BENJAMIN B. RUBINSTEIN:

Contributions to the Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory

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BEYOND FREUD

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Most of the analysts and theorists included in this volume have attempted to add to psychoanalytic theory by developing their own clinical and theoretical formulations. This sort of endeavor is visible and often even produces adherents and disciples. A few theorists contribute by attempting to clarify the basic structure of psychoanalytic theory. Because they work quietly and do not often generate the kind of stir that creates followers, it is all too easy to overlook their contributions. A strength of this volume is that it recognizes the important contributions of one such theorist, Benjamin B. Rubinstein.

In his writings, Rubinstein is essentially a philosopher of psychoanalysis. But this simple statement does not really capture the nature and quality of his work. Rubinstein is an analyst with many years of clinical experience, and his work on the conceptual status of psychoanalysis is written, so to speak, from the inside. The basic questions he poses are questions that arise in the course of clinical work (and that most of us slough over and ignore). But what he brings to this probing is a remarkable and sophisticated philosophical knowledge and style of thinking. After coming to the United States from Finland, through the efforts of David Rapaport, Rubinstein, as Holt (1967) notes, “made himself into one of the few

persons who know as well as Rapaport did the divergent literatures of psychoanalysis and the philosophy of science" (p. 18). He also brings to his task an intellectual honesty and conceptual clarity that is unsurpassed by any work in this area. In this paper I will discuss both Rubinstein's specific ideas and some general issues which these ideas generate, beginning with a brief attempt to place Rubinstein's work in a wider historical and intellectual context.

Broadly speaking, modem efforts to explain human behavior and distinctively human features (such as consciousness and mentation) have taken one of two philosophical directions. One approach is to view human beings as nothing but mechanism, as essentially sophisticated machines. A clear and classical expression of this position is La Mettrie's (1912) *Man a Machine*. A more sophisticated and biological version of this view is Huxley's epiphenomenalistic view of consciousness, as expressed in the title of his 1874 paper, "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata." According to this conception, states of consciousness and presumably other psychological phenomena are no more than effects of bodily processes. As Huxley stated it: "The mind stands related to the body as the bell of the clock to the works..." (see Edwards, p. 103). What follows from La Mettrie's and Huxley's general philosophical position is that explanations of human behavior are, in principle, not essentially different from explanations of physical and chemical phenomena.

An alternative approach is that accounts of human behavior require special

explanatory methods and principles. The neo-Kantian distinction between *Geissteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften* and the emphasis associated with Dilthey (1961) on *Verstehen* as the appropriate method for the study of human phenomena are the prime historical examples of this approach. Recent emphasis on empathy as the distinctive data-gathering method for psychoanalysis (e.g., Kohut, 1959,1977) and on the so-called clinical theory of psychoanalysis (e.g., Klein, 1976) as well as recent attempts to conceptualize psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic discipline (e.g., Habermas, 1971, 1979; Ricoeur, 1970, 1977; Schafer, 1976; see also Grünbaum, 1983, for a superb critique of this point of view) can be seen as contemporary expressions of Dilthey's neo-Kantian program.[1]

In contrast to the above views in which human beings are seen as *either* nothing but mechanism *or* immune from laws of nature is recognition that we are from one perspective persons and from another, organisms. This ontological insight permits Rubinstein to reject a dichotomous either-or approach to explanations of human behavior. Instead, it leads him to accept the complementarity of explanation by way of meanings and causes (which parallels the basic complementarity of person and organism) and to recognize the complex inter dependence between the so-called clinical theory and metapsychology of psychoanalysis. In recognizing this duality, Rubinstein has preserved one of Freud's core insights and one of the primary sources of creative tensions within psychoanalysis (see Holt, 1972, for a discussion of Freud's two images of humankind).

Rubinstein's writings and contributions cover a wide range. They include a conceptual analysis of psychoanalytic ideas such as unconscious mental events and defense; an elucidation of the nature of clinical inferences in psychoanalysis; the development of a model of mental functioning that is compatible with both psychoanalytic accounts and neurophysiology; lucid discussions of the mind-body problem and how it relates to psychoanalytic theory; and a beautiful explication of the nature of metaphor and related phenomena and their relationship to certain psychoanalytic issues. (Rubinstein's 1972 paper on metaphor in particular is a wonderful combination of clarity of analysis and exquisite sensitivity to poetic and literary nuances.) In all these areas, Rubinstein substitutes for casual use of psychoanalytic concepts careful and detailed examination. For example, the notion of unconscious mental events is utilized in a casual fashion in the psychoanalytic literature without any apparent recognition of its ambiguity or the conceptual difficulties it entails. Similarly, psychoanlytic interpretations and inferences are typically made in the course of clinical work and in case history descriptions without any systematic attention to the nature of the evidence on which they rest or to their epistemic and explanatory status. Rubinstein's rare armamentarium of extensive psychoanalytic clinical experience, a thorough and deep knowledge of the psychoanalytic literature, and a high degree of philosophical sophistication permits him to subject such psychoanalytic concepts and methodology to careful conceptual analysis.

Since Rubinstein's work is so rich and complex, I can deal only with limited

aspects of his work here. I will begin with a brief discussion of his demonstration of the dependence of the clinical theory for its validation on some form of metapsychology, or extraclinical theory (a term Rubinstein prefers because it avoids confusion with Freud's metapsychology). Rubinstein (1967) has shown that what he refers to as "general clinical hypotheses"—the hypotheses of "partial functional equivalence" or of "the persistent manifestation potential of unconscious motives" (Rubinstein, 1975, p. 13), for example—function as axiomatic assumptions in the formulation of specific interpretations and clinical hypotheses in a particular case. Thus, although we may infer unconscious motives in particular cases, we can "confirm their presence only if we presuppose the actual occurrence of processes by which the unconscious motives in question, if in fact present, have been rendered unconscious and being unconscious, are expressed in various, mostly indirect ways"(Rubinstein, 1980b, p. 13). But, Rubinstein also (1980a) notes, "the occurrence of these processes cannot be confirmed clinically" (p. 435). It is the *assumption* of their occurrence that permits the particular clinical inference. To confirm the existence of these processes requires the analyst to step out of the clinical context and look to nonclinical, including neurophysiological, evidence.

Consider another example of the dependence of clinical formulations on some form of metapsychology. We are justified, Rubinstein observes, in considering parapraxes and symptoms as motivated and in considering certain behaviors as substitute fulfillments because of the assumptions of persistent

manifestation potential and of partial functional equivalence (including symbolic equivalence) among different behaviors. Now, there is simply no way one could ever confirm the hypothesis of persistent manifestation potential of unconscious motives solely on the basis of clinical data. Such a general assumption clearly requires nonclinical evidence for its confirmation.

