not necessarily conscious) point of view the introject is experienced as an alien presence. ... It is felt as part of the body, or one's thought, but not as part of the self" (p. 295). The internalization process involving reversal of voice, on the other hand, is identification. Through accommodation, the selfschema is modified, differentiated, and enlarged to bring into it "the values, manners, and interpersonal modes of others" (p. 292). Experientially, when a successful identification occurs, there is no felt separation between the newly internalized mental contents and the self as a whole. In fact, ego identity is largely composed of identifications formed by means of active reversal of voice. Similarly, the superego is the result of active incorporation of prohibitions that were originally passively experienced. Introjection is a defense mechanism and identification a nondefensive structuring process.

3. *Pathology*. At times, repression and active reversal operate simultaneously in regard to the same objects, with pathological consequences. For example, a man may identify with certain aspects of his father and repressively introject other, opposite aspects. The result may be ambivalence and symptomatology.

4. *Creativity and art*. Klein (1976) considered the art-making impulse as an

effort to remedy a sense of "fracturing of selfhood and anxieties that herald…such a threat" (p. 206), primarily through the operation of active reversal of voice. Here, in response to some painful failure or rejection, the artist uses his talent to convert previously repressed, fractionated fantasies into creative products. In this process, the artist is actively mastering (through repetition) both the early conflicts that had been dissociated and the current traumata.

E. PSYCHOTHERAPY

Klein considered classical psychoanalysis both inefficient and perhaps less effective than other, modified forms of treatment. He believed its main value was as a method of training and research; however, he felt its true potential as a naturalistic setting for data gathering was not being achieved, in part because of a lack of systematic research approaches to analysis and in part because of the stultifying effect of metapsychology on creative clinical thinking.

The theoretical formulations he proposed were partly intended as a remedy for this problem. However, Klein said relatively little about the direct clinical application of his ideas—perhaps because of their incompletely developed state.

Characteristically, Klein's few direct comments about treatment concerned active, growth-inducing aspects of psychotherapy, which he felt had received too little consideration in the past. He suggested that the principle of reversal of voice contributes a new dimension to understanding transference repetition. In

addition to transference being a regressive expression of split-off conflicts, Klein postulated that through active reversal in transference (or perhaps the "treatment alliance"), direct, positive personality change is brought about. In effect, this appears to refer primarily to growth through identification with adaptive functions of the therapist and the treatment process itself.

DISCUSSION: KLEIN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

George Klein turned his creative, inquiring intelligence to a remarkable scope of problems and tasks. He was at the forefront of his field almost from the first. He was an innovator of research methodology and had an ability to challenge theory and to see problems in new ways, both in the laboratory and in his theoretical formulations. It is probably correct to view him, as Goldberger (1982) has said, as primarily a psychologist and only secondarily a psychoanalyst. His work was always at the interface of the two fields, beginning with explorations in the use of experimental methods to enhance psychoanalysts' knowledge of ego functioning, and culminating in the seeming paradox of his proposals to use concepts from general psychology to create a clinically relevant theory for psychoanalysis, free of what he saw as the counterproductive burden of metapsychology. As Goldberger (1982) points out, Klein was unusually talented at synthesizing concepts from many fields—for example, making Piaget meaningful to psychoanalysts. He notes: "The gift that George Klein evidenced was being able to cross conceptual and theoretical boundaries, a brand of creativity that bespeaks

a mature thinker."

The manifest form of Klein's work changed radically over time, not only in his shift of emphasis from laboratory research to theoretical formulation, but also in his sudden change from leadership in the expansion of Rapaport's ego psychology to a diametrically opposite, clinical and phenomenological point of view. Throughout his career, however, certain basic themes can be clearly discerned. From the beginning, in perceptual research and then in psychoanalysis, he was dissatisfied with explanations based, as he saw it, too heavily on drive causality and too little on structure. He was persistently and articulately critical of the drive concept itself, considering it both inaccurate and logically unsound, and he ultimately developed these ideas into his sweeping indictment of metapsychology. Finally, he always advocated an enhanced role in psychoanalysis for "positive" growth potentials, conflict-free motives, and autonomous structural characteristics. In all these areas he was constantly interested in broadening the scope of psychoanalysis to encompass normal, conscious, and nonconflictual phenomena as well as pathology, while at the same time he strove to maintain its fidelity to clinical experience.

Klein's impact as a leader, teacher, and pioneer in the study of unexplored territory was unquestionably significant. Similarly, although Klein was not alone as a critic of metapsychology, his careful dissection of the inconsistencies and logical defects of the two psychoanalytic theories had considerable value, not only

for theory building, but also in helping the psychoanalytic clinician cope with the complex, layered conceptual heritage handed down by Freud and his followers. Previously, analysts who were resistant to metapsychology were vulnerable to the charge of being "atheoretical." Klein, however, contended that the focus of attention should be on meaning, not mechanism; and that clinical concepts, correctly framed, are sufficient to stand as the basic theory. They have the advantage of being closer to the clinical material, more responsive to pressures of the data.