This demonstration of the dependence of the clinical inferences and formulations on extraclinical theory indicates quite clearly the limitations, even the futility, of recent related attempts to define psychoanalysis solely in terms of its so-called clinical theory (e.g., Home, Klein, 1976; 1966; Shafer, 1976) and to conceptualize it as a hermeneutic discipline concerned only with interpretation and meaning.

Defining psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic discipline seems to represent, in part, an attempt to avoid the challenge of how to test and confirm the clinical inferences and interpretations the analyst regularly employs in clinical work. If psychoanalysis is only a hermeneutic activity, one need merely view clinical interpretations as "narratives" and "stories." What Rubinstein has shown, however, is that these interpretations are not "merely" stories, but are based on extraclinical axiomatic assumptions. If follows that the validity of these inferences and interpretations ultimately can be tested only if one steps outside the clinical context. The only self-sufficient clinical theory that can be developed is one which accepts that its clinical inferences and interpretations will remain untested and

unconfirmed. The conceptualization of psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic discipline, limited only to "narratives," "stories," and other constructions seems to reflect an acceptance of this fate, insofar as it fails to come to grips with and brushes aside the question of the validity of clinical inferences.

One can attempt to dispense altogether with issues of validity and verdicality by limiting one's concerns to therapeutic effectiveness, taking the position that all that one claims for one's interpretations is that they provide the patient with a new, more helpful, and more constructive perspective on life. This position, stated explicitly or implicitly, is increasingly frequent these days. In its extreme relativism and utter dismissal of issues of validity and truth value, this position seems to run counter to the central values and outlook that inform Rubinstein's work. It also runs counter to the central psychoanalytic tenet that in the final analysis (no double entendre intended), the truth is liberating. Freud (1917) explicitly stated his belief that only interpretations that "tally with what is real" will be therapeutic. Although this may or may not be true, the question is central in the psychoanalytic outlook. When psychoanalysis is defined as a hermeneutic discipline, the question is, so to speak, legislated out of existence. As I have argued elsewhere (Eagle, 1980), most, if not all, patients who come for psychoanalytic treatment implicitly and explicitly expect, that they will learn the truth about themselves, not that they will be provided with "narratives" and "stories," however helpful they may be. And I strongly suspect that most psychoanalytically oriented therapists, whatever their philosophical position,

believe that while they are doing clinical work they are helping their patients learn important truths about themselves rather than simply presenting helpful "stories." Indeed, I doubt that therapists who believe in presenting "stories" can be maximally effective.

Whatever patients and therapists believe, however, the claim that psychoanalytically inspired "stories" or "narratives" are therapeutic is (1) simply an assumption, and (2) itself a truth claim—it asserts that the proposition, "Stories or narratives constructed in the course of psychoanalytic therapy are therapeutic in such and such ways," is true. Attempts to validate or confirm this truth claim take one outside the boundaries of hermeneutics, just as, Rubinstein has shown, attempts to validate or confirm clinical inferences and interpretations take one outside the clinical theory as commonly understood. Furthermore, talk about new perspectives and liberating "narratives" takes place without any reference to systematic and controlled outcome studies that would give substance to at least the therapeutic claims made for these interpretive narratives.

Common to recent attempts to define psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic discipline, to the claimed independence of the clinical from the extraclinical theory, and to the failure to seriously consider, let alone implement, more systematic efforts to gauge outcome of treatment, is an implicit insistence on the self-sufficiency and autonomy of the clinical enterprise—as if this enterprise could somehow escape or is immune to issues of accountability on both the

epistemological level of validation of clinical hypotheses and the pragmatic level of effects of treatment. These are disturbing developments, isolating and solipsistic in their effects. It is as if the response to the difficult and seemingly insoluble problems of validation of interpretations and clear determination of outcome is to declare them irrelevant and to aggressively hail the independent legitimacy of the clinical enterprise itself. This defiant proclamation of self-sufficiency seems to mask an underlying despair of being able to deal effectively with the complex problems generated by the clinical enterprise. In contrast to this position, Rubinstein has through the years doggedly attempted to unravel and reveal to us the inherent logic of clinical inferences and clinical hypotheses and the evidence and assumptions on which they rest (see, for example, Rubinstein, 1975).

Ironically enough, Rubinstein's (1975) description and defense of the clinical theory in psychoanalysis is more systematic and complete than that of those who argue for the self-sufficiency of the clinical theory. He demonstrates that it is at least possible to lend additional credence to both the general and the specific clinical hypotheses of psychoanalytic theory. In addition, his discussion of Popper's falsifiability in the context of confirmation of clinical hypotheses is a gem of lucidity and simple ingenuity, worth describing briefly. Popper (1962) argues against the scientific respectability of psychoanalytic theory by maintaining that it is "simply non-testable, irrefutable" (p. 37). According to Popper, only refutability rather than confirmation are tests of scientificity because "it is easy to obtain

confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look for confirmations" (p. 36). Rubinstein shows that this argument can be turned into a defense of confirmation in the following simple and elegant way: The hypothesis (c) "He has an unconscious wish for A," although not falsified by the hypothesis (d) "He has an unconscious wish for non-A," is falsified by the hypothesis (e) "He does not have an unconscious wish for A." It seems clear that to falsify hypothesis (c) one would have to confirm hypothesis (e). But, Rubinstein (1975) notes: "Hypothesis (e) can only be confirmed by an absence of data confirming hypothesis (c). Accordingly, data confirming hypothesis (c) must be taken as valid in favor of this hypothesis. Popper's falsifiability criterion is fulfilled since, as is evident from the compatibility of hypotheses (c) and (d), the only condition for falsifying hypothesis (c) is the absence of data confirming it" (p. 46).[2]

It seems to me that an all too frequent recent response to criticisms of the scientific status of psychoanalytic theory is to declare that psychoanalysis is to be judged by criteria other than the rules of evidence and inference characterizing the sciences. Bowlby (1981) sees this response as a reaction of despair at dealing even adequately with these criticisms. Rubinstein's response, as the examples given here demonstrate, is to deal carefully and systematically with such criticisms and to try to make explicit the kinds of evidence and inference that are critical in the testing of clinical hypotheses.

I will now turn to a concern that, in greater or lesser degree, permeates a

good deal of Rubinstein's work—the mind-body problem. This problem seems never far from the center of Rubinstein's thoughts on psychoanalysis. Consider the themes and issues that have been detailed: persons and organisms, meanings and causes; clinical and extraclinical theory. All these relate in relatively clear fashion to the mind-body problem. I noted earlier Rubinstein's pervasive recognition of the duality of human existence. This should not be misread to mean that Rubinstein takes a dualistic position on the mind-body problem. On the contrary, he forcefully (and in my view, correctly) rejects any philosophical position or option which ignores the central fact that we are *embodied* beings, and whatever it means to be a person cannot be entirely separated from that embodied status. Rubinstein rejects not only a metaphysical dualism, which treats mental events as if their ultimate nature were made up of mental "stuff," separate and apart from physical matter, but also what can be called a methodological dualism, which claims autonomy for psychological explanation, whatever its relation (including one of contradiction) to explanation at the level of neurophysiological functioning. In either case, Rubinstein rejects the self-sufficiency of mind.[3] In his view, a psychological explanation or account, however clever and ingenious it may be, however intuitively or empathically correct it may seem, cannot be valid if it contradicts what is known about the principles of neurophysiological functioning. This will seem self-evident to many, but it is obviously not self-evident to those who take the position that the formulations and hypotheses of psychoanalytic theory are and should be entirely derived from the psychoanalytic situation,

whatever the logical relationship of these formulations to other bodies of knowledge.

In rejecting a psychology that implicitly advocates the self-sufficiency of mind and ignores our embodiment, Rubinstein is being faithful to a core and critically valuable aspect of psychoanalytic theory. It is Freud's recognition of the central fact of our embodiment, as expressed in his instinct theory, that forms the foundation for psychoanalytic theory. Although many of the specifics of Freudian instinct theory may be deficient or mistaken, what remains valid is Freud's insistence that our basic motives and desires as well as our modes of behavior derive from biological imperatives and are intimately linked to our neurophysiological structure. In rejecting dualism and in keeping in the forefront the fact of our embodiment, Rubinstein is reminding us of that general insight.

It may seem strange to link Rubinstein to instinct theory. But what I am pointing to is Rubinstein's emphasis on our neurophysiological structure as the source of both our motives and the manner in which we go about dealing with these motives. In this sense Rubinstein preserves the insights that remain valid in Freudian instinct theory; and the rejection of these central insights characterizes attempts to separate psychoanalysis—either methodologically or substantively—from the facts of embodiment.[4]

Rubinstein's philosophical position on the mind-body problem is expressed

in his discussion of the nature of unconscious mental events. What can it possibly mean, he asks, to speak of unconscious wishing, wanting, thinking, etc.? According to Rubinstein, unconscious mental events are theoretical terms that can be described in (1) the language of psychological observables; (2) the language of neurophysiology or "protoneurophysiology" (as in a *disposition* for conscious wishing);[5] and (3) "as-if " mental or phenomenal terms. With regard to the third description, by prefixing the term "unconscious" to ordinary mental terms such as "wishing," "desiring," and "thinking," we intend to convey the idea that the person is behaving and acting *as if* he or she were wishing, desiring, and thinking such and such, when in fact, in the ordinary sense of these terms, which includes the element of conscious experience, the person is not so behaving.

A further consideration of how terms such as "desiring" and "thinking" are used in ordinary discourse helps us make the transition to talking about unconscious desiring and thinking. In ordinary discourse, to say that one is desiring or thinking X does not necessarily mean that either content X or the activities of desiring or thinking continually occupy all of one's conscious experience. There is a dispositional element to many such psychological terms, by which I mean that someone consciously desiring X both behaves and is predisposed to behave in certain ways, whether or not, at any given moment, that person is consciously aware of X or of experiencing desire for X. In thinking, similarly, when we focus on a problem, for example, we are not necessarily aware of a continual stream of thoughts or of the uninterrupted experience of thinking.

As is well known, one may arrive at a solution following a period in which one neither consciously experienced any relevant thoughts nor was aware of thinking. As Rubinstein (1977) and, more recently, Dennett (1978) note, during this period we, as persons, did not do anything. Rather, our brains did. I would add that we can get some idea of the structure of these brain events by noting the nature of the solution. In describing the solution and the structure it implies, we often allow ourselves to say that it is *as if* we engaged in conscious thinking of such and such a kind.

The point of all this is that even in ordinary discourse, mental terms such as "desiring" and "thinking" presuppose a more continual neural activity underlying the stochastic and sporadic nature of conscious experience. This observation was made by Freud and was certainly involved in his general conclusion that the major part of mental life goes on without awareness. Now, if the ordinary use of terms such as "desiring" and "thinking" imply neural activity plus a process in which aspects and portions of that activity are represented in conscious experience, it seems reasonable that unconscious desiring and thinking, which by definition do not include the element of conscious experience, would refer to neural activity.

Once having recognized that statements referring to unconscious mental events can be viewed as "as-if" statements that ultimately refer to neural events, a number of questions immediately arise. One basic question is whether the conception of unconscious mental events retains the intentionality (both in

Brentano's [1960] sense and in the ordinary sense of the term) we have in mind when we speak about *mental* events. Let me comment here that philosophers are not necessarily entirely in agreement regarding what is meant by intentionality or the criteria by which a system is judged to be an intentional one. But for our purposes, we can agree that intentionality refers to such conscious properties as having purposes and goals, planning, and thinking. Freud's approach to this issue, which is entirely consistent with Rubinstein's, is that the essence of the mental is somatic (neural) processes. However, Freud (1915b) said, these unconscious mental processes "have abundant points of contact with conscious mental process. …They can be transformed into, or replaced by, conscious mental processes, and all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions and so on, can be applied to them" (p. 168). Hence, Rubinstein (1965) concludes, for Freud, unconscious mental events are neurophysiological events which are classified as mental on the two assumptions

> (a) that observed phenomena resembling the effects of such phenomenal events as wishing, intending, fantasizing, etc., are in fact the effects of these neurophysiological events, and
>
> (b) that the latter are in some ways transferable to the particular neurophysiological events that are correlated with the phenomenal events, the effects of which their effects resemble [p. 43].

Hence, when we say "Unconsciously, Harry wants to do X," although strictly speaking we are referring to a neural event, we generally mean that although Harry does not experience wanting to do X and will deny wanting to do X, he

behaves (here behavior is widely defined to include thoughts, dreams, slips, and symptoms) *as if* he wants to do X. Such talk of unconscious mental events is serviceable and not simply an aberration or anomaly of language, as some philosophers have claimed (e.g., Field, Aveling, & Laird, 1922), because, as Freud noted, these events have points of contact with and are describable in terms of conscious mental processes.