These assertions had a stirring effect on those analysts who were defensive about their aversion to metapsychology, and led one (Slap, 1980) to write:

> Klein liberates such analysts. He confers upon us theories much as the Wizard of Oz dispensed courage, heart and intelligence to creatures who already had them. More than that, Klein congratulates us for our scientific integrity, our willingness (we knew not what else to do) to stick with the observational data rather than to fudge. Suddenly we are the purists and the emperor has no clothes [p. 170].

In the words of another commentator (Gedo, 1977), Klein's book on *Psychoanalytic Theory* (1976) "lives up to its promise to explore the essentials of psychoanalytic theory with so much authority that no future work in the field will qualify to be taken seriously which does not come to grips with Klein's arguments" (p. 320).

On the other hand, the usefulness and validity of many of Klein's new

formulations, created to replace metapsychology, have been the subject of much disagreement. One reviewer (Loeb, 1977) concludes that Klein "clearly separates data-related, clinical psychoanalytic theory from data-unrelated metapsychological psychoanalytic theory"; he feels that Klein's new model was derived from clinical theory and "should be highly useful and relevant to both therapists and researchers" (p. 215). In contrast, another critic (Chessick, 1980) expressed concern about the "radical nature" of Klein's proposed theoretical revisions; and Frank (1979) saw Klein's entire enterprise as flawed: "It is difficult to see where Klein's basic principles would be useful in application to either the clinical or theoretical psychoanalytic situation" (p. 193).

In his suggested revisions of clinical theory, Klein often struggled with major problems and dilemmas of psychoanalysis, areas with which many were dissatisfied. Although many of his solutions did not succeed in forming a model that is free of internal contradictions and logical flaws as well as consistent with clinical data, in our view his deliberations do have heuristic value. Included here are such matters as whether psychoanalysis requires (or whether it can encompass) conceptions of "active, positive" forces for growth and mastery; the related issue of the autonomy and conflict-free status of various motives and structures; the nature and role of the "self"; repetitive "mastery"; activity-passivity; and the role of conscious experience in psychoanalysis.

We see much merit in Klein's delineation of a cognitive model of repression

and in his invocation of the Piagetian constructs of assimilation and accommodation to describe the different modes of processing data used by dissociated (repressed) mental contents and those that are not split off. Indeed, one of us has co-authored a paper that sought to bring this model to the attention of a wider audience (Slap & Saykin, 1983). We see this model as embodying the advantages of Freud's early concept of repression as dissociation of a set of mental contents from "the main mass of ideas," which then remain active as an unconscious fantasy shaping behavior (by assimilation). This model of repression is close to clinical experience, accounts in a superior fashion for the impact of current life experiences on the mind, and absorbs and explains in an internally consistent way numerous phenomena, including transference, repetition, and symptom formation (all of which reflect assimilation). As Klein himself said: "Psychoanalytic understanding lies precisely in the recognition of themes "which we have never lived down nor successfully outlived' " (p. 185). We find this model of repression helpful in this clinical task.

However, Klein's complementary principle of "reversal of voice"— although based on often-noted clinical observations of undeniably real phenomena—stands on much shakier ground, as is the case for many of the factors that he construes as "positive," "growth-inducing," and the like. We do not consider it justifiable either on theoretical or clinical grounds to dichotomize behavior and experience as Klein does so often into regressive-progressive, positive-negative, defensive-nonconflictual, and sensual-autonomous. It is as much a misunderstanding of

repression to view it as totally maladaptive, regressive, and so forth as it is to view active, identificatory turning passive-to-active as entirely nondefensive. After all, the ego expansion of latency is founded on repression of infantile sexuality; and in identification with the aggressor and many other instances, reversal of voice is used as a *defense* to create for oneself the illusion of being aggressive and to deny passivity. Of course, in each of these instances, the other side of the coin is also present—identification with the aggressor can be adaptively useful.

Klein's concept of the self-schema is more difficult to evaluate, because his use of it varied. At times his "self" is a clinical concept—an active self-identity and a *sense* of self—which contrasts with the abstract concept of the ego as a structure. It seems consistent with clinical experience to conceptualize intrapsychic conflict as an internal struggle between repressed fantasy and the main, integrated system of selfrepresentations, ideals, values, and wishes.

At other times, however Klein's self-schema is a superordinate structure, with its own inherent need for self-consistency that has the status of an autonomous motive. Further, the conception of conflict is broadened and redefined in cognitive terms as a problem of resolution of "incompatible tendencies"; and conscious experiences such as anxiety or feelings of estrangement are considered to be direct reflections of intrapsychic realities—that is, of deficiencies in self-integrity. In these formulations, Klein replaced the old metapsychology with a new and, if anything, more abstract one. It is subject to

the same criticism of inappropriateness in level of discourse and unresponsiveness to clinical data that Klein leveled at the old metapsychology. In addition, it shares many of the difficulties we have elsewhere found in Kohut's self psychology (Levine, 1978,1979; Slap & Levine, 1978), such as the reliance on hybrid concepts in which levels of data and theory are inappropriately mixed. Among these is the concept that internal structural psychic conditions are directly reflected in conscious experience.