We recognize that we can say little regarding the neural events underlying what we describe in the language of unconscious mental events. What we can do, however, is develop models in a *neutral* language that is compatible with both conscious experience and neurophysiological functioning. As we shall see, Rubinstein attempts to present just such a model. The challenge for any such model is to accomplish the necessary depersonification of ordinary psychoanalytic statements required by a scientific rendering and, at the same time, retain the intentionality contained by the ordinary statements. For example, in an increasingly scientific rendering, a statement such as "Unconsciously, Harry wants to do X" must be depersonified, but in a manner that will not lose the intentionality that the original statement contains and that permits the use of "as-if" descriptions. Any depersonified scheme must reflect, as Rubinstein (1980a) puts it, "not the experience, but what we may regard as the phenomenological structure of wishing" (p. 438).

In a difficult but provocative paper, Rubinstein (1974) has presented a

psychoanalytic theoretical model of mental functioning which, by virtue of being theoretical, is depersonified, but which nevertheless is intended to be consistent with the phenomenological structure of the activities of persons. It is also intended to be consistent with, or at least not contradict, what is known about neurophysiology. The model is presented in terms of classificatory processes and in a neutral language that is neither neurophysiological nor mentalistic.

One of Rubinstein's basic intentions is to construct a model in which the kinds of phenomena that psychoanalysts are interested in, such as motivated behavior and dream symbolism, are generated and elucidated by the *design features* of the system. Think of trying to build a machine that is so designed that it can perceive, recognize, engage in goal-directed behavior, and so on. Such a machine might yield some insight concerning the formal characteristics necessary to do such things as perceive, recognize, and so on. In this regard, Rubinstein's model is in the general tradition of artificial intelligence and computer simulation. Let me briefly describe the outlines of the model in order to give some idea of Rubinstein's attempt to link the psychoanalytic conception of mental functioning to current scientific thinking.

The model is mainly of motivational processes and the related processes involved in motivated activity, including perception, recognition, and imagery. Rubinstein's model of perception is based on the now commonly accepted central idea that perception is not a passive registration of external objects, but an active

processing of input. This active processing is based on a hierarchically organized analysis of features. According to this view (e.g., Neisser, 1967), a percept is the result of an active synthesizing of analyzed features. Thus, the percept *orange* is achieved by synthesizing the features of its size, color, texture, smell, etc. And we recognize an orange by classifying it in accord with these various features. (It can be seen that in this view perception and recognition are closely related processes). Based on the idea of analyzed features, Rubinstein introduces the concept of *object classifier*. A classifier is made up of *subclassifiers*, each subclassifier corresponding to a different attribute or feature of the object. Subclassifiers are general properties or features such as "elongated object," "two syllables," "round," or "begins with the letter s." Hence, it can be seen that most subclassifiers will be common to many different object classifiers. It can also be seen that a percept is "constructed" out of subclassifiers or features, much like the title of a book or play is constructed in a game of charades.

It should be apparent that the notion of a classifier corresponds to the psychoanalytic concept of *object representation*. Obviously, a human object classifier will consist of many subclassifier features, including physical, aesthetic, psychological, and moral attributes. Looking at it this way, one can imagine the possibility that of a total set of subclassifiers that normally combine in a single percept or image, particular subsets can become functionally organized, yielding such representations as "good mother" and "bad mother". As Rubinstein notes, just as there are object classifications, there are also self-classifications, which

probably interact in various ways with self-standards that we set.

Having elucidated the concept of object classifier, Rubinstein then turns to motivational processes and introduces the concepts of *goal-situation classifier* and *fulfillment-situation classifier* (which are combined into *goal-fulfillment- or GF-situation classifiers*) and *goal-act disposition*. A GF-situation classifier can be activated from within, which is analogous to the activation of an object classifier when we think about an object in its absence; from without, as is the case with situations we refer to as temptations; or spontaneously, as in the case of periodic fluctuations of sexual desire. A GF-situation classifier is activated by an existing goal situation much the way an object classifier is activated by the presence of the corresponding object. In both cases, the input is subjected to feature analysis, which then partly determines whether or not the classifier will be activated.

Rubinstein makes the assumption that once activated, a GF-situation classifier remains active at least until the motive is fulfilled. What activates a motive is a *mismatch* between GF-situation classifier and a particular perception of a situation. Normally, a mismatch will result in instrumental activity until *a match* is achieved (which will occur when, during the consummatory act, the situation is classified as a fulfillment situation). However, a *GF-situation fantasy* may be activated, particularly if instrumental action is "judged" not to be feasible. We may note the correspondence between this kind of fantasy and mental imagery (that is not related to a wish) of an object. In the case of mental imagery,

the classifier activates features in the *feature storage* (rather than features of perceptual input); while in fantasy, the GF-situation classifier activates corresponding stored GF-situation features.

It should be noted that in this model, although a goal-situation percept can match a goal-situation classifier, it will *not* match the goal-fulfillment classifier. The latter is activated by the activation of the *goal-act disposition* and the release of the goal act. In ordinary terms, this is tantamount to saying that although one can experience a situation as an appropriate goal for one's motive, one will not experience fulfillment of that motive until the goal act is performed (unless one posits something like hallucinatory wish fulfillment). Such fulfillment is associated with pleasure and with a disintegration of the motive structure and its reversion to a mere disposition. There are motives that do not involve a consummatory act (Rubinstein's example is a motive such as the desire to be understood). In such cases, "fulfillment" of the motive is determined entirely by the goal-situation classifier.

I have given only the briefest sketch of Rubinstein's model and have omitted quite a number of details. We can obtain additional insights into the model by seeing how it accounts for certain phenomena of interest to psychoanalysis. Consider dream symbolism. The basic idea is that goal-situation (and object) classifiers break up into subclassifiers, with one or more operating independently to organize an image. For example, if a penis classifier is part of an active goal-

situation classifier, the subclassifier or feature “elongated object” may operate independently and organize an image of a snake or baseball bat.

How does the model deal with repression? Briefly, certain active goal-and fulfillment-situation classifiers or a particular set of subclassifiers may match a superego classifier (that is, a classification of what must not be done, thought about, felt, etc.), which then prevents awareness of the motive as a motive and also, therefore, of all the subsequent steps that normally accompany awareness of a motive (such as instrumental action).

I want to remind the reader once again of Rubinstein’s intention to construct a model in which the design features of the system can yield and account for the kind of motivational and intentional phenomena that are of greatest interest to psychoanalytic theory. Also to be stressed is that the terms of the model are in a *neutral* language that is neither mentalistic nor physiological but hopefully compatible with both. Finally, it is of utmost importance to Rubinstein that the model be not just verbal description, but falsifiable and discardable if it is not heuristic or is contradicted by the facts.

Returning to the issue of depersonification of explanatory schemes and theoretical models, Rubinstein (1976b) tells us that in talking about unconscious mental events we extend ordinary language applicable to persons or, more specifically, to “a sense-of-being-person-doing something” (p. 245). There is no

harm in this, as long as we know that we are speaking in this "as-if," extended language. Strictly speaking, however, the unobservable and *unexperienced* activities referred to by unconscious mental events "are part of our everyday human world *in name only*" (p. 254). In fact, they refer to the depersonified natural science world of organisms. This fact tends to arouse in many deep-seated fears and suspicions toward a scientific enterprise which, in the process of concerning itself with human behavior, depersonifies it. However, it is important to keep in mind that, as noted earlier, such depersonification need not and must not eliminate such characteristically human features as intentionality (in the general sense of the term). Theoretical models need to describe and explain these features rather than eliminate or ignore them.[6] Having said that, however, it is important to note that theoretical models need not themselves employ the personal language of wants, wishes, and desires.[7] As I have argued elsewhere (Eagle, 1980) although wants, wishes, and desires serve an explanatory function in ordinary discourse, they are themselves phenomena to be explained in a scientific conception of humankind. One would hardly expect a scientific explanation to limit itself to the concepts that describe the very phenomena it aims to explain. This is something of what Rubinstein has in mind when he informs us in a highly condensed fashion that the scientific rendering of "Unconsciouly, Harry wants to do X" will necessarily involve the depersonification of that statement. Perhaps the most condensed description of why this is so is Rubinstein's (1977) reminder that "from a critical point of view it is illusory to

regard a person as the subject-in the sense of being the agent-of an unconscious activity" (p. 13).[8]

Implicit in Rubinstein's insistence that the existential referents for unconscious mental processes are neural events and implicit in Freud's belief that the essence of the mental is somatic processes is the seemingly strange idea that neural events themselves (or rather systems of neural events) possess at least some of the features we normally attribute to and by which we characterize conscious mental processes. I am not at all certain that one can justifiably speak of, let us say, the intelligence of neural events, except perhaps in a metaphorical sense. But, at least in a certain sense, they are intelligent-perhaps in the same sense that computers are intelligent. It has been customary to think of all physical processes as inherently "blind," that is, without intelligence or intentionality, and to locate these latter qualities in the mind and/or the person. However, there are certain perceptual and cognitive phenomena that imply often elegantly intelligent processes which are not and often cannot be represented in conscious experience. I will provide some examples.

Consider as the first example the dichotic listening situation in which subjects are presented with messages simultaneously on two different channels and are instructed to attend to and read aloud a message on one of these channels. Typically, they can report only gross physical features (for example, a male voice) from the unattended channel and cannot report the content. However, Lackner

and Garrett (1973) have shown that messages in the unattended channel influence the particular interpretation given to ambiguous sentences presented in the attended and shadowed channel, even though subjects *could not report* what they heard in the former. As Dennett (1978) notes, "the influence of the unattended channel on the interpretation of the attended signal can be explained only on the hypothesis that the unattended input is processed all the way to a semantic level, even though the subjects have no awareness of this—that is, cannot report it." (p. 211).

As another example, consider an experiment by Lazarus and McCleary (1951) in which subjects are presented a series of words exposed tachistoscopically for a brief duration and are asked to report what they see. When the stimulus word is "raped," many subjects report seeing "rapid." Their galvanic skin response (GSR) measurements, however, are of a magnitude associated with emotionally laden words such as "raped" rather than neutral words such as "rapid." As in the first example, some aspects of the subject's response indicate that the stimulus has been processed accurately, even though the subject is not aware of it and does not report processing the stimulus.

The next two examples are somewhat different from the first two. They focus on phenomena that reflect the problem-solving nature of perceptual processes which are not and cannot be represented in conscious experience. The first example is the well-known Ames room, in which the ceiling and floor are

sloped in a manner unobservable to the viewer. A child standing in the corner of the room where ceiling and floor converge will look markedly taller than an adult standing in a comer where ceiling and floor diverge. This illusion is irresistible and persists even if the onlooker is told how the room is constructed. What is perceived seems based on a tacit inference that someone whose head is very close to the ceiling is obviously taller than someone whose head is not so close. Normally, ceilings and floors are parallel to each other, and this tacit inference or "rule" will be highly accurate and serviceable. In the context of the Ames box, that what is immediately perceived and experienced follows that tacit "rule" rather than what is consciously known. In fact, the immediate experience is, as noted, irresistible and not changed by one's conscious knowledge.

The second example in this area has to do with stroboscopic movement. If, let us say, the image of a triangle flashes at point A and then, after an appropriate interval, at point B, one will experience the triangle moving from A to B. As Rock (1970) notes, this perceptual experience is based on the tacit inference "that if an object is now here in this field and, a moment later, it is not there but elsewhere, then it must have moved" (p. 9). Indeed, Rock reports that the experience of movement can be eliminated "if, simultaneous with the flashing on of B, A reappears in its original location as well; in other words, if you flash A then A-B, then B then A-B and so forth, A need not be 'deduced' to have moved to B if it is still where it was a moment ago" (p. 9). The experience of movement can also be destroyed if a and b appear as two objects being successively uncovered and

covered. As Rock notes, the experience follows the "impeccable logic" that "if the first object is covered over, it has not moved to location but remained where it is" (p. 9). Evidence such as this leads Rock to conclude that "perception turns out to be shot through with intelligence" (p. 10) and to support Helmholtz's (1962) rule that "…objects are always imagined as being present in the field of vision as would have to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous mechanism." (p. 5).

Finally, consider the seemingly simple phenomenon of experiencing vertigo after getting on an escalator that is not moving. One infers that the person experiencing such vertigo had unconsciously "expected" the metal stairs to move. That such unconscious expectations are different from ordinary, conscious expectations is evidenced by the fact that knowing beforehand that the metal stairs are not and will not be moving does not eliminate the vertigo. As Polanyi and Prosch (1975) note with regard to "tacit inferences" in general, such phenomena seem to be relatively immune to adverse evidence. To say that one unconsciously expected the metal stairs to move is, to Rubinstein's way of thinking, an "as-if" use of "expectation," which does no harm and is certainly useful insofar as it is structurally analogous with both conscious experience and the neural events for which it is an approximate description. However, as Rubinstein warns us, to give *existential* implications to unconscious expectations is erroneous. In a certain sense, there is no such thing as an unconscious expectation. It provides only a very approximately and vague linguistic window on

certain neural events that intervene between getting on the stationary metal stairs and experiencing vertigo.