Klein's postulated series of vital pleasures, too, has both features that we find valuable and problematic ones. The concept that pleasure is to be seen as within the scope of the ego and as a positive experience of gratification and consummation rather than merely a tension release contributes to the internal consistency of psychoanalytic theory. Klein did not claim priority for this idea, which, he pointed out, is similar to suggestions made by Ludwig Eidelberg, Mark Kanzer, and Thomas Szasz. We have serious disagreements, however, with his list of vital pleasures because—as he himself pointed out—just these conscious experiences and motives regularly occur as disguised, derivative representations of unconscious conflict. In addition, his treatment of sensual pleasure leaves one with the impression that such matters as gender identity, sexual appetite, and the procreation of the species are essentially accidental. In his discussion of these motivational constructs, we believe Klein fell prey to a number of fundamental fallacies that appear repeatedly in his work: the need to dichotomize conflictual and nonconflictual forces; the enumeration of presumably autonomous motives,

without supporting data, resulting in a fragmented conception of human beings as extensively "preprogrammed" (analogous to the instinctual patternings in lower animals), which is inconsistent with the flexible nature of human adaptation; and the predilection to accept conscious mental contents as basic, unanalyzable data. These problems, of course, might have been eliminated if Klein had been able to subject his work to further revision.

Klein focused part of his critique of metapsychology on its presumably inappropriate avoidance of "teleological" explanation. As defined by *Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary* (25th edition, 1950), teleology is "the doctrine which asserts that all things which exist were produced for the end which they fulfill." Many of Klein's own explanatory rubrics, in fact, fit this definition of teleology, with its attendant implication of arbitrariness and untestability by any independent data source. Freud's clinical theory was *not* teleological in the same way. It is true that it did not have recourse to extrapsychological realms of data, such as neurophysiology; however, it does involve a systematic method of forming and testing hypotheses about a *psychological* realm (the unconscious) that is not directly observable but that can be inferred from future behavioral observations. When Klein's conceptions of self and dissociated schema are used in a clinical sense—as referring to *conflict* related psychic organizations with conscious and unconscious features—they are useful aids in organizing data and inferences. If they are conceived of in reified, structurelike terms, they have the same stultifying, counterproductive effect Klein saw in classical metapsychology.

In summary, we see Klein's theoretical work as a valuable but not fully successful contribution to the effort that has been undertaken by many theorists to remedy the often-noted difficulties of metapsychology-We find Klein's analysis of these difficulties particularly cogent and valuable. His proposed solutions contain many heuristically valuable elements, but also very significant weaknesses.

Klein's earlier work on cognitive controls, through which he attempted to enrich psychoanalytic ego psychology by research methods, similarly does not appear, at this point, to have fully achieved its objectives. Although there was a great deal of interest in the study of cognitive controls and styles for some time, it has not yet fulfilled its promise as a bridge between academic psychology and psychoanalysis, or as providing a means of determining "constitutional givens" that contribute to the formation of defenses and other personality structures. Further research did not always demonstrate the postulated unitary character of the cognitive controls or the anticipated direct connections between these structures and defenses. However, research has suggested that similar cognitive control behaviors may reflect *different* personality determinants in different individuals; that controls may differ in degree of relative autonomy; and that many other factors such as sex differences, developmental variations and fine distinctions in measurement of these cognitive processes remain to be understood (see, for example, Levine, 1966,1968; E. Lichtenstein, 1961; Spivack, Levine, and Sprigle, 1959).

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Notes

1) These studies were, of course, not close experimental analogues of psychoanalytic propositions. There is no reason to expect thirst to have similar motivational properties to those of the "drives" with which psychoanalysis concerns itself because, unlike libido and aggression, thirst is not ordinarily a focus of conflict and defense.

2) Klein used the word "teleology" at times as though it were synonymous with "purposiveness" or "intention." Although this usage is incorrect and, as will be seen, some of Klein's motivational constructs may be open to criticism as truly teleological, it will be retained here in an effort to accurately represent Klein's statement of his own ideas.

3) Klein's work preceded the publication of Heinz Kohut's self psychology and apparently was developed completely independent of it. Eagle (1982) believes that Klein's thinking on this score did not share the problems and weaknesses of Kohut's. Perhaps because of the preliminary nature of Klein's formulations, however, the two conceptions of self do, at times, appear similar, and they may therefore be susceptible to many of the same criticisms.

4) This is similar to Kernberg's (1980) concept of self-object-affect "units" in the ego.

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