The ontological status of the processes involved in the phenomena described in these examples is difficult to pinpoint. At least since Helmholtz advanced his concept of "unconscious inference," there has been debate regarding the status of such processes. Helmholtz recognized that these processes have a cognitive, inferencelike property and yet are immediate and automatic and are not represented in conscious experience. The term "unconscious inference" was intended to capture both aspects of the process. Helmholtz's concept fell into disrepute, mainly as a result of the criticism that, by definition, inferences could not be unconscious and, therefore, the notion of an *unconscious* inference was an absurdity. However, the phenomena in our examples, attesting as they do to the inferencelike processes involved in perception, have led to a revival of the concept of unconscious inference.

It is instructive in this regard to consider the situation in so-called cognitive science. In that area, descriptions are given of inferred and hypothetical cognitive processes that are neither represented in conscious experience nor tied to specific brain events. Rather, the emphasis is on the *structure* of these cognitive processes. Similarly, one can say of the processes represented by Helmholtz's "unconscious inference" that they are not in conscious experience, nor can one specify the neural events to which they refer. What the concept does, however, is to inform us

that leading up to some perceptual experiences are certain inferencelike processes—that is, they function as if they were making a conscious, logical inference of an if-then kind. Hence, Helmholtz's concept essentially reveals the (inferred) structure of certain processes that, at this point, cannot be further specified. One can interpret them as ontologically neutral. Similarly, Chomsky's (1965) concept of "deep structures" is also a structural description that is neither represented in conscious experience nor tied to specific neural events. It is meant to reveal some important things about the structure of the mind; however, it is embodied. It seems to me that in Rubinstein's way of looking at the concept of unconscious activity, an interpretation cast in the language of unconscious wishes or wants is a structural description that, despite their differences,[9] functions much like Helmholtz's "unconscious inference" and Chomsky's "deep structures."

It says something like: "Your behavior and associations are patterned *as if* you wish or want such and such," much like a statement of unconscious expectations says that one's vertigo is *as if* one expected the escalator to move. Casting statements about unconscious activity in the ordinary language of "narratives" about wishes and wants has the dual advantage of not only being potentially therapeutic, but also permitting one the freedom to describe patterns of behavior with as few constraints as possible. But Rubinstein's conceptualization of unconscious activity makes clear that these "narratives" ultimately have to answer to what is actually the case. That is, they must be consistent with what we know about the structure of neural processes. This single consideration seems to

me to be a sufficient reason that a psychoanalytic theory that makes use of the concept of unconscious activity cannot be entirely construed as a hermeneutic discipline. As Rubinstein (1974) observes, "…no matter how apt an interpretation of a symbol in terms of its meaning, if the processes by which symbol formation is explained are improbable, we have no alternative but to discard the interpretation" (p. 105).

Keeping Rubinstein's clarifying comments regarding unconscious activities in mind, it would seem that the perceptual experiences in our examples are *as if* we were engaging in logical inferences. But such inferences or, more accurately, inferencelike processes, cannot be ascribed to a person insofar as the person is not aware of such activities. Hence, it seems to me that such intelligent, inferencelike processes must be ascribed to neural events and brain processes.[10] To state it generally, intelligence resides in subpersonal neural processes. I do not pretend to be able to explicate this notion much further, except to say that such neural processes must have been selected out in the course of evolution and to point to the work of others who have attempted to develop further this idea of subpersonal intelligence and intentionality (e.g., Dennett, 1969, 1978).[11]

It seems to me that the notion of subpersonal intelligence and intentionality is also implicit in some of Freud's basic formulations. This is seen in a number of ways. The very basic scheme of partitioning the personality into id, ego, and superego can be seen as implying subpersonal intelligence and intentionality.

Strictly speaking, insofar as id, ego, and superego are unconscious processes, they are, ontologically, brain processes ascribable to an organism. However, as we have seen earlier, Freud (1915b) tells us that unconscious mental processes "have abundant points of contact with conscious mental processes" and can be described by the categories applicable to conscious processes. Hence, id, ego, and superego are not simply metaphors of what persons do, as is claimed, for example, by Schafer (1976) in his "action language," but are both (1) labels for particular constellations of neural events and brain processes and, (2) names for classes of wishes and dispositions to behave in certain ways and to have experiences of certain kinds. In other words, as with Rubinstein's classification model discussed earlier, one can think of id, ego, and superego as a *neutral* language description that will ideally capture something of the structure of both neurophysiological functioning on the one hand and behavior and conscious experience on the other.

If unconscious processes are, ontologically speaking, neural in nature and if, as Freud maintained, such processes constitute the basic psychic reality, then the seemingly peculiar conclusion one is led to is that psychic reality is neural! (See Nagel, 1974, for a further elaboration of this argument.) This conclusion is not as peculiar as it may seem. For what else can unconscious activities be but neural events? But they are at the same time mental, insofar as they are characterized by intelligence and intentionality. For Freud, it should be noted, what defined "mental" was not phenomenal experience but what I am referring to here as intelligence and intentionality. For Freud, conscious experience was not the

essence of the mental but only a surface and sporadic representation of an ongoing underlying activity. Hence, when Freud writes that the ultimate and underlying psychic reality is unconscious, he is essentially saying that the underlying psychic reality is neural. Although Freud abandoned his attempt to implement in detail this point of view (in the *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, 1895), this general conception of psychic reality was never abandoned.

A critical question raised by the psychoanalytic conception of unconscious activity is how an unconscious want or idea becomes transformed into a conscious want or idea. If, as Rubinstein maintains, an unconscious want refers essentially a kind of neural activity, how does it ever get represented in conscious experience? This question has always been central to psychoanalysis. How does the unconscious become conscious, and how does it get to be represented in personal experience? I do not pretend to have even the beginnings of an answer to this question. But implicit in psychoanalytic theory and in some current conceptions is the idea that much of our behavior is guided by subpersonal intelligent and intentional processes and that only the products of some of these processes are represented, with varying degrees of distortion, in conscious experience. Conscious experience can be conceptualized as a selective and constructional rendering of products of underlying subpersonal processes. If, as Dennett (1978) suggests, there is a subpersonal system that processes "inner events," it is the products of such processing that are selectively represented in consciousness (just as it is the products of visual processing that are selectively represented in

perceptual visual experience). Surely this is implied by Freud's belief that the major part of mental life goes on outside awareness.

The opportunities for defense and dissimulation arise in the representation and rendering of these subpersonal products. In strictly psychoanalytic language, this would be stated largely in terms of the degree to which conscious experience and the ego accurately represent unconscious instinctual aims.[12] If unconscious aims are only metaphorical descriptions of neural activity, the issue becomes the degree to which conscious experience and the ego accurately represent the subpersonal neural activity we are really referring to when we talk about unconscious aims.

Another issue that has been central to psychoanalysis is the degree to which subpersonal aims are *integrated* into those structures we think of as consciousness and selfhood. Obviously, that which is not represented in these structures cannot be integrated into them. But it is possible for certain subpersonal aims to be represented in but not integrated into consciousness, as in the case of an ego-alien obsessive thought. Indeed, what we mean by a partial failure of repression is that the aim linked to the obsessive thought is rather clearly represented in consciousness, but in an unintegrated, ego-alien state—in contrast to a more complex repression in which the aim is only very indirectly represented or hardly represented at all.

In any case, the point here is that in psychoanalytic theory, a central aspect of personality integrity concerns not only representation but the successful integration of subpersonal tendencies and aims into a superordinate, higher-order structure identified as one's (largely conscious) self. This central idea is conveyed by the dictum "where id was, there shall ego be," which can also be translated as "where the impersonal 'it' was, there shall the personal 'I' be." Although the impersonal "it" has been equated with instinctual aims, it can also be interpreted as referring to all those unconscious subpersonal tendencies that are not but can become part of the "I," the personal self. If, however, the impersonal "it" is essentially neural activity (and it is difficult to see what else it can be), then Freud's dictum is tantamount to the assertion that one can claim or reclaim, so to speak, bits of neurology and transform them into psychology. Or, to put it somewhat differently, the self assimilates bits of the impersonal and transforms as well as integrates them into the personal, thereby expanding the realm and domain of the latter.

No wonder the mind-body issue is at the center of both Rubinstein's writings and of psychoanalytic theory! It may seem less strange to speak of transforming and integrating bits of neurology into psychology if one takes the perspective that every bit of conscious experience represents such a transformation. According to the logic of Freud's conception of psychic activity, every bit of conscious experience entails making the unconscious conscious. What is distinctive about the process when it is discussed in the therapeutic context is that active forces

(i.e., repression) have both rendered certain contents unconscious (hence, the concept of the dynamic unconscious) and interfered with the smooth transformation of unconscious (neural) activity into conscious experience.

The picture of psychoanalysis that emerges from Rubinstein's (as well as Freud's) conception of unconscious mental events is radically different from the current conception of psychoanalysis as hermeneutics and from the current emphasis on "stories," "narratives," and related constructions. As I have already noted, for Rubinstein these "stories" and "narratives" ultimately depend for their validity on confirming through nonclinical means general hypotheses regarding our basic structure. Now, from the point of view of unconscious activity as neural events, to ascribe to the individual unconscious wishes, wants, and so forth is, in an approximate and metaphoric way, to describe the structure of that person's mind, with mind identified as an intentional but nevertheless neural system. Hence, it is not merely a matter of a "story" or "narrative" that makes sense, but of an account that cannot contradict what we do know about the structure of mind in general. In other words, implicit in Rubinstein's view is the idea that psychoanalytic interpretations regarding unconscious mental events, although cast in the ordinary language of desires, wants, and actions, are, in some cases, groping descriptions of brain processes and hence, not only must not contradict what we know about brain processes, but must actually reflect something about the structure of the latter.

The final issues I want to deal with in this discussion of Rubinstein's work emerge from contrasting his formulation with Schafer's (1976) "action language." By referring to all mental events, including unconscious activity, as action, Schafer makes it clear that in his view all the phenomena with which psychoanalysis deals are to be ascribed to the person. Unconscious motives are to be seen as disclaimed actions. One consequence of ascribing unconscious activity to the person (rather than ascribing such activity to the organism) is Schafer's conclusion that we are all responsible for such activity. (Thus, Schafer's cites with approval Freud's [1925] comment that we are responsible for our dreams). Schafer's conclusion does, indeed, logically follow from his premise. For, if unconscious activities are things we do to accomplish particular ends, then they fit the model of action and the practical syllogism that describes action; and, if these activities are actions, we are responsible for them. But Rubinstein's analysis of unconscious activities sensitizes us to such questions as how an activity, the goal or aim of which we are not consciously aware, can be an action. He points out that certain motives, particularly unconscious motives, function more as causes propelling activity than as reasons for action. Schafer does not deal with these issues, but rather attempts to resolve the conceptual difficulties inherent in the notion of unconscious activity merely through the verbal device of labeling such activity "action." As for our responsibility for unconsciously motivated behavior, Rubinstein's analysis suggests that this whole issue represents confusion between different universes of discourse. That is to say, the whole question of responsibility applies to the

everyday world of persons and actions (and the social-legal-ethical contexts it generates), whereas talk about unconscious wants and desires, insofar as it is a metaphoric description of neural activity, belongs to the world of organisms.

There is a good deal of Rubinstein's work that has not been covered here, and what has been discussed has not had the rigor and details that characterizes Rubinstein's own work. That, of course, is inevitable in a chapter of this kind, but I believe that what I have discussed represents some of the more important and central themes of Rubinstein's work.

In summarizing some of the main related themes in Rubinstein's writings, first and foremost is Rubinstein's awareness of the dual perspective one can adopt toward human existence—that is, we are both persons in an everyday human world and organisms in a natural science world. This awareness—which, I believe, is also central to psychoanalytic theory—permeates much of Rubinstein's work. It permits him, for example, to understand the complementarity of meanings and causes rather than pitting one against the other.

A second theme is Rubinstein's relentless quest to understand the *relationship* between the world of persons and the world of organisms and to avoid confusion between the two worlds and contexts. This quest is reflected in his analysis and clarification of psychoanalytic concepts such as unconscious mental events and in his writing on the mind-body problem. It is also reflected in

Rubinstein's attempt to develop a "neutral language" model of mental functioning that will be faithful to the worlds of both persons and organisms.

A third theme in Rubinstein's work is his elucidation of the logic and nature of clinical inference in psychoanalysis. More than any other psychoanalytic theorist, Rubinstein attempts to explicate clearly and, as I described it earlier, "doggedly" the nature of the evidence and inference rules that legitimate clinical inferences. His description of how particular clinical hypotheses are confirmed represents one of the few systematic attempts in this area. Also, his demonstration of the logical dependence of particular clinical formulations on general clinical hypotheses and the dependence of the latter on extraclinical sources of evidence represents the most effective argument against an overly narrow conception of psychoanalysis.

As important as such specific themes and contents, however, is the unrelenting intellectual honesty, clarity, and rigor of Rubinstein's thinking. I hope I have given the reader some idea of these qualities.

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Notes

1) 'Within philosophy, certain formulations concerning the nature of human action and its claimed lack of susceptibility to causal explanation also seem to me to be contemporary expressions of this program (see for example, the work of Abelson, 1977; Louch, 1966; Taylor, 1964). One also sees in Schafer's (1976) work-in the very notion of "action language"-the influence of these philosophers of action on a conception of psychoanalysis.

2) The letters of Rubinstein's passage have been changed to conform to my example.

3) It seems to me that the recent cluster of formulations including the hermeneutic vision of psychoanalysis, the autonomy of the clinical theory, and the exclusive emphasis on the psychoanalytic situation reveals an underlying attitude that implicitly proclaims the autonomy of the mental and that denies our embodied, material nature. This attitude, in part propelled by a reaction against the purported dehumanizing influence of the scientific Weltanschauung, characterizes many recent intellectual developments, particularly in the social sciences. Ironically, although the failure to include and do justice to such essential psychological considerations as subjective experience and intentionality in an explanatory system may be dehumanizing, it is equally dehumanizing, though perhaps in a less obvious way, to fail to include and do justice to our embodied status. We certainly recognize in our clinical thinking that the isolation and separation of mind from body is alienating and dehumanizing. For example,

Winnicottt (1954) points to the role of excessive mentation and the separation of mind from what he refers to as the psycho-soma in schizoid conditions.

4) I am not suggesting, as do some defenders of Freudian instinct theory, that all divergences from and criticisms of that theory are based on a rejection of the biological—of our embodiment. Indeed, some of these criticisms entail an expansion of the instinctual. For example, Bow toy's (1969) rejection of what he calls Freud's "secondary drive" theory of the infant-mother relationship is based on the positing of an independent instinctual attachment system. And Fairbaim's (1952) dictum that "libido" is object seeking" can be construed as positing an inborn response to objects. (See Eagle, 1981, for a further discussion of these ideas.)

5) A disposition to behave (or think or feel) in a particular set of ways can be taken as the manifestation of a neural structure.

6) As Sellars (1963) puts it, "…to complete the scientific image we need to enrich it *not* with more ways of saying what is the case, but with the language of community and individual intentions, so that by construing the actions we intend to do and circumstances in which we intend to do them in scientific terms, we *directly* relate the world as conceived by scientific inquiry to our purposes and make it *our* world and no longer an alien appendage to the world in which we do our living" (p. 40).

7) Indeed, even if such terms are used in a theoretical model, they will have meanings different from the ones they ordinarily have, as Rubinstein has shown is the case with unconscious wants, wishes, and desires. It is also possible, as Chomsky (1965) notes, that in giving a physical, depersonified explanation for such mental phenomena as wants, wishes, and desires "the very concept of "physical explanation' will no doubt be extended to incorporate whatever is discovered in this [mental] domain, exactly as it was extended to accommodate gravitational and electromagnetic force, massless particles, and numerous other entities and processes that would have offended the common sense of earlier generations" (pp. 83-84).

8) That one is not the agent of an unconscious activity or, more accurately, some variation of this insight, is undoubtedly one of the important considerations that lies behind Freud's division of the personality into id and ego. If one goes back to the original German terms this becomes clearer (see Bettelheim, 1982; Brandt, 1966). Thus, *Das Es* or "the it" (rather than the id) obviously represents those aspects of the personality that are not

experienced as agent but rather as impersonal happenings; *Das Ich* or "the I" (rather than the ego) clearly is meant to include those aspects of the personality that one experiences as personal agent. Although the concept of ego came to include more than this-unconscious defensive activities, for example—the fact remains that in Freud's tripartite division of the personality, that which is experienced as personal agent belongs to the ego. Freud's equation of id with instinct and his difficulty in deciding whether it was to be defined psychologically, biologically, or somewhere between the two (see Freud, 1915b, pp. 111-116) reflects the fact that Freud's id-ego division is, in part, body-mind distinction (see Eagle, 1984). As is the case with the concept of unconscious activity, in the concept of id, one is not the subject—in the sense of being the agent—of id strivings. And yet, also as in the case of unconscious activity, id strivings are nevertheless intentional and purposive. Because they are intentional, we want to attribute them to an agent. As Flew (1949) points out, in our habitual style of thinking we are accustomed to identify intentional and purposive with conscious and voluntary, not with unconscious, impersonal, and peremptorily involuntary. We are used to thinking of intentional activity as *doings* carried out by personal agents. However, as Dennett (1978) notes, subpersonal systems can be intentional systems. It seems to me that this point is implied in Freud's attribution of motivational aims to subpersonal structural components of the personality.

9) An essential difference is that whereas unconscious wishes or wants can become conscious, Helmholtz's "unconscious inference" and Chomsky's "deep structures" cannot, almost by definition.

10) It should be clear that not all the implications I draw from Rubinstein's formulations would necessarily be shared by Rubinstein himself.

11) In the examples of perceptual phenomena, a subpersonal system such as the visual system has what Dennett (1978), borrowing from computer language, calls "computational access" to certain stimuli. What the person has access to, continuing with computer language, is some of the computational products of the visual system's processing. The latter are represented in conscious experience, whereas neither the stimuli to which the visual system has "computational access" nor the visual system's processing are so represented. One may also speculate, as Dennett does, that just as the visual system has access to certain stimuli, there is very likely an "affect" system within the person that has access to certain "inner" events (for example, hormonal secretion and hypothalamic stimulation). Continuing with the analogy, just as the products of the processing by the

visual system are consciously experienced percepts, so the products of the hypothetical "affect" system are experienced as wants and desires. Finally, just as the individual "constructs" percepts when the product of visual processing is unclear, so one "constructs" reasons, desires, motives when the product of the "affects" system processing is unclear.

It should be noted that although I mention subpersonal intelligence and intentionality, the problems presented by each are not necessarily equivalent. Thus, the essence of certain machines is that they are intelligent, as the very term "artificial intelligence" indicates.

12) It is interesting and consistent with what I have been proposing that Gedo (1979) states as an important goal of psychoanalytic treatment the raising of biological aims and needs to the level of conscious awareness.

About the Author

